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FIRST THINGS

J. BUDZISZEWSKI

The Second Tablet Project

ALLEN C. GUELZO

Reparations Then and Now

RONALD J. RYCHLAK

Goldhagen v. Pius XII

JIHAD AND JUST WAR *James Turner Johnson*

THE VERY AMERICAN STANLEY HAUERWAS *Stephen H. Webb*

FILMS OF THE SPIRIT *Austin W. Bramwell*

THE CASE FOR "DISCRIMINATION" *Ronald J. Sider*

ALSO: *Scandal Time (Continued)*

Damon Linker on the Antipolitical Temptation • Charlotte Allen

Philip Gleason • David Martin • Habib C. Malik • John J. Reilly




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
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WEEK I: Oxford: David Payne performs "C.S. Lewis: My Life's Journey"; Dedication and tour of "The Kilns" (C.S. Lewis' home); Music Recital at the Sheldonian Theatre; dramatic rendition of Ecclesiastes.

WEEK II: Cambridge: Service of Evensong at Ely Cathedral; an English Country Dinner and Dance at Chilford Hall; Lamb's Players Theatre presents "The Great Divorce"; punting on the river Cam and much more.

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Editor: *James Nuechterlein*

Associate Editor: *Damon Linker*

Managing Editor: *Alicia Mosier*

Editorial Assistant: *Matthew Rose*

Poetry Editor: *J. Bottum*

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Correspondence

Lutherans and Homosexuality

I am moved to respond to the opinion piece by Professor Robert Benne ("Reinventing Sexual Ethics," March) not only because Prof. Benne refers to me but (more importantly) because he raises some issues concerning homosexuality and the Church that need continuing, reasoned examination on the part of theologians and church leaders. His remarks were directed to developments in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA), but, as he notes, the issues and concerns he raises relate to the whole ecumenical scene.

My belief is that the subject of homosexuality is challenging us to transcend the usual ideological stances we bring to this topic, stances which create a "we versus them" mentality that fails to address the substance of the matter. My discontent with Prof. Benne's analysis is that it reflects too much of this ideological thinking. One sees it in his disparaging description of the ELCA "bureaucracy" and clear hints that the church's leadership is forming a liberal "juggernaut" designed to overwhelm the conservative opposition. These kinds of observations play well with one's ideological soul mates, providing a measure of grim satisfaction and perhaps some condescending amusement in ascribing questionable motives and spiteful intent on the part of the opposition—the "enemy." Unfortunately, this kind of argument helps only in solidifying the lines that divide us rather than inviting the kind of dialogue that is essential if the Church is to genuinely address the issue.

Nor is the subject of homosexuality adequately addressed by claims on the part of conservatives that they are the defenders of Scripture in opposing any change in the Church's historic stance, in contrast to liberals

who are accused of sacrificing the scriptural witness to the shifting views of contemporary experience and the social sciences. Prof. Benne writes that Gilbert Meilaender extracted an admission from me precisely on this point, that I was relying on experience and reason rather than the Bible and the Lutheran Confessions. Actually this way of posing the issue simply muddies the water; it assumes simplistically that homosexuality compels one to opt *either* for Scripture *or* the Church's contemporary experience, when in reality the Church's understanding of Scripture is always an engagement that reflects its ongoing experience. What I was acknowledging to Meilaender was that there is no reason to deny the historical record of the Church's negative assessment of homosexuality, based on its understanding of Scripture *up to the present era*. The point, however, is that we are being driven to reconsideration of the biblical witness on this subject because the Church's contemporary experience is challenging the assumption that we are justified in simply repeating the conclusions from the past.

This is a situation that creates conflict, but the beneficial aspect of that conflict is that it is compelling biblical scholars literally for the first time to give extended attention to those passages that have shaped the Church's stance on homosexuality. Intense exegetical work on these passages has raised all kinds of questions that never occurred to past generations. What was obvious in the past is no longer so obvious in the present, a development that ought not surprise us, given the history of biblical interpretation in conjunction with the changing experience of the Church. It should be patently clear that the significant advances in our understanding of homosexuality are not irrele-

vant to what the Church has traditionally thought the Bible says about it. It would not be the first time that changing circumstances have ushered in a reassessment of what the Bible says on any number of topics. To cite but one example, the scientific shift from geocentric to heliocentric thinking constituted a far more significant and potentially devastating threat to Bible-believing Christians than any changes we might anticipate from a more adequate understanding of homosexuality.

The comment Prof. Benne cites from Wolfhart Pannenberg, that a church's decision to change its stance on homosexuality means that it "would cease to be one, holy, catholic, and apostolic," is little more than a gratuitous assault on the historic meaning of those terms. Pannenberg is claiming that the wrong view on homosexuality constitutes a denial of the Church's very identity, an espousal of heresy that pulls the theological rug out from under the Church. To elevate a particular social issue to that status is highly unusual in itself, though not unheard of. We Lutherans were debating not long ago whether one of the churches in the Lutheran World Federation could maintain its membership as long as it continued a policy of apartheid. Because that policy and the belief underlying it constitute an assault on a particular group of God's children, in effect denying their creation in God's image, it had to be repudiated as a denial of the God we worship. In contrast, the traditional stance of the Church on homosexuality has actually constituted another assault on a group of God's children, not on the grounds of race but of sexual orientation. Certainly one of the more urgent and compelling reasons for changing the Church's stance is a simple desire for justice, to say nothing of a Christian desire to embrace in love those who have been excluded and persecuted over the centuries.

The ideological flavor of Prof. Benne's article is further evidenced

in his evaluation of several publications of the ELCA relating to sexuality. He regards the study material produced by the task force on sexuality, of which he was a member, as being "heavily biased" toward the "revisionist agenda." Upon first reading this material, I remember being impressed with its evenhandedness in stating both pro and con viewpoints. I used the primary document in my Sunday School class as the basis of a six-session course, and the class' general impression was that it was quite impartial.

Prof. Benne's ideological leanings are dramatically evident in his judgment that "the ELCA has more or less followed the culture on issues of abortion, divorce, and the acceptance of premarital sex and cohabitation." The ELCA's major statement on sexuality as revised and published in October 1994 clearly affirms the ideal of abstinence before marriage ("Marriage is the context for mature sexual involvement, prior to which this church affirms and encourages sexual abstinence"), while the abortion statement constitutes an impressive attempt both to affirm a bias on behalf of life and to acknowledge in a fragmented world that abortion may at times become the lesser of two evils. This stance, which pro-life absolutists would reject as inadequate in affirming life, reflects the Lutheran ethos in its willingness to hold opposite viewpoints together in tension and to consider the nuances of each individual case in arriving at an ethical judgment.

I suspect a primary element in Prof. Benne's conservative posture is genuine apprehension over the possible fallout that would ensue should the ELCA and other churches totally dismantle their historic position on homosexuality. He fears a slippery slope effect, describing it in graphic terms in several of his concluding paragraphs. What he envisions—the glorification of gay unions and gay adoptions in church periodicals and Sunday School materials, a growing

gay representation in the pew as well as the pulpit, massive defections by disillusioned families—is, unfortunately, the kind of fear-mongering that is intended to scare the Church away from an honest attempt to grapple with this issue.

Let me suggest an alternative vision. The Church demonstrates an increasing maturity on this subject that serves as a model for the larger society. It does not glorify homosexuality but simply recognizes it, encouraging the small minority of gays and lesbians to live their lives responsibly, authentically, and in peace, as the vast majority devoutly want to do. This would mean the encouragement of stable, legalized partnerships or unions, marked by fidelity and commitment—relationships that are already exemplified in countless instances by both Christians and non-Christians in the gay community.

Paul Jersild

Professor Emeritus of

Theology and Ethics

Lutheran Theological Seminary

Columbia, South Carolina

Like Robert Benne, I deplore the way ELCA revisionists dismiss biblical and confessional arguments against the ordination of clergy who are in same-gender relationships. Although some revisionist intellectuals have attempted to confront such arguments (e.g., L. William Countryman's *Dirt, Greed, and Sex: Sexual Ethics in the New Testament and Their Implications for Today*), most prefer the intellectual brutality of power politics. They assume that they will never convince the hardened hearts of the conservatives, and, whenever they have the majority of votes, they don't bother to try.

On the other hand, I have seen the same refusal to discuss the issues, the same tyranny of the majority arising from mental lassitude and moral cowardice, on the part of ELCA conservatives in a local church that ejected its gay pastor. It should be obvious that if we take too lightly our biblical and confessional heritage, we may

become neither Lutheran nor Christian. It is perhaps less obvious that we can nevertheless sin with the Law. Remember that Jesus flouted the Law as people understood it when he cured a man's congenital blindness on the sabbath (John 9:1-16).

The general refusal of both sides to engage in genuine dialogue (Professor Benne and company excepted) reflects the incivility of the larger society in which this debate is embedded. The rejection of civil dialogue in favor of partisan politics on a host of issues endangers not only the Church. It endangers civil society in general, and American democracy in particular.

John A. H. Futterman
Pleasanton, California

Robert Benne is surely correct that the ELCA's 2001 assembly put a process in motion that "may result in a straightforward decision to ordain gays and lesbians in committed relationships and to bless same-sex unions" at the 2005 ELCA assembly. Indeed, it is almost inevitable.

Professor Benne ponders what those who dissent from such actions will do. He suggests that some will go to Eastern Orthodoxy, some to Rome, and others to conservative Lutheran churches such as the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. No doubt that will happen. He then notes that "perhaps another group will step forward, but that would take leadership that as yet is nowhere in sight." Perhaps not "in sight," but such leadership is already active on the Internet. Yes, there are some of us in the ELCA who are already preparing for a mass exodus out of the ELCA and into a new Lutheran Church that we are terming a "centrist" Lutheran Church—solidly confessional—in between the ELCA on the far left and the Missouri Synod on the far right. We are just beginning to work on a draft of a constitution and bylaws for a new church that would have its constituting convention in the spring of 2006—after the ELCA formalizes sexual revisionism as poli-

cy. Many moderate Missourians may wish to be a part of this new church.

Brad Jenson
Duluth, Minnesota

Robert Benne replies:

Mr. Futterman is certainly accurate in his judgment that those in the majority tend to dominate the opposition with power politics rather than engage in genuine dialogue with them. To my mind the ELCA will not engage in the sort of extended theological dialogue that he commends. But the main cause is not simply the use of raw power politics. The use of power is more subtle. Power is wielded through the quota-ized representation schemes to which the ELCA has been wedded since its inception. The shrewd use of those schemes will prevent a fair, serious, and extended theological conversation.

The composition of the just-appointed task force on sexuality indicates as much. There is not one theological ethicist on the task force who will vigorously represent the orthodox teaching on these matters. But all other interest groups are represented, some of whom interpret theology as a tool of oppression. So the dialogue that Mr. Futterman longs for won't take place there. Rather, it is likely that a tectonic change in the church's teaching on sexual morality will take place after a week-long assembly in which 40 percent of the delegates will be there for the first time. We will be fortunate if the assembly requires a two-thirds majority vote on this momentous issue rather than a simple majority.

Brad Jenson interprets my reference to "a leadership group stepping forward" to mean a group that is ready to form a new church. My reference was rather to a group that might organize widespread resistance to the general direction of the ELCA on sexuality issues. I cannot be enthused about the formation of yet another church, though what he describes is attractive to me. The exo-

dus he talks about will likely be less than "massive" and we will have one more fragmentation of the Lutheran body. It is too soon to give up the ship. Indeed, there is resistance organizing that may awaken a slumbering laity whose voice might be heeded.

Paul Jersild scolds me for being too "ideological" when in fact he is just as ideological as I, if by "ideological" he means partisan. (In his view, my adherence to the Church's traditional stance "assaults" a group of God's children. Is that not an intemperate, ideological allegation?) So let's drop the word "ideological" and call our stances "theological." Professor Jersild is clearly a liberal theologian who is willing to revise a near universal, enduring moral tradition of orthodox Christianity in light of a decade or two of contemporary experience of the Church. I am a conservative or orthodox Lutheran who believes that the dramatic revision of such a tradition needs overwhelming arguments against it. When Prof. Jersild can demonstrate with the certainty of the heliocentric worldview (his example) that homosexual relations are God-pleasing I will change my mind. That sort of scientific precision perhaps asks too much of him, but I will ask revisionists for overwhelming biblical, theological, social-scientific, and experiential arguments—in that order of importance. Nothing like that is in sight.

Prof. Jersild is certainly right that the Church's moral teaching develops in confronting new challenges. But those developments are generally based on the retrieval of some neglected element or theme in the tradition that allows us to reshape contemporary practice. Such is the case with the Church's changing views on slavery, racism, and women's role in the Church. But there seems to be nothing in the Bible or tradition to retrieve in order to revise our normative teaching on homosexual relations. Absent such grounds, "development" turns into "accommodation" or even "capitulation." It should give

Prof. Jersild pause that the only religious bodies to accept the revisionist agenda to date are the Unitarians, the United Church of Christ, and Reform Judaism.

There is surely one point upon which Prof. Jersild and I agree—Christians are obligated to treat homosexual persons with respect and to include them in the life of the Church, just as it includes all sinners. However, rather than change the normative teaching of the Church, as Prof. Jersild recommends, I would argue that the normative teaching is solidly defensible and that the Church's primary challenge is a pastoral one demanding both compassion and ingenuity.

Getting Berlin Right

Although George Weigel makes many fine points concerning virtue and freedom in his essay "A Better Concept of Freedom" (March), his argument is flawed because he conflates two completely distinct areas of human life. I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Weigel that freedom cannot be viewed as a license for mere willfulness. But it does us no better to couch it in terms such as "freedom for excellence." Doing so only confuses the issue.

Freedom, as Isaiah Berlin and others (e.g., Karl Popper) have argued, must be defined negatively in order to preserve it from the tyranny of well-intentioned officials in power. History is littered with bloody examples of the terror that is bred from "positive" conceptions of liberty. The USSR is our most recent and prominent example of this. Virtue, and the cultivation of it, should not be clumsily expressed as "freedom for excellence," but rather should be seen as the effort of the individual with God's grace to strive for what is good. It is a matter that should not, and cannot, fall under the auspices of legal power; it is a matter solely between the individual, his community, and God.

Of course, in a society that formulates freedom negatively, individuals will fall by the wayside and pursue less-than-virtuous ends. People will do that anyway, as history has amply shown, just as it has shown that a misguided idea of "positive" liberty can do far more damage than that of the lone individual obsessed with his willfulness.

Daniel J. Sisti
Cardiff, California

Although his notion of "freedom for excellence" is attractive, George Weigel's essay is likely to mislead readers about Isaiah Berlin's political thought. This is unfortunate, especially because of the historical significance of Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty."

Mr. Weigel writes of "the perversion of liberty that was at the heart of the totalitarian project," but he fails even to sketch how this perversion occurred. He refers to positive freedom as the "freedom to realize some greater good in history." This particular idea may have had currency in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, but positive freedom does not generally have such sinister connotations. As Berlin wrote, the longing to be free in the positive sense must be recognized as a valid universal goal. (See the Introduction to Berlin's *Four Essays on Liberty*, which includes "Two Concepts of Liberty.")

What did Berlin mean by positive freedom? To speak broadly, it means self-governance, an idea (or ideal) that finds expression in both democratic theory (e.g., Rousseau's General Will) and moral philosophy (e.g., Kant's notion of autonomy and the Stoicism of Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius).

Because Mr. Weigel discusses positive liberty only in its perverted form, it is easy for him to dismiss both the negative and positive concepts of freedom as inadequate for our age. But on any fair reading of Berlin's essay, Mr. Weigel's notion of "freedom for excellence" should be seen as another

variant of the positive concept of freedom. Anyone who doubts this should review Berlin's comments about T. H. Green (1836-1882) in "Two Concepts of Liberty." In "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract" (1881), Green wrote: "The ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all the members of human society alike to make the best of themselves." Berlin considered this one of the classic statements in behalf of freedom in the positive sense. Green's statement is also no great distance from the idea of "freedom for excellence."

In my judgment, Mr. Weigel is correct to argue that Berlin's endorsement of the negative concept of freedom—as ultimately more humane or dignified than the positive concept—has contributed to some unexpected (and undesirable) developments. But perhaps because of his desire to offer a third alternative, Mr. Weigel glosses over some key issues. In any event, his essay contains some glaring errors. It is simply wrong, for example, to say that, in Berlin's account, both the positive and the negative concept of freedom are "children of the Enlightenment." And anyone who has ever read "Two Concepts of Liberty" in its entirety will have great difficulty accepting Mr. Weigel's judgment that Berlin's philosophical anthropology was "exceedingly thin."

Since his death in 1997, Berlin's reputation as a scrupulous scholar and original thinker has remained intact. Accordingly, his celebrated essay deserves a closer and more careful analysis.

David L. Tubbs
Natural Law Institute
University of Notre Dame
South Bend, Indiana

George Weigel's article "A Better Concept of Freedom" is interesting and provocative, but contains two important errors of detail. The author repeatedly refers to Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham as "monks." As a medieval historian and an admirer of both medieval monasticism

and scholastic theology, I must object to this unfortunate confusion.

Aquinas was, as Mr. Weigel correctly points out, a Dominican friar. Ockham was a Franciscan, and as such also a friar. Referring to either as a monk is simply wrong. Friars were not and are not monks, nor are monks friars. The orders of friars, beginning with those of Francis and Dominic, were founded as self-consciously different from orders of monks. The most important difference was that friars, or mendicants, begged for a living in some fashion, did not take vows of stability (one of the Benedictine triad of obedience, stability, and conversion of manners), and in various forms eschewed communal property.

To this day, Benedictines (including Cistercians and Camaldolese), Carthusians, and a few other groups prefer to be called monks; Franciscans, Dominicans, some Augustinians, and a few others prefer to be called friars.

Patrick J. Nugent
Director, Center for Quaker
Thought and Practice
Earlham College
Richmond, Indiana

Redeeming Flaubert?

Rodney Delasanta is too quick in his indictment of Gustave Flaubert ("Flaubert and the Sin Against the Holy Ghost," March). At least, I hope this is so; if not, it would be wrong of me to like *Madame Bovary* quite as much as I do. But I think I have more on my side than mere affection: reflection on Aquinas' definition of despair reveals that Delasanta has missed a crucial distinction.

Not every instance of despair constitutes a sin, let alone a sin against the Holy Ghost. I might despair of fixing my bicycle tire, of ever learning to play the piano, or of ever becoming really good at chess. Despair constitutes a sin against the Holy Ghost when it is directly contrary to the theological virtue of hope. According

to Thomas, a man despairs in this way when he no longer believes that union with God is possible for him: "Despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share in God's goodness" (ST II-II 20a3). Just as union with God is the focal point of hope, so it must be the object of true despair. This despair leads to other sins insofar as man, having given up hope for true and divine good, turns to sin: "When hope is given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good works."

Properly speaking, despair presupposes a recognition that friendship with God is a desirable end. For to despair is to cease to believe that God could find one lovable. And no one can despair of something he does not first keenly desire. Ernest Hemingway is supposed to have said, towards the end of his life, that although he still prayed for others, he could no longer pray for himself, because he was too far gone to be saved. If this report is true, Hemingway must have struggled with true despair.

Contrast all this with disillusionment. While despair consists in recognizing the true good as good and ceasing to believe that that good is possible for me, disillusionment consists in the shattering of a worldview, namely, what it is that happens when I realize the way in which I have heretofore viewed the world is altogether inadequate. Suppose I am a Stalinist through and through. I pin all my hopes on Stalin and center my life around the Stalinist party. I live Stalinist ideals, I mouth Stalinist slogans as I go about my daily tasks, and I read Stalinist bedtime stories to my children. Now suppose that in my zeal I actually move to (Stalin-era) Russia, and suppose that having done so I begin to see things differently. I see that instead of peace and harmony my ideal leads to unhappiness, not only in isolated aspects of life, but in virtually all of them. My life suddenly has no center, and, consequently, it has no meaning. I begin to see that the ideal I cherished, the very thing that

motivated my hatred of religion and the bourgeoisie, proved to be a chimera.

To be disillusioned is to discover that an apparent good is not the true good. To despair is to surrender to the belief that what I rightly recognize as the good is beyond my reach. Unlike despair, disillusionment paves the way for conversion and grace. For it is only by casting off illusions that one can come to see the truth. And if the modern world is peculiarly full of false ideals, it is that much more in need of honest men who, unwilling to be pigs satisfied, voice their own disillusionment. It is the disillusioned men, those who have no hope in the merits of their idols, who are particularly ripe for grace, and I think Flaubert was one of them.

I have no doubt that, as Professor Delasanta tells us, Flaubert disliked priests and felt contempt for religion. In fact, I would go even further. Flaubert seems to despise people of quiet virtue who lead good ordinary lives. (Consider his portrait of Charles, the affable and dreadfully proper husband.) But if Flaubert sees himself as Emma, it is not that he sees such lives as good and despairs of being like them. Instead, from the perspective of a romantic, he cannot see how such a life could be attractive. A similar point must be made about Emma's "religion." There is no vice in hating Emma's religion—it is a false and empty thing. Religion is as unsatisfying to the romantic as his many and varied love affairs: all are born in the shallow soil of sentiment and emotion and quickly fade. Yes, Flaubert is cynical about religion and presents it as one more unsatisfying option. And so it is, for the romantic.

In short, if Flaubert were to recognize the religion and virtue of the abbé and Charles, and yet give up any hope of attaining these goods, he would be guilty of despair. But the novel does not indicate any such recognition. Instead, Flaubert shows that one cannot be a romantic and see these goods as good. In fact, he

does even more than this: he shows that one cannot be a romantic at all. We therefore owe Flaubert a debt of gratitude for the honest portrait of his own disillusionment, for we can learn a great deal from it.

Madame Bovary gives us the truth. Not the whole truth, perhaps, but still a necessary part, and a part that Flaubert suffered a great deal to discover. Would it have been a better book if we were offered some words of redemption or hope on the last page, perhaps a nice moral to turn over on our tongues? I doubt it. Flaubert's genius and great creative gift lie in his honesty. He shows us himself at the moment of disillusionment. We should see such a man as one who, rather than having turned resolutely away from God and truth, is peculiarly ripe for the grace of God, because he sees himself clearly.

Angela McKay
University of Notre Dame
South Bend, Indiana

Rodney Delasanta replies:

"Seldom affirm, never deny, always distinguish" was the neo-Thomist mantra of my undergraduate days, so I am obliged to Angela McKay for insisting on the distinction between despair and disillusionment as a way of reading Flaubert. Perhaps she is the better theologian for having made the distinction: *il miglior fabbro*, as Eliot said of Pound.

But, notwithstanding the aptness of the distinction in general, it is still difficult for me to tidy up Flaubert by calling his spiritual spite mere disillusionment, particularly if one "reads" *Madame Bovary* through the lens of *Un Coeur Simple*. (Surprisingly, Ms. McKay ignores my discussion of the latter work in her letter.) I confess that "disillusionment" is not the word that comes to mind when I observe Flaubert deliberately aiming his contempt at the final moment of Christian consciousness: toying with the Eschaton, as it were. Had he felt only disillusionment, his reaction would

more likely have come to him, in one form or another, of "nada," such as it came to Hemingway in "A Clean, Well-Lighted Place." There is no God; any hope of an afterlife is misplaced; only this clean, well-lighted cafe offers a momentary stay against chaos.

But Flaubert wanted to drive the nail deeper. Not only did he substitute Nothing for Something, as many writers since the mid-nineteenth century have done, but he also travestied the very iconography of that Something, by whose grace—for believers at least—theological hope is sustained. Remove the dove, therefore, the sacred icon of the Holy Ghost, and stuff a gigantic hovering parrot into the final conscious moments of Felicité's life. To execrate further, describe the odor of incense from the Corpus Christi censers reaching her dilating nostrils as she expires in parrot hallucination. This is more than disillusionment with institutional religion; it is brilliantly crafted blasphemy directed against the *Spiritus Sanctum*, *Dominum et vivificantem*—the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of Life—and to any who would be so foolish as to find succor in that vain belief.

Other writers have blasphemed, of course. Voltaire probably leads the list with irreverencies directed against biblical figures. James Joyce repeatedly parodies the mass while pronouncing his *non serviam*, and Samuel Beckett targets his own sacral favorites, including the crucified Christ. But I am aware of no other writer who has taken such literary pains to mock Jesus' admonition in Luke 12:10: "But unto him who blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost it shall not be forgiven." Really? Flaubert seems to be saying, as if in answer to a dare, "Just watch me!"

Ms. McKay is right, of course, in pointing out that "not every instance of despair constitutes a sin, let alone a sin against the Holy Ghost." Emma Bovary's adulteries do not constitute such a sin; nor does her refusal to accept the cheap grace of the parish

priest, nor her multitude of other sins. But when Flaubert tells his story in such a way as to cut off every avenue of lesser hope and force Emma into ingesting arsenic, he is reminding us that suicide is *the* sin against the Holy Ghost because it despairs of the mercy of God and rebels against the *vivificantem*, the giver of life, the I AM of Judeo-Christian revelation. Until recent Kevorkian times, Christians would have identified suicide as the one unforgivable sin. Like Shakespeare and every other writer educated in the Christian tradition, Flaubert was quite aware that the Almighty had set his canon 'gainst self-slaughter. What he does in *Madame Bovary* is to defy the canon that shelters hope and in *Un Coeur Simple* to pluck out its very feathers.

The Case Against Anger

Habits acquired in graduate school are hard to break. A few years of term papers, cooked up under pressure of menacing deadlines, and the formula is down pat: state your case and choose weighty authorities to support it.

Damon Linker's piece on "The Uses of Anger" (March) shows that he wrote many a term paper. By marshaling Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Paul, and Christ—may the Prince of Peace forgive him—he deemed his case for anger airtight and printed it. No doubt, he slept better afterwards.

Anger is "in." I drove this morning behind a truck that sported in the back a big sticker proclaiming, next to a picture of the American flag, "Bin Laden Can Kiss My American A**." Crude, perhaps, but genuinely patriotic. And, as for concision, the truck driver wins over Mr. Linker.

As a Catholic, I would point out to both angry men that wrath is a capital sin, called "capital" because it engenders other sins, other vices. I would adduce in support of my case not only the authority of St. John Cassian and St. Gregory the Great, but also

the oceans of pain, fully known to God alone, that the meek have always suffered at the hands of the wrathful.

Maria J. Cirurgião
Endicott, New York

An Ominous Omission?

In his review of *C. S. Lewis Then and Now* by Wesley Kort (March), Alan Jacobs remarks about *The Abolition of Man* that Lewis “ends his book with several pages of quotations from the world’s great religious and moral traditions to show that they all speak with a single voice on key moral issues”—and so I also thought until, on September 12, 2001, I went back and checked. Then I noticed for the first time that there is not a single quotation there from the Qur’an. Is this void to be explained by the limits Lewis confesses (“The following illustrations of the Natural Law are collected from such sources as come readily to the hand of one who is not a professional historian”)? Or was it intended to tell us something?

Brian Barbour
Professor of English
Providence College
Providence, Rhode Island

Curious Sentences

Thomas Stransky’s review of Bernard Wasserstein’s book *Divided Jerusalem* (March) contains some curious sentences: “Jerusalem today includes the Old City and East Jerusalem, formerly held by Jordan and annexed by Israel in 1967.” “Held by Jordan” but “annexed by Israel.” Jordan took “hold” of it in 1948 in a war intended to obliterate the newborn Jewish state and which did completely ethnically cleanse the Old City of its Jewish population. And “. . . Al-Haram al-Sharif (The Noble Sanctuary), which the Jews call the Temple Mount.” It seems that to Stransky it is the Haram al-Sharif but the Jews call it the Temple Mount. Might not it be more historically accurate to say that it is the Temple Mount, and the mosque complex

is built on it? Perhaps we should be grateful that the reviewer’s bias is so clearly signaled.

Peter Borregard
Berkeley, California

Orthodoxy and Rome

In Richard John Neuhaus’ comments on Eastern Orthodoxy (“Orthodoxy and ‘Parallel Monologues,’” Public Square, March) I miss, as almost invariably in such discussions, the most fundamental stumbling block to Orthodox-Roman relations, which is the radical transformation of the liturgy of the Latin Church after the Second Vatican Council. The bitter struggles over the liturgy that continue today are largely internecine, and so a crucial historical fact is overlooked: that the reforms of the Pauline missal aligned the Roman Mass in stylistic terms (note that I am careful not to say doctrinal terms) definitively towards the ideology of Protestant communities, with whom the Catholic Church does not share the apostolic succession, and against the heritage of the East, with which it does.

The famous “Ottaviani Intervention,” which criticized elements of the new missal before its publication, addressed the issue head-on in a section titled “The Alienation of the Orthodox”: “The Apostolic Constitution makes explicit reference to a wealth of piety and teaching in the ‘Novus Ordo’ borrowed from Eastern Churches. The result—utterly remote from and even opposed to the inspiration of the oriental liturgies—can only repel the faithful of the Eastern rites. . . . Against this, the ‘Novus Ordo’ would appear to have been deliberately shorn of everything which in the liturgy of Rome came close to those of the East.” This is a very canny historical observation on the medieval Gallican additions to the Roman rite, generally thought by scholars to be of Eastern origin, and marked out by the Concilium for ruthless elimination in the reforms.

Cardinal Ottaviani does indeed appear to have been a kind of liturgical Cassandra. One reads, for example, on the website of the Orthodox Diocese of Berkeley the following in a review of a book on Dom Prosper Gueranger and his work at Solesmes: “Unfortunately [the book] completely prescind[s] from any consideration of the fact that the great work of Solesmes and the liturgical movement it led has come totally to ruin in the era of Vatican II. What many Eastern Orthodox hoped would be a permanent reorientation of the Catholic world towards the patristic and iconographic traditions that define the lineaments of Orthodoxy Herself has been subverted by the very forces of liberalism and relativism against which Solesmes established itself as a bastion of pure faith and good taste.”

Father Neuhaus hopes for a revival of “an authentically traditional ecclesiology” that will bring East and West together. It will take more than that. Father Bob, together with his altar girls, his harem of eucharistic ministers, and his repertoire of Pelagian hymnody, represents the real, and so far as I can see, insurmountable contemporary barrier to any significant improvement in relations.

David P. Kubiak
Professor of Classics
Wabash College
Crawfordsville, Indiana

I thought that Richard John Neuhaus’ analysis on the state of Orthodoxy was overly pessimistic. I am a Roman Catholic priest currently enrolled in a Master’s program at St. Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary. In my experience there I have never felt any rejection due to my being non-Orthodox. All of the students and professors I have had contact with have been most welcoming and seem to have a genuine desire that our churches may one day overcome their differences. In my contacts with the future clergy of the OCA I have hope that we are not entering an ecumenical winter.

On a more pragmatic note, I think that we cannot expect to overcome nearly a millennium of separation in the short period of time that has passed since the Second Vatican Council. Any eventual reunion must be based on true love for Christ and not on any sentimental feelings of the goodness of fellowship.

(The Rev.) Neil Xavier O'Donoghue
Our Lady Queen of Peace
Catholic Church
Maywood, New Jersey

RJN replies:

On the last point Father O'Donoghue and I are agreed. As to the pessimism, I was but reporting on the overview offered by John Erikson, Dean of St. Vladimir's, and what he said is, I would suggest, not pessimistic but bracingly straightforward.

Worse than Imprudent

One wonders what curious logic may

have informed Richard John Neuhaus' assertion in the March "While We're At It" that George Bush's August 9, 2001 decision to fund research on certain stem-cell lines was "morally defensible but gravely imprudent."

The heart of this question has been and always will be whether or not it is moral to treat human beings as mere means; the morality of any related question regarding consequent loss of life is wholly subsidiary. Erudite discussion of President Bush's complicity in the murder of these innocents, whether formally or materially, is, therefore, at best, marginally relevant and hopelessly abstract. It is sufficient to locate the immorality of the Bush decision in the undeniable fact that it set in motion a series of events that ultimately will result in making tools of these littlest of children. It is said by some, sadly even by some Catholic ethicists, that no moral principle is violated here, that as dead stem-cells,

there is no reality worth the name to abuse. Apart from its suitability as an apologetic for those harvesting the organs of executed Chinese criminals, such thinking ignores Catholic teaching on the Eschaton and its assertion that although unspecified, at least some relation between the person and materiality survives the grave.

So it is hardly some protocol that Bush has failed to observe with this decision, or some unfortunate precedent-setting that we'll all live to regret, although regret it we will. Rather, he has done something quite epochal here: he has made possible for the first time government support for research that relies on the destruction of defenseless human life, something he specifically promised not to do when campaigning for office, and he has disgraced himself and the people of the United States in the bargain.

John H. Lowell
Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio

Shipwreck

Like the weary sailor, the refugee
from wreck and storm, who escapes half-dead,
and then, in terror, shudders with dread
at the very mention of the name of the "sea";
who swears he'll never sail again, who raves
he'll stay home, even on the calmest days,
but then, in time, forgets his fearful ways,
and seeks, again, his fortune above the waves;
I, too, have barely escaped the storms that revolve
around you, my love, traveling far away,
vowing to avoid another catastrophe,
but I can't; the thought of you breaks my resolve,
and so, I return to where, on that fateful day,
I nearly drowned in your tempestuous sea.

Luis de Camões (1524/25-1580)

Translated from the Portuguese by William Baer

THIS TIME

The Antipolitical Temptation

Damon Linker

Nothing is more human than discontent with the human condition. And few aspects of human life inspire more discontent than politics. The longing to withdraw from, escape, or transcend the vicissitudes of political life in favor of a more perfect world permeates Western culture from ancient times to our own, though the responses to it have taken many forms. For Plato, the philosophical life enables a man to leave behind the imperfections of politics—with its harsh necessities, imperatives of self-defense, worldly ambition, violence, and craving for power—to pursue the higher justice supposedly embodied in rational reflection. Similarly, the Stoics believed that heroic acts of virtue could protect the virtuous man from the nastiness that so often prevails in political life. Others, by contrast, have denied the possibility of transcendence altogether. For these Epicureans, sophists, and skeptics, our only option is reconciliation to worldly limitations.

Things are different still for believing Jews and Christians, who offer yet another interpretation of human discontent. On the one hand, the world is a “vale of tears.” On the other, there is a promise of redemption from, and even the redemption of, the world by a Messiah who will “wipe away every tear” from our eyes. Transcendence, then, is possible, but it awaits us in a future we lack the power to make present. The Judeo-Christian tradition thus synthesizes apocalyptic yearning with stark realism about the obstacles to its satisfaction. If recurring Gnostic and messianic heresies testify to the precariousness of this synthesis, its relative stability and persistence over the millennia demonstrates, equally well, its remarkable resilience.

Not that the Judeo-Christian interpretation hasn’t faced its share of hostile challenges over the centuries. Among the most potent was the one launched by the mad sophists of the modern age—those radicals who promised, at long last, to make us at home in the world, not by reconciling us to its imperfections, as their ancient counterparts had proposed to do, but by transforming the world into a post-political paradise. In the act of total revolution we would, in the words of Karl Marx, purge ourselves of “all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew.” Whatever else

might await us after the deluge, Marx made it abundantly clear that he expected his new world to be one in which “public power” had lost its “political character,” by which he meant the “organized power” of “oppression.” In the cataclysm of revolutionary violence, we would learn to wipe away our own tears, once and for all.

With the demise of communism as a viable antipolitical option, it sometimes seems that such eschatological hopes have been rejected by almost everyone. Yet the antipolitical temptation hasn’t disappeared. On the contrary, it has metastasized. The relentless drive to negate our political natures through revolutionary destruction has been displaced by the quieter, but far more widespread, call to redeem the world in slow motion, using the powers of supranational organizations and institutions. Ours is an age of antipolitical humanitarianism.

Some humanitarian organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have undoubtedly done good over the years, drawing needed attention to startling abuses of power in renegade regimes from Asia to the Americas. But more often than not, they have acted as gadflies on the backs of the world’s merely imperfect governments no less than its truly sinister ones. In the name of an abstract and otherworldly “humanity,” they claim the moral high ground by virtue of their lack of attachment to any actual human community. From this enlightened perspective, they then pronounce virtually all military actions, regardless of what provoked them and no matter their ultimate aims, to be “humanitarian disasters.” Thus do they reduce morals to the counting of corpses. It is precisely this kind of logic that leads to such trouble for Israel in the “international community,” where the fact that more Palestinians than Israelis have died in the past eighteen months has come to be seen as definitive proof that the latter are guilty of everything from recklessness to genocide.

But such reasoning is morally obtuse. As military historian Victor Davis Hanson has noted, “Hitler, Tojo, Kim Il Sung, and Ho Chi Minh . . . all lost more soldiers—and civilians—in their wars against us than we did.” And yet no one with a functioning sense of moral proportion believes that this fact implies their ethical superiority to us. Likewise, the Palestinians “suffer more casualties than Israelis not because . . . they are somehow more moral—but because they are not as adept in fighting real soldiers in the full-fledged war that is growing out of their own intifada.” Looking down on the conflict from the transpolitical stratosphere staked out by humanitarian organizations, the motives, causes, and methods of warfare might appear

to be irrelevant compared to brute quantities of human suffering. But for those concerned with rendering nuanced and informed—that is to say, accurate—moral judgments, considerations beyond mere numbers will always be at least as important.

As disconcerting as the influence of the non-governmental human rights establishment might be, it possesses little power to do real harm, beyond influencing public opinion within free societies. Much more troubling are the supranational antipolitical institutions that now aspire to police the world, doling out punishment to moral transgressors. The UN has a long history of such pretensions, but its well-known incapacity to enforce its resolutions has rendered it largely impotent. Things might very well be different, however, with the International Criminal Court (ICC), which on April 11 was empowered, on a permanent basis and over strenuous American objections, to try individuals—including sitting heads-of-state—for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

While the ICC's mandate might sound innocuous and even admirable—after all, whose heart bleeds for Slobodan Milosevic, currently on trial as a war criminal at an ad hoc Balkans tribunal?—many of those behind the Court are motivated by a far more ambitious agenda. As the Cato Institute's Gary Dempsey has pointed out, some have advocated amendments to the Court that would empower it to prosecute environmental crimes, cyber-crimes, and drug trafficking, while others have gone even further, to propose the criminalization of "aggression" as such. This ominously vague and open-ended crime could include "the bombardment of the armed forces of a state against the territory of another state" and "the blockade of the ports or coasts of a state by the armed forces of another state."

The problems with such proposals are legion. If enacted and enforced, they would make military deterrence impossible, and preemptive actions, such as the blockade President Kennedy employed as a tactic

during the Cuban Missile Crisis, illegal. They would treat all hostility between nations as unambiguously evil, despite the fact that, for all the pain they cause, wars are sometimes required by justice itself. Then there is the fact that, like so many UN programs, the ICC will almost certainly become a tool of Third World thugocracies. Lastly, and most absurdly, in order to put these or any other proposals into effect, the Court will have to rely on the use, or at least the threat of the use, of force. Which is, of course, precisely the political power it would deny to those over whom it presides.

Some of the ICC's more sympathetic critics have warned of the danger of allowing it to become "politicized." But that's not the half of it. Such a Court cannot help but be, in its essence, a political institution. "Humanity" might be a useful transpolitical ideal, but as soon as it is transformed into an actually existing institution, it becomes, like all things concretely human, something partial, something partisan, something political.

But we were political animals already. Just as communism was supposed to redeem us from politics and wound up producing an unprecedentedly vicious form of political tyranny, so today's prophets of global humanitarianism would trick us into believing that we can bureaucratize our way out of the human condition. And once again the results are liable to be pernicious. Superimposing a second layer of political institutions—run by lawyers and judges from Nowhere—onto those we already have will not save us from ourselves, like positive and negative integers canceling each other out, leaving behind only the equilibrium of universal peace and brotherhood. It will, more likely, increase our attachment to the ways of the City of Man, as well as enslave us to the rule of moralizing "experts" operating at multiple removes from popular accountability. This side of the Eschaton, there'll be no crawling out of our political skins. ^[F1]

Opinion

Jihad and Just War

James Turner Johnson

In February 1998, long before the September 11 terrorist attacks on America, Osama bin Laden and four other leaders of radical Islamist groups in various countries issued a fatwa, or religious ruling, calling for jihad against “the crusader-Zionist alliance” in the following language:

In compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem] and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of the lands of Islam. . . . This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.”

While more examples of bin Laden’s thinking emerged after the September 11 attacks, this fatwa stands as a fundamental statement of his rationale for a campaign of violence against America and the West: an appeal to the Islamic tradition of defensive jihad by which every Muslim is obligated, as an individual duty, to take up arms against invaders. It lays out the justification not only for the attacks of September 11 but also for other terrorist attacks linked to bin Laden’s al-Qaeda group, notably, the bombings of the two American embassies in East Africa and of the U.S.S. *Cole*. It also provides a warrant for future attacks by “every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it”—in short, for a continuing war by terrorist and other means by Muslims against “Americans and their allies,” an ongoing clash of civilizations. How should this call be understood in relation to the Islamic tradition? And how does it compare to the just war tradition of Western culture?

The classical Islamic conception of jihad in the sense of warfare comes not from the Qur’an directly, where the term jihad is used to refer to the believer’s inner

struggle for righteousness, but from the jurists of the early Abbasid period (the late eighth and early ninth centuries A.D.), who developed it in the context of a general effort to clarify the nature of the Islamic community, the proper leadership of that community, and the community’s relations with the non-Islamic world. Central to this conception was a legal division of the world into two realms: the *dar al-Islam* or abode of Islam, and the remainder of the world, defined as the *dar al-harb* or abode of war.

The *dar al-Islam*, as the jurists understood it, had existed since its creation by the Prophet Muhammad himself, who had been its first head. It is a community at once religious and political, and thus its ruler, like the Prophet, was understood to be supreme in both spheres. There could be at any time only one right ruler, understood to be the successor of the Prophet and inheritor of his authority. Because of its character—its essential unity, its rule by a successor of the Prophet, its governance according to divinely given law—the *dar al-Islam* is fundamentally different from the rest of the world, which is torn by perpetual conflict and is a constant threat to the peace of the *dar al-Islam*. A general, lasting, universal peace is impossible until the *dar al-harb* is no more, when the whole world has become the *dar al-Islam*, a place within which submission (*islam*) to God is the law of the land. Until then war between the two realms is the normal state. Yet at the same time extended periods of peace are possible by means of treaties between the *dar al-Islam* and non-Islamic societies.

This conception formed the background for the jurists’ conception of the idea of jihad as warfare. As they described it, this warfare could take two forms: that of the *dar al-Islam* as a body under the authority of its legitimate ruler, the caliph for the Sunni tradition, the imam for the Shiite—a conception that encompassed offensive war against the general threat and organized collective defense against attack—and an emergency form of defensive jihad against a direct attack on the *dar al-Islam* by a force from some part of the *dar al-harb*. In the former case the duty to take part in jihad was conceived as a collective one, with some Muslims fighting and others playing other roles, including simply going about their normal lives; in the latter case, though, to fight was an individual duty, incumbent on all Muslims who were able to do so in the immediate area of the aggression.

These were significantly different forms of warfare. The collective jihad was a thoroughly rule-governed activity, from the requirement of the caliph/imam’s authority to that of a declaration of hos-

ilities and a call for peace to a form of combatant-non-combatant distinction to extensive discussion of the disposition of spoils by the ruling authority. The jurists clearly understood this as the norm for the warfare of the *dar al-Islam*. This form of jihad drew upon the religious unity of the Islamic community even as it depended on the social and institutional relationships that comprised the Islamic state; the proper exercise of jihad on this model strengthened the *dar al-Islam* and the role of its ruler both religiously and politically.

The jihad of emergency defense was another matter entirely. It assumed an acute emergency in which normal religiously and socially prescribed relationships and structures were erased. The model the jurists had in mind was simple: a direct attack across the border of the *dar al-Islam* by a force from the *dar al-harb* in some particular place remote from the *dar al-Islam*'s center of authority and power. Against this attack Muslims in the area were to rise up in arms, on their own authority, as a kind of *levée en masse*. The individual duty to take up arms crossed and eliminated all the usual divisions: not only healthy men of fighting age but women, children, the aged, and the infirm were to fight to the limit of their ability to do so. Correspondingly, the rules of collective jihad did not apply: the enemy was the invading army, so noncombatants were not present and thus played no part in the conflict. While the jurists admitted this form of jihad in time of dire emergency caused by overt aggression, there was an inherent tension between it and the collective jihad of the *dar al-Islam* under the authority of the caliph/imam. In practical terms, local leaders on the frontiers might (and did) use the excuse of the jihad of emergency to challenge the legitimacy of the central authority. However, this form of jihad was originally meant to be an exceptional response to an exceptional circumstance, not the norm for Muslim warfare.

It is generally agreed within Islam that jihad of the first sort is impossible today, as there is no central caliph or imam. This gives new importance to what was originally considered to be an exceptional case: the idea of jihad as an individual duty in the face of external aggression. In the Islamic mainstream this conception has developed along lines compatible with international law to allow Muslim heads of state to organize and execute defense collectively, though on the juristic model they do so on the basis of the individual responsibility of all their people to respond to aggression. The historical model for such action is the medieval hero Saladin, who though only a regional commander (not the caliph) organized and led a successful defense against the armies of the second Crusade. In theory, this mainstream conception of defense respects the patterns of relationships within the society as well as the limits to be observed in fighting, the most important of

which are understood to come from the Prophet Muhammad himself.

However, the last hundred years or so have seen the development of another line of interpretation of jihad. First appearing in North Africa as an ideology for resistance against colonialism, by 1960 it was being used as a justification for terrorist attacks against Israel, and in the 1970s and 1980s it was adapted to justify armed struggle by terror and assassination in such states as Iran, Egypt, and Algeria against rulers who were nominally Muslim but were judged to be tools of the West. It is out of this tradition that bin Laden's fatwa has emerged.

This radical form of jihad makes several critical assumptions not found in the traditional conception or in the mainstream theory. First, the *dar al-Islam* is conceived as any territory whose population is mainly Muslim and which was once part of the historical *dar al-Islam*. By this reasoning any non-Islamic state existing within the territory of the historical *dar al-Islam*, as well as all non-Islamic presence within that space, must be resisted and subdued or eliminated. Further, the "aggressors" are deemed to be all those who support such states or non-Islamic presence, so that the usual lines of distinction between combatants and noncombatants are erased, with the result that all individuals are considered acceptable targets. Further, because of its origins in an "emergency," there are no limits on means in this struggle. Finally, all Muslims are faced with the duty to take part in this struggle, so that it ultimately becomes one involving individuals rather than politically organized communities; anyone who accepts this duty—men of fighting age, women, children, or the aged or infirm—becomes a combatant in the war.

This extreme interpretation of the idea of defensive jihad implicitly rejects much of the actual history of Muslim societies and the Muslim faith. It leaves scant room for toleration of "people of the book," as prescribed in the Qur'an, because it treats the simple presence of Christians and Jews in dominantly Muslim societies as an act of aggression. It also leaves no room for differences of interpretation as to what Islam requires; its reading of Islamic law is narrow and unyielding on doctrine and behavior alike. Social developments identified with modernity are rejected as un-Islamic, even if large numbers of Muslims have accepted them without losing their faith.

Bin Laden's fatwa reflects all these assumptions. The United States is deemed an aggressor against all Islam because of the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that they are there by agreement, and despite the fact that their purpose is to protect Saudi Arabia, not to dominate it. Likewise, the "protracted

blockade" against Iraq is viewed as an assault on the Iraqi people, despite the fact that Saddam Hussein's diversion of resources for his own purposes is the real cause of their suffering. The same could be said of bin Laden's hostility to U.S. support for "the Jews' petty state" and "its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims." In other words, the United States has become the embodiment of the *dar al-harb*, engaged in aggression against Islam, despite the fact that millions of Muslims live and enjoy freedom of religion within its borders. But bin Laden's fatwa takes the radical line of jihad to new extremes when it calls for any and all Muslims to kill any and all Americans—"civilians and military" alike—"in any country in which it is possible to do it." No longer a defensive war, this is jihad on the offensive.

Bin Laden and his associates in the fatwa of course lack the religiously mandated authority to wage such war, as they do not bear the mantle of succession to the Prophet. That is why they try to describe the war against America as a defensive one. By painting the entire nation of America as guilty of "aggression," the fatwa can set aside the limits imposed on warfare by normative Islamic tradition, which includes no direct, intended killing of noncombatants and no use of fire, which is prohibited among Muslims because it is the weapon God will use in the last days. Bin Laden's jihad not only pits Islam against America, the West as a whole, and ultimately the rest of the non-Islamic world; it also seeks to overthrow the contemporary Muslim states and mainstream views of Islamic tradition among the great majority of contemporary Muslims.

To be sure, the early Abbasid jurists also thought the relation of the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds to be one of inherent conflict, and their notion of the collective warfare aimed at ensuring the eventual submission of the entire world to God reflected this. Yet they never defined this eschatological goal as one that could be achieved only by war or even primarily by war. And in the absence of any universal Muslim ruler bearing the mantle of authority of the Prophet, Muslim tradition and Muslim life have found ways of pursuing this goal by other, nonmilitary means. The radical ideology of jihad changes this, making the use of violent means, indiscriminately and without principled limits, a binding obligation for all Muslims.

While the idea of just war is deeply rooted in Western culture, it is perhaps more strongly institutionalized today in international law, in American military doctrine and practice, and even in political culture than at any time since the age of Vitoria. Though the just war tradition has important Christian roots, it differs from the Islamic juristic tradition in that it can be employed without explicitly religious premises. Similarly, in Western political thought and theology more gen-

erally, the nature of the political community, the role of government, and the use of armed force are conceived in secular rather than religious terms. All these features differentiate just war tradition from the juristic tradition of jihad by the *dar al-Islam* on the authority of the caliph/imam.

Yet there are also significant points of contact, which reveal important common interests. I have already suggested this by noting that mainstream Islamic thought and political practice have developed in a way compatible with international law and orderly, peaceful interaction with non-Muslim nations. More specifically, both traditions link the right to use armed force to the exercise of legitimate governing authority for the protection and common good of the governed community. That common good, moreover, is defined normatively in terms of high ideals of value and behavior, not in terms of repression and intolerance. Both traditions recognize that even the use of force justified in this way is not without limits when it comes to the question of who may be targeted and the means that may be used against aggressors. These are all matters on which there can and should be a pursuit of common cause. The radical doctrine of jihad advanced as the justification for contemporary terrorism is a challenge to both of these traditions, and people of good will from both communities have reason to reject it.

JAMES TURNER JOHNSON is Professor of Religion at Rutgers University.

The Very American Stanley Hauerwas

Stephen H. Webb

David Tracy was my advisor at the University of Chicago Divinity School at the time he was developing the idea of the analogical imagination. The way he wove together all aspects of religious thought into an intricate fabric inspired me, even though my evangelical Protestant instincts kept me from embracing it entirely. Perhaps I was intimidated to find that Tracy had managed to weave even my own dialectical predilections into his multicolored coat, making my theology look patched and worn by comparison. I kept

looking for a loose thread to pull, but Tracy had managed to tie his arguments too neatly together.

Nobody read Barth much at Chicago in those days, but what I needed was an American version of Barth's thundering voice. Barth, of course, was more than a loose thread; he threatened to rip the garment of modern theology into shreds. An American Barth, however, would say "No!" to secular liberalism not from the vantage point of the utter transcendence of God but from the more modest perspective of a Church out of sync with the world, unable and unwilling to do for modern culture what that culture could not do for itself.

Stanley Hauerwas was that voice, although it took me years until I could hear him. Now I wonder how I could have kept from hearing him all along. Many theologians do not have much of a voice in their texts; you have to hear them speak in person to get a sense of who they are. They do not write like they speak, or, if they do, it is because they speak like they write—in a formal, analytical, and dry style. Hauerwas is an exception to this general rule: you don't have to meet Stanley to know him. And for many people, reading him is as close as they ever want to get.

Like all voices that are distinctive and sharp, his can be irritating and annoying. It can also be very appropriate. I teach at a secular institution, and my colleagues really cannot imagine that their liberal assumptions are capable of being challenged. Hauerwas has helped me to be more confident in articulating my differences from them. I should also note that Hauerwas is not just a polemicist. More than any theologian I know, he not only defends the importance of friendship for theological conversation but also practices what he preaches. He promptly answers his mail with long letters, generously giving his time to friends and strangers alike.

While he writes too much, Hauerwas can still be as surprising as he is predictable. He always seems to be trying to get the words right in order to say the one thing that is necessary to be said, and yet he never quite says it. This is due in part to his insistence on the irreducibility of the particular, which leads him to be more contextual than systematic. Indeed, much of the power of his prose comes from his cleverly constructed mistrust of the very rationality that he so beautifully showcases.

Hauerwas speaks from the whirlwind of hyperbole—the trope of prophets—and his rhetoric is as intentional as Barth's. As Flannery O'Connor once said, "When you are talking to the hard of hearing, sometimes you have to shout." Hauerwas' hyperbole, however, has a more clipped and sarcastic bite than Barth's Teutonic proclamations. If Barth threw a bomb into the playground of liberal theologians, Hauerwas, in his shadow, keeps throwing firecrackers to keep liberals on their toes.

Understandably, his liberal victims never seem to appreciate his provocations, but they could do a better job of reading him. They take him both too seriously and not seriously enough. They take him literally, and thus they are outraged by his jibes and generalizations. Readers who think his criticisms are indiscriminate forget that liberalism is such a pervasive phenomenon that even the wildest of swings is bound to hit its target. But if his critics would acknowledge the rhetorical construction of his work, they could better understand how Hauerwas has already anticipated their reactions. Asking Hauerwas to modify his critique of liberalism is like asking Jim Carrey to tone down his facial tics. A Hauerwas essay without antiliberal jeremiads might count as more nuanced and careful scholarship, but it would not sound a thing like Stanley Hauerwas—and it would be a lot less fun to read.

Over the years I have become convinced that Hauerwas is right more often than he is wrong, but it is the way in which he is wrong that makes him so interesting. His hyperboles can let evangelicals off the hook from thinking about the critical issues liberal academics raise, and they can soothe the consciences of academics (like me) who are alienated from their liberal colleagues. Hyperbole is a seductive trope. It is so excessive that you can think you have done what it demands just by speaking it. But saying something does not make it so. Indeed, Hauerwas is so persuasive that his theology sounds too good to be true. That's because it is. Such rhetoric sounds good to those of us who believe that the Church has lost much of its integrity in the modern world. Precisely because it is so pleasing to the quasi-evangelical ear, this rhetoric can become a substitute for thinking through the hard decisions that the modern world forces upon Christians. It is easy to see the world through Hauerwas' eyes while forgetting the fact that he describes a Church that does not exist and a world whose existence cannot be so easily denied.

Perhaps the key to the reception of his work is his anti-Americanism. Hauerwas has given rise to a whole generation of theologians who make quick work of consumerism, patriotism, nationalism, and popular culture. Some of his students have told me that they are so alienated from American politics that they no longer vote. Nevertheless, his critique of all things American is what makes Hauerwas look more at home with liberals than conservatives. By continuously thumping on that theme, he is able to gain a larger academic audience than would ever listen to a more traditionally evangelical theologian. Indeed, without his constant critique of everything American, he would be in danger of looking like just another evangelical theologian.

Hauerwas thus pushes the intellectual elite to take traditional theological claims seriously while at the same

time assuring them that many of their left-leaning cultural and political assumptions will remain untroubled. Can you really enter theology from the right and exit at the left? That trick seems less plausible in the light of September 11. Hauerwas recently has spoken about how isolated he feels in sticking to his pacifism during the war on terrorism. During this time of crisis, his barbed rhetoric seems less helpful. Now it does not seem so wise to work so hard to isolate Christianity from America—and the West. Modernity, after all, is the bastard child of Christianity, and Christians still have some parental responsibilities. This is a time for a more prudent rhetoric about America's moral and political responsibilities in a world divided by poverty and hatred.

Hauerwas' recently published Gifford Lectures, *With the Grain of the Universe* (an odd title for someone who goes so much against the grain), can be read as a response to critics who think he is too reckless in his scholarship. It is also a response to those who clamor for a masterwork. *With the Grain* fails to live up to this expectation, however, because it swings too hard from polemic to commentary. Note, for example, the long and involved footnotes, which in many cases take up more of the page than the primary text. Like all great hyperbolists, Hauerwas' best work is occasional; the prophetic pace of his prose makes him a sprinter, not a long distance runner.

The book is a lesson in Hauerwas' reading habits rather than an addition to his constructive theology. His meticulous commentary on William James, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Karl Barth barely masks his anxiety about who has influenced whom. He protests the most against the very theologians with whom he shares more than he is willing to admit. For example, he blames James for pushing theology down the slippery slope of subjectivity, but Hauerwas too has a pragmatic criterion of truth. Hauerwas extends, rather than reverses, James by making the community, not the individual, the justification of Christian convictions. For example, Hauerwas often argues that you have to be a pacifist in order to understand the Bible. Scripture, then, does not have any inherent meaning. Texts belong to communities, which suggests that their interpretation is determined by the practices of the community that reads them. In making this argument, Hauerwas tries to combine the post-modern hermeneutics of Stanley Fish ("Is there a text in this class?") with the biblical realism of John Howard Yoder, a precarious synthesis at best.

Hauerwas next turns to Niebuhr, who is the real villain of his book, just as Barth is its hero. Hauerwas has to rebuff Niebuhr for the same reason that Niebuhr so often put down Barth—both are gaining distance on theologians to whom they are closer than they would like to be. This might seem like a surprising claim, but

the parallels between Hauerwas and Niebuhr are abundant. Both are ethicists concerned with social questions, rather than systematic or dogmatic topics. Both wrote quickly and boldly for a broad audience, without always playing by the academic rules of the game. Both polemicize against liberalism, and neither does exegetical theology. Both are obsessed with America (even if one thought that America was a nation with the soul of a church and the other thinks that America is soulless). More substantially, Niebuhr did for anthropology, the popular doctrine of his day, what Hauerwas has done for ecclesiology, the doctrine of today. Indeed, Niebuhr doesn't really develop a full portrait of Christianity, leaving out the doctrine of the Trinity and ecclesiology, for example, while Hauerwas too has not shown much interest in a more systematic presentation of Christian dogma, writing very little, for example, about liturgy and Christology.

Just as Niebuhr made it safe for atheists to use Christian rhetoric without actually going to church, Hauerwas has taught evangelicals how to employ a hermeneutics of suspicion and critique without accepting the values of the secular academy. Evangelicals-for-Hauerwas are able to shun liberalism while still staking a claim for membership in that most liberal of institutions, the academy. Hauerwas has also made it possible for mainline Christians to sound as angry and alienated as evangelicals or fundamentalists without actually having to inhabit those particular subcultures. In fact, there seem to be two groups of readers that Hauerwas attracts: evangelicals who want to engage with secular culture more critically, and mainline Christians who want to position themselves outside of secular culture without having to become evangelical.

Moreover, just as Hauerwas thinks that Niebuhr secretly legitimates the coercive features of liberal democracies, Hauerwas himself is often accused of encouraging the more conservative elements of the Christian churches. Niebuhr is no more liberal than Hauerwas is conservative. Yet when Niebuhr criticizes the optimism of liberalism or when Hauerwas criticizes the nationalism of conservatism, each thinker ends up being much more implicated in the assumptions of his opponents than he would like to admit. There is no doubt that Niebuhr was a kind of optimist. He thought Christianity could be cleaned up and made presentable to modern liberals. And Hauerwas is a kind of conservative who thinks the Christian Church can stand against decadent secular culture by providing an alternative to liberal forms of socialization. Niebuhr never sheds his optimism or his belief that American democracy is the best, even though limited, vehicle for the achievement of the Kingdom of God. Likewise, something of the American exceptionalism that Hauerwas so vehement-

ly rejects comes back to haunt his ecclesiology, wherein the Church becomes an entity set apart from all other institutions and lacking any obligation to enter into reciprocal relationships out of fear that that would compromise or imperil its moral superiority.

Both Niebuhr and Hauerwas demonstrate to what extent theology is a rhetorical art, a matter of persuading the faithful to rethink the historical and critical context of their commitments. When Hauerwas writes that "the truth of Christian convictions requires a recovery of the confident use of Christian speech about God," he could be describing Niebuhr's project as well. One way of thinking about their differences is to look at their rhetorical strategies, rather than their theological conflict. Niebuhr is in debt to the figurative power of irony as much as Hauerwas is to hyperbole. Indeed, Hauerwas is typically American in his insistence that Christian theology be translated into American politics in direct and aggressive form, without much reflection on the various ways in which democratic structures mediate moral action. For Hauerwas, the Church is not a merely passive sign of God's grace, but an active body that accomplishes God's will. Hauerwas is missing an ironic sensibility that understands how our best intentions often end up subverting the good we hope to achieve, and how, therefore, even prophetic utterances should normally result in reform, rather than revolution.

In sum, Hauerwas' utopian view of the Church as self-sufficient and antimodern needs a little Niebuhrian realism. Hauerwas has been very harsh in criticizing Niebuhr's famous use of the phrase "impossible possibility," but the language of impossibility is becoming popular in the academy today, thanks to its use by Derrida and negative theologians. Such language is helpful precisely because it reminds us not to take our hyperboles too literally. Americans, as Tocqueville noted long ago, do not trust thinking that does not lead immediately to some kind of action. We are stirred by extravagant rhetoric, and we like to think we can remake the world in the image of our words. We are an impatient people, and we like results. Hauerwas praises the virtue of patience in his work, but he is also drawn to the grand gesture of sacrificial witness and the hope that, even at this late hour, America can still be redeemed by the morally pure. In a word, he wants pacifism to pay. Irony is missing from Hauerwas precisely because, in spite of his many protestations, he is so perfectly American.

STEPHEN H. WEBB is Associate Professor of Religion at Wabash College. His most recent books include *Good Eating: Diet, the Bible, and the Proper Love of Animals* and *Taking Religion to School: Christian Theology and Secular Education*, both published by Brazos Press.

Films of the Spirit

Austin W. Bramwell

It is a truth seldom acknowledged that the most delightful art is also the most didactic. Jane Austen comes readily to mind, as does the best of children's literature. Supposed counterexamples only prove the rule. Oscar Wilde is celebrated for his dictum that "bad art is always sincere," but he is in fact one of the most sincere of writers in the sense that in all his works virtue triumphs and vice is defeated. That few of his admirers today realize this is a testament to Wilde's skill, for so pleasing is his wit that he can lead even the most unwilling reader to accept, even if only unwittingly, a moral truth. Wilde and Austen, to use a phrase that sounds almost paradoxical to modern ears, are delightful moralizers.

In this sense at least, Whit Stillman, writer and director of a charming trilogy of films—*Metropolitan*, *The Last Days of Disco*, and *Barcelona*—is an Oscar Wilde for twenty-first century America. Stillman's task is more difficult than Wilde's, for as Mark C. Henrie writes in *Doomed Bourgeois in Love*, a recent collection of thoughtful essays on Stillman's work, Stillman's audience—"the sophisticated frequenters of art house cinemas"—prizes subversiveness above all else. To slip old-fashioned moral lessons right in front of their very eyes is a remarkable feat.

As if that were not enough, Stillman's delightful moralizing is also—unlike Wilde's or even Austen's—specifically Christian. His films attempt the seemingly impossible: to vindicate the very worldview most readily derided by his audience. To say that Stillman is a moralizer is not to detract from the fact that his films are extremely fun to watch, containing dialogue that rivals the best of Noel Coward. The fun, however, is inextricably linked to the lessons imparted, for Stillman's work is designed to both please and instruct. One often wonders while watching Stillman, "Can he really get away with saying that?" In *Metropolitan*, for example, one almost Burkean character, after lamenting the passing of such traditions as the detachable collar, opines that "our generation is the most barbaric since the Protestant Reformation," thus managing in one sentence to call into question not only sixties-era cultural upheaval but also all the revolutions and emancipations of the past five centuries. Such views in any other context would not be taken as credible contributions to intelligent discussion, but rather dismissed as those of a crank.

The argument that Stillman's films are Christian is not based merely on their religious trappings. To be sure, they are unmistakable: *Metropolitan*, Stillman's first film, begins with Martin Luther's "A Mighty Fortress is Our

God," while *The Last Days of Disco*, Stillman's most recent, ends with "Amazing Grace." One character in *Metropolitan* provides an experiential argument for the existence of God, another in *Barcelona* prays for his cousin's revival from a coma, and another in *The Last Days of Disco* is relieved from depression by a penitential hymn. Cathedral bells ring in the distance in all three films.

Nor is the argument based on the fact that each film upholds Christian virtues, although this is equally apparent. The chastity of Audrey Rouget in *Metropolitan* sets up the film's climactic scene; the hope of Ted Boynton in *Barcelona* is rewarded when, after earnest and persistent prayer, his cousin Fred awakes from a coma; and the forgiveness of Josh in *The Last Days of Disco* toward his more cunning rival Des results in his winning the girl in the end. All three films also depict such quaint virtues as modesty, chivalry, and honesty.

What most contributes to the Christian character of Stillman's films is the barely perceptible but, in the final analysis, unmistakable role that a specifically Christian God plays in all three. Typically, Stillman introduces the theme through disarmingly clever dialogue. Take the following exchange in *Metropolitan* as an example:

CHARLIE: Of course there's a God! When you think to yourself—and most of our waking life is taken up thinking to ourselves—you must have that feeling that your thoughts aren't entirely wasted, that in some sense they are being heard. I think this sensation of being silently listened to with total comprehension represents our innate belief in a supreme being, some all-comprehending intelligence. At some point most of us lose that, after which it can only be regained by a conscious act of faith.

CYNTHIA: And you've experienced that?

CHARLIE: No, I haven't. But I hope to someday.

This first piece of extended dialogue in the Stillman trilogy introduces the class with which it is preoccupied: educated, articulate, self-conscious, and fretful offspring of wealthy urban families. It also, however, introduces the religious conceptions that form the very theme of Stillman's work. As we shall see, Charlie's argument is only half right.

Few commentators on Stillman's films agree on whether Stillman really means to defend such much-maligned subjects as the bourgeoisie, disco, and Protestantism. Stillman himself evidently relishes the confusion he has created on this score; in *The Last Days of Disco*, one character delivers an ornate and impassioned

paeon to—of all things—disco music, while church bells peal in the background. Such ironic praise almost caricatures Stillman's love of redeeming the irredeemable.

The same sort of confusion exists with regard to the religion of Stillman's characters. Mainline Protestantism has been derided as philistine by the left and flaccid by the right, while liberals of the "vital center" these days no longer seem to have any use for it. Yet Stillman's characters still cling to the religion they have inherited, despite their awareness of seemingly more compelling alternatives. Never are the religious foibles of Stillman's characters so endearing as when in *Barcelona* Ted Boynton clandestinely seeks business and romantic advice in Proverbs while dancing to the tunes of Glenn Miller. After unexpectedly barging in on him with an alluring Spanish girl on his arm, Ted's cousin Fred asks "What's this? Some strange Glenn-Miller-based religious ceremony?" "No," replies Ted, "Presbyterianism," thereby causing the Spanish girl to wonder aloud, "Is this what Presbyterian churches look like?" The amusing and not altogether incorrect response is that Presbyterian churches do indeed look just like someone's living room. Her question might as well have been: "Is this where you Americans find religious comfort?" In comparison to the transcendent Roman Catholicism of Spain's past, and the brooding Marxism of Spain's present, Ted's Protestantism seems like the last place where one would look for answers.

Yet Stillman's characters nevertheless *do* find answers there. Ted's prayers that his cousin will recover from his coma are indeed answered—a point so obvious that sophisticated audiences easily miss it. Similarly, in *The Last Days of Disco*, we learn that shy and unsteady Josh had suffered a manic episode during which one of his favorite Episcopal hymns had become, in his words, a kind of mantra:

*Dear Lord and Father of Mankind, forgive our foolish ways!
Reclothe us in our rightful mind, in purer lives thy service find,
In deeper reverence, praise.*

While courting Alice, the object of his affection, Josh sings this hymn to her as they are walking through Central Park. By doing so, he is revealing and making himself vulnerable to Alice; he is also, however, offering a covert prayer. Throughout the film, Alice has made a number of romantic missteps, mistaking her lack of sexual experience as a drawback, dating the unfaithful Des, and trying to win over the environmental lawyer Tom by suppressing her most attractive qualities. Josh's hymn is thus a plea that Alice might recognize that despite his flaws his love for Alice is made of purer alloy

than that of her other suitors. In the end (although not at first), Josh's prayer is answered, just as Ted's prayer was in *Barcelona*.

With such strange juxtapositions, one wonders whether Stillman is trying to vindicate mainline Protestantism or cynically to make fun of it. Protestant pieties seem to be either a sign of mental imbalance as in Josh or lack of sophistication as in Ted, but nonetheless seem to work. The answer to this puzzle is found in those pieties themselves: American Protestantism, since the days of the Puritans, has been preoccupied with grace and redemption. Uncoincidentally, if one can extract one consistent theme from the Stillman trilogy, it is redemption through grace—redemption, that is, that comes not as a result of his characters' meritorious effort but of their missteps and apparent misfortune. Thus, Fred in *Barcelona* can win over his true love only after having been shot in the eye and even temporarily forgetting who she is; Alice in *The Last Days of Disco* is able to make the right romantic choice only because she listens to the advice of her most treacherous friend; Tom in *Metropolitan* realizes that he loves Audrey only after he has successfully wooed his longtime infatuation.

The theme of redemption through grace, moreover, explains why Stillman devotes his attention to subjects that for so long have been found unattractive. His films are not valiant defenses of all things now discredited, but neither do they deride them with the sort of ironic detachment has become so *en vogue*. Rather, Stillman's films simply show how good can come from the most unlikely sources. Thus, disco may have been superficial and narcissistic, but it also returned conversation, dancing, and formal dress to popular music. Americans abroad may be simpletons, but they are more honest and willing to stand up for the right than their European counterparts. Debutante balls may exist only for the privileged, but they also encourage good manners and liberal education (rather than the narrow philistinism found among the upper crust in popular movies such as *Titanic*). Lastly and most importantly, American Protestantism may not be rich in mystery or philosophical insight, but it is a religion of simple truths and simple faith.

Faith, indeed, is always rewarded in Stillman's films. Audrey in *Metropolitan*, Ted in *Barcelona*, and Josh in *The Last Days of Disco* all possess an unselfish love that is at first rebuffed but eventually rewarded. Other characters—Tom in *Metropolitan*, Fred in *Barcelona*, and Alice in *The Last Days of Disco*—love badly at first and consequently cannot achieve happiness until they overcome their own egotism. Redemption through grace is thus for Stillman not the severe Calvinist dogma that redemption can come only to the radically undeserving, but rather the warmer and more humane teaching

that it always comes in unexpected ways. There is another Christian term for this: Providence. Charlie in *Metropolitan* is right that God is always listening and watching, but he is wrong that we must consciously recover His presence; on the contrary, He makes Himself present to us if we are prepared to receive Him.

Stillman the director brings out this theme just as skillfully as does Stillman the screenwriter. In *Metropolitan*, a sorrowful Audrey walks down Park Avenue, as the lit windows of the Pan Am building form a cross above her. Here, in one picture, is the whole of Stillman's religious sensibility: as Audrey suffers, Providence looks over her, shining forth in the most unlikely of places—a stark, post-Bauhaus, commercial office building. As the rest of the films show, Providence looks over her not merely in symbol but in fact.

Stillman has thus revived not only the tradition of the delightful moralizer, but another just as great—that of the Christian allegorist. Three generations ago, the members of a famous British cénacle expounded in their various works their shared sense of the romance and adventure of Christian faith. Like C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, and Dorothy Sayers, Whit Stillman advances an aesthetic vision that cannot help but appeal to a certain repressed yearning in all but the most Laodicean viewer. In the very act of enjoying his films, Stillman's audience confirms the superiority of the Christian worldview.

AUSTIN W. BRAMWELL is a student at Harvard Law School. His articles have appeared in the *Weekly Standard*, *Intercollegiate Review*, and the *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy*.

The Case for “Discrimination”

Ronald J. Sider

I'm a long-time Democrat. In 1972, I organized a group called “Evangelicals for McGovern/Shriver” and helped McGovern sweep—well, the great state of Massachusetts.

As a Democrat, I have been deeply dismayed by how out of touch with the American mainstream the party has proven to be on the issue of faith-based initiatives, particularly on the issue of the so-called hiring exemption. (For a discussion of other aspects of the initiative, see Joseph Loconte, “Keeping the Faith,” FT, May.)

A vast majority of Americans believe that as a society we have lost our moral moorings and that we must reaffirm the role of religious faith in nurturing persons of integrity and fostering a just, stable society. It is in that context that we must evaluate the Democratic leadership's opposition to allowing faith-based organizations that accept government funds to show preference in hiring to those who embrace the organization's basic religious beliefs and practices. Democratic President Bill Clinton signed three Charitable Choice bills that explicitly included this hiring exemption. Presidential candidate Al Gore embraced Charitable Choice. But when the Bush Administration's legislation expanding Charitable Choice moved to the Senate in mid-2001, the Democratic leadership blocked even the consideration of such legislation—largely on the charge that the hiring exemption amounted to employment discrimination.

In other words, the Democratic leadership has come to believe that religious organizations must give up their long-recognized right to hire staff who share their faith commitments in order to receive federal money that provides needed services to the public. In this, the Democrats are wrong.

To begin with, a religious organization's decision to hire staff who share its religious beliefs and practices is not an example of intolerant discrimination, but rather a positive act of freedom. In a free society, a wide variety of organizations—environmental organizations, feminist groups, unions—are left free to select staff who share their core commitments and who agree with their agenda. This right does not disappear if governments choose to request these private organizations to perform some desired tasks. Planned Parenthood, for example, does not lose its right not to hire pro-life staff simply because it has a government contract. It is precisely the denial of this right to religious organizations that would amount to intolerant discrimination instead of the promotion of a free and open society.

To equate this positive good with the evil of discrimination on the basis of things like race or disability is pure confusion. Whether we think that religion is a medieval superstition or a true and good contributor to social well-being, all who believe in religious freedom should insist that religious organizations be permitted to hire staff who share their religious beliefs.

The obvious fact is that the ability to choose staff who share a religious organization's core beliefs is essential if that organization wishes to retain its basic identity. As Justice William Brennan wrote in *Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos* (1987): "Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization's religious mission and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them is . . . a means by which a reli-

gious community defines itself." A Jewish organization forced to hire substantial numbers of Baptist staffers, for example, will not long remain a significantly Jewish organization.

Having staff who share a religious organization's essential religious beliefs shapes the group's identity in a variety of ways. Shared motivation, common values, a sense of community and unity of purpose, shared experiences of prayer and worship (even if they are outside work time in the organization) all contribute to an esprit de corps and shared organizational vision. As law professor Ira C. Lupu said in testimony before a House subcommittee (June 7, 2001), "The sense of religious community and spirit on which [the] success of the group's efforts depend" may be hampered if it is forced to hire those who do not share its beliefs.

This is important even when, for example, a faith-centered organization chooses to separate by location or time (and fund with private money) sectarian worship, instruction, and proselytization in a program in order to receive direct government grants. This is true for several reasons.

First of all, religious activities may be important to the social service program, even though they are voluntary, privately funded, and segregated from "secular" government-funded activities. In such programs, holding certain religious beliefs and practices is a legitimate qualification for a staff position, equally as valid as having the right skills and experience.

Second, enforced religious diversity can have the effect of stifling religious expression of staff within the agency, creating a climate of fear of offending other staff members with religious speech or actions. Since personal faith is very important to many who choose to work in a religious organization, such a climate can diminish staff motivation and effectiveness. Forced religious diversity can sap a program's spiritual vitality and lead to its secularization.

Third, staff often play multiple roles in small organizations. For example, an agency might seek someone to work part-time as a youth minister and part-time as a social worker for its youth mentoring program. Implementing a policy in which religion could be considered as a factor in hiring for some job duties but not others would lead to unnecessarily complicated and impermissibly entangling regulations.

But even leaving aside the effects of such regulation on religious organizations themselves, the rationale behind it makes little sense. The fact that a religious organization accepts some federal funds does not mean that it ceases to be an independent, autonomous entity and becomes an arm or agent of the state. Law, precedent, and common sense all argue that a private organization that accepts some government funds still retains

its separate identity. This is clearly the case with colleges and universities that receive government funding, scholars engaged in federally subsidized research, and artists and artistic organizations funded by the National Endowment for the Arts. All of these receive government funding, and all maintain their autonomy from the government. Similarly, a religious organization that receives government funds to provide a public service that serves a public good would maintain its autonomy and not be co-opted by government.

Moreover, not only does allowing hiring preferences based on religious belief within religious organizations pose no social danger, it is the only way to avoid discrimination and governmental preference of one religious view over another. Using the typology of different types of faith-based organizations recently published by the Working Group on Human Needs and Faith-Based and Community Initiatives chaired by former Democratic Senator Harris Wofford helps explain this point.

"Faith-saturated" and "faith-centered" programs both include substantial religious content in their programs and hire (primarily or exclusively) employees who share their beliefs—precisely because their religious beliefs tell them that persons are spiritual as well as material beings and therefore the best results follow when spiritual and material transformation are combined. "Faith-related," "faith-background," and "secular" providers do not include significant religious content in their program or consider religious belief in their staffing because their worldview tells them that all that is needed to correct dysfunctional social behavior and social problems is socio-economic, material transformation. All these providers, not just the first two, are grounded in an explicit or implicit religious perspective. Secular providers work at least implicitly within a naturalistic worldview (nothing exists except the natural world) that functions in effect as a religious perspective. Functionally, faith-related and faith-background providers operate with deistic religious beliefs (God exists but never intervenes in the natural world of cause and effect). Naturalism and deism, however, are just as much particular religious worldviews as the historic theism that undergirds most faith-saturated and faith-centered programs.

Obviously, if government only funds some private providers of services (i.e., the naturalistic and deistic ones that do not explicitly use religious criteria for staff), government clearly discriminates among religions.

Thus far, I have argued that as a matter of principle religious freedom is such a fundamental right that it ought to prevail even if on occasion embracing that overriding principle has the secondary effect of, for example, reducing the number of job opportunities for a particular group. For example, the Catholic Church

must, as a matter of principle, be free to live out its religious belief (which I do not share) that only men should be priests, even if the practice has the effect of reducing the number of job possibilities for women.

My last point offers an argument, not about principle, but about practical effect. The recent suggestion that extending the hiring exemption to faith-based organizations (FBOs) would in practice mean that African-Americans or gay Americans would suffer a loss of job opportunities is simply wrong.

There is a certain tension between two treasured values: on the one hand, protecting the religious freedom and identity of FBOs as they expand their effective services to the most needy; on the other, our society's conviction that except in the case of a narrow range of specific situations, employers should not discriminate on the basis of religion.

But do such hiring preferences really result in job deprivation? Hardly at all.

First, we are talking about a small percentage of the total jobs in the society. Second, many FBOs pay almost no attention to the religious beliefs of staff. Third, in the case of those evangelical Christian, Orthodox Jewish, and Muslim FBOs that do, virtually all the different religious groups have their own FBOs offering a hiring preference to people who share their own beliefs.

For very understandable historical reasons, African-Americans have been concerned that racial discrimination might find cover under the hiring exemption based on religious belief. This is extremely unlikely to happen. FBOs working in minority communities are run either by people of the same racial group or by whites who have been at the forefront of fighting racial prejudice.

What about sexual orientation? Few FBOs ask about or select staff on the basis of sexual orientation. It is true that a number of FBOs do say that staff should not be sexually active outside marriage. But is that really so terrible—especially for FBOs working to overcome poverty in a society where a child growing up in a single-parent household is eleven times more likely to be persistently poor than a child growing up in a two-parent family?

Even if the hiring exemption in Charitable Choice were expanded to a lot more government funding streams, sexually (and openly) active gay Americans would face extremely little job deprivation. The number in that group is very small and the number of jobs affected is a minuscule fraction of the total number of jobs. Gay FBOs exist and others can be formed that give a hiring preference to those who share that ethical/religious belief. Surely the well-educated gay community does not want to block an enormously promising way to overcome poverty and social decay for millions of desperate Americans to avoid what in practice would at worst mean only the loss of a handful of possible jobs.

Constitutionally, Charitable Choice strikes the right balance between the no-establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment. Morally, it offers promise for major progress in overcoming some of our most intractable social problems. Politically, Charitable Choice and the broader Faith-Based Initiatives have rightly become identified with the widespread sense that we have lost our way morally as a society. By remaining steadfastly opposed to allowing religious organizations to contribute to solving social problems,

the Democrats harm our country as well as their future electoral prospects. Only at great peril dare Democrats be on the wrong side of today's widespread embrace of religious faith's crucial contribution to social wholeness. If that happens, they will deserve a repetition of 1972.

RONALD J. SIDER is *President of Evangelicals for Social Action and Professor of Theology and Culture at Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.*

Sin

Happy is he whose only problem worth
complaining about is love's audacious schemes,
since they alone can never destroy his dreams
of finding some contentment here on earth.
Happy is he who, far from home, embraces,
sadly, only his fondest memories
because, despite his isolation, he sees
and clearly comprehends the sorrow he faces.
Happy is he who lives in *any* state
where only fraud and love's deceits and doubt
are able to torture his heart from within.
But tragic is he who lives beneath the weight
of some unforgivable act, living without
consciousness of the damage of his sin.

Luís de Camões (1524/25-1580)

Translated from the Portuguese by William Baer

The Second Tablet Project

J. Budziszewski

According to the mainstream of the natural law tradition, the reality of God and of our duty to Him are among the things everyone really knows. They are part of “general” revelation; we have natural knowledge not only of the Second Tablet of the Decalogue, but of the First. Needless to say, some people find this claim scandalous. They deny the natural knowledge of God, deny the natural knowledge of the First Tablet of the Decalogue, and deny the natural knowledge of the first precept of the Summary of the Law. Apart from direct or “special” revelation, they think ethics should acknowledge neighbor only. Passions run high among such thinkers. A book reviewer angrily declares that “God does not belong” in discussions of how to live. A scholar of my acquaintance devotes the last phase of his intellectual career to what he calls “pushing God out of the natural law”—or at least, he says, “into the wings.” This goal is widely shared. Insofar as it wishes to get by on the Second Tablet without the First, we might call it the Second Tablet Project.

The Second Tablet Project is probably more popular among lukewarm religious believers who wish to make the moral law palatable to nonbelievers than it is among nonbelievers themselves. Nonbelievers who want to get rid of the First Tablet usually have doubts about the Second too—and for the same reasons. God, they think, is a dubious proposition, but why should morality be less dubious than He? Aren’t both matters equally dim? As to the notion of “things we can’t not know,” they do not believe that there are any—we have only a grab bag of incompatible opinions about God and how to live, all of them equally controversial because none of them can be known to be true. Under the circumstances, they

think, the only sensible thing to do is to eject the whole lot of these opinions from the public square. This is the mentality that finds it scandalous to post the Ten Commandments on a courtroom wall. The argument seems to be, “Because we don’t agree with each other, you must do as I say”—for if anyone should protest, “But your opinion that these norms are *not* common knowledge is far more controversial than the norms themselves,” they respond, “See what I mean?” Or perhaps, like John Rawls, they respond that *their* opinion should have special privileges because it is “political, not metaphysical.” Here the argument seems to be, “The ultimate truth of things is unknowable, and *that’s* why you must do as I say.” Of course, any view of what is knowable or unknowable presupposes something about what is, so that is another sleight of hand.

For those who do believe in natural law or general revelation, the fact that the Second Tablet Project so often turns into a No Tablet project raises an important question. What difference does it make to the knowledge of the moral law that we do have some knowledge about God? If we didn’t have that knowledge, then could we retain knowledge of morality? And if we could retain it, would it be different?

The inquiry requires two parts, because there are two ways to know about God: the vague, partial, natural knowledge of God that is available to every human being, and the additional knowledge of God that is offered (for those who accept it) in the biblical tradition of direct revelation. Though my emphasis is on the first way, I will comment on the second as well. To be sure, the Bible is not included in the things one can’t not know. But every perspective for discussing what we can’t not know is *some* perspective for discussing what we can’t not know, and my perspective is biblical.

By the first way to know about God I mean the *sensus divinitatis*, the spontaneous awareness of the reality of

J. BUDZISZEWSKI is Associate Professor of Government and Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. His newest book, *The Beginning of Wisdom*, will be released this fall by Spence Publishing.

the Creator. I do not exclude the clarity that philosophy can add to this awareness; I only wish to point out that the philosophical arguments for the existence of God do not start from nowhere. However complex they may be, they merely elaborate pre-philosophical intuitions, such as the everyday idea that anything which does not *have to be* requires a cause. “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is a question that anyone can ask.

As to the second way of knowing about God—the biblical tradition of direct revelation—I use the qualifier “biblical” advisedly. Other religions have traditions too, but traditions of direct revelation are quite rare. Every major religion that claims to record God’s direct revelations to human beings in actual historical time accepts at least part of the Bible; this includes Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. No major religion outside of the biblical orbit claims to record God’s direct revelations to human beings in actual historical time.

Part one of the inquiry, then, is this: Apart from any consideration of an alleged direct revelation, what difference does it make to the natural law that we *naturally* have knowledge of God? It seems to make not one difference, but at least four.

The first difference has to do with what C. S. Lewis called the “abolition of man.” If God has designed and endowed us with our nature—this is not a question of how He did it or how long it took, only of who is responsible—then we can be confident that we have the nature that we ought to have in accord with His good purposes. This premise in no way slights the Fall; even a crushed foot remains a foot. The proposition that we are in conflict with our nature has nothing to do with the proposition that it is not, in fact, our nature.

Let us imagine someone who denies divine design. He admits that human beings have a nature, just in the sense that certain ways of living go against the grain; he only refuses to allow that we were endowed with this nature by God. Paraphrasing George Gaylord Simpson, we are to regard the direction of the grain as the result of a meaningless and purposeless process that did not have us in mind. I think it follows that had the process gone a bit differently—had our ancestors been carnivores instead of omnivores, had they laid eggs instead of borne live young, or had they never left the oceans for the land—then we would have had a different nature. Given the nature that we do have, certain things go against the grain, hence a certain natural law. Honor your father and mother. Do not kill. Do not covet. Given some other nature, different things would have gone against the grain—hence a different natural law. It might have been anything. Supplant your father. Chase away your mother. Eat your neighbor and covet his mate. What strikes our nature as distressing would for that nature be the norm.

The entire basis of morality, on this account, is the particular nature that we have at the moment. There would be nothing wrong with having a different nature and thus a different natural law. We just don’t.

But what if we could? What if we could change our nature? According to those who hold this view, we already have. Our ancestors were as different from us, they say, as a prosimian is different from a man. Generation by generation, the ur-men of the long-gone past adapted to a changing environment. Our great-grand-primates were the products of adaptation to a life in the branches of trees. Our grand-primates were the products of adaptation to a life on the savanna. Our parents were the products of adaptation to the practice of agriculture. And our descendants will be the products of adaptation to the most enduring features of our own environment, whatever those turn out to be. Perhaps television.

Notice that on this theory, some of the circumstances to which our ancestors adapted were the results of their own prior actions. It was they who came down from the trees, and had therefore to adapt to the savanna. It was they who invented agriculture, and had therefore to adapt to a different diet. In a sense, then, we have been influencing our own evolution all along. We have already changed our nature. We just didn’t know that we were doing it.

If there is nothing wrong with having a different nature—and if we have already changed our nature without knowing—then why shouldn’t we take the process in hand? Why shouldn’t we deliberately change ourselves as we wish to be changed? Why shouldn’t we determine the nature of our descendants?

Such proposals are no longer idle talk. In October 2000, news leaked that an American company named Biotransplant and an Australian company named Stem Cell Sciences had successfully crossed a human being with a pig by inserting the nuclei of cells from a human fetus into the pigs’ eggs. Although the embryos were destroyed when they reached the thirty-two-cell point, they would have continued to grow had they been implanted in the womb of a woman—or a sow.

According to J. Bottum in the *Weekly Standard*, “There has been some suggestion from the creators that their purpose in designing this human pig is to build a new race of subhuman creatures for scientific and medical use. . . . Then, too, there has been some suggestion that the creators’ purpose is not so much to corrupt humanity as to elevate it.” His comments are worth quoting at some length:

It used to be that even the imagination of this sort of thing existed only to underscore a moral in a story. . . . But we live at a moment in which British newspapers can report on nineteen families who

have created test-tube babies solely for the purpose of serving as tissue donors for their relatives—some brought to birth, some merely harvested as embryos and fetuses. A moment in which *Harper's Bazaar* can advise women to keep their faces unwrinkled by having themselves injected with fat culled from human cadavers. . . . In the midst of all this, the creation of a human-pig arrives like a thing expected. We have reached the logical end, at last. We have become the people that, once upon a time, our ancestors used fairy tales to warn their children against—and we will reap exactly the consequences those tales foretold. Like the coming true of an old story—the discovery of the philosopher's stone, the rubbing of a magic lantern—biotechnology is delivering the most astonishing medical advances anyone has ever imagined. But our sons and daughters will mate with the pig-men, if the pig-men will have them. And our swine-snouted grandchildren—the fruit not of our loins, but of our arrogance and our bright test tubes—will use the story of our generation to teach a moral to their frightened litters.

Plainly, Bottum is not pleased with what the researchers have done. As he writes, it makes no difference whether they plan to create subhumans or superhumans, for “either they want to make a race of slaves, or they want to make a race of masters. And either way, it means the end of our humanity.” The evil is not that the experiment might turn out badly. It is that our nature would be abolished.

But our atheist will ask: What exactly is the objection to abolishing our nature? Why *not* abolish it? We won't be around to mind. Our descendants won't mind either, because we can build into their natures that they are satisfied with the natures they get. If we like, we can make an entire graded set of natures, along the lines of Huxley's *Brave New World*. “I'm glad I'm a Beta,” say his Betas. So why *should* we reap the consequences that the tales of old foretold? Why should the pig-men use the story of our generation to teach a moral to their frightened litters? Why should these litters be frightened by what, to them, would be the story of Genesis?

Genesis, I think, is the crux of it: not the text of Genesis, but its idea of creation. To abolish and remake human nature is to play God. The chief objection to playing God is that someone else is God already. If He created human nature, if He intended it, if it is not the result of a blind fortuity that did not have us in mind—then we have no business exchanging it for another. It would be good to remember that Genesis contains not only the story of creation but the story of Babel, of the

presumption of men who thought they could build a tower “to heaven.”

Here then is the first difference that the knowledge of God makes to the natural law. A godless natural law would revere the laws of human nature only insofar as we continued to be human. Denying that our humanity is a creation, it would have no reason to preserve this humanity, and no objection to its abolition.

The second difference it makes to have natural knowledge of God concerns what we might call “oughtness.” A moment ago we spoke of a godless natural law. But in what sense can a godless mind revere the laws of human nature at all? The early modern Dutch legal philosopher Hugo Grotius famously remarked that even if there were no God (as he conceded that it would be impious to believe), the natural law would still have a kind of force. What seems to impress most people who read this remark is that Grotius thinks it *would* have a kind of force. More interesting is his qualifier: it would have a *kind* of force. The suggestion is that it would not have the kind that it would have if God were real.

Taken with that emphasis, the remark of Grotius might be true. Although a godless natural law would lose the force of “oughtness,” it would retain the lower force of prudence. But perhaps it would lose that force too. Let us consider further.

The argument for saying that the natural law would lose the force of oughtness but retain the force of prudence runs like this. If there is no God, then the universe is not a creation. One immediate consequence is that I owe nothing to anyone for the fact that I am in it. If there is a reason to keep the moral laws, it cannot lie in honoring the one who made us. Another consequence is that the universe has no meaning beyond itself. The patterns in it *just are*; they do not reflect the goodness or the intentions of a Designer.

And this makes a difference. A theist who attributes the order of nature to God can say things like this: “I see that the sexual powers cause conception, and that the fact that they do so is part of the explanation of why human nature has been endowed with such powers in the first place. This tells me that conception is a *purpose* of the sexual powers, a part of what they are *for*. When I employ them, I ought to respect this fact; I ought not to use them in ways that are incompatible with their purpose.” Adding inference to inference in this fashion, he gradually works out a comprehensive account of the right use of the sexual powers and the respect that is owed to the natural institutions which direct and contain them, and he can reason similarly about the other natural powers and institutions.

But an atheist might reply like this: “I use the word *purpose* too, and I am even willing to concede that you

use it correctly. If one thing causes another, and that's part of the explanation of why the first thing occurs, then the second thing is a purpose of the first;* even a Darwinist like me can concede that much. So what? How do you get from 'One of the purposes of the sexual powers is procreation' to 'I should not use the sexual powers in ways that are incompatible with procreation'? So far as I can see, the only thing that follows from the connection between procreation and sex is that when I do have intercourse, it would be prudent to watch out." Stretching a point a bit—taking into account the entire set of things there are to "watch out" for (not only conception, but jealousy, emotional emptiness, loss of trust, and so forth)—perhaps a purely prudential justification of marriage and family and so forth could be developed. Perhaps a purely prudential justification for each of the other natural laws and institutions could be developed in the same way. And perhaps that is the sort of thing that Grotius had in mind.

Unfortunately, a truly oughtless prudence would have nothing to say to free riders. Anyone who thought he saw a way to obtain the benefits of these laws and institutions without their costs—or who was willing to accept the costs of transgressing them—would do so. To speak again of marriage, some men prefer seducing married women. Others say they can do very well without trust. Still others, that although they fear exposure, they would rather risk it than forgo their pleasures. Some even enjoy the risk; for them, it isn't a cost.

To be sure, the oughtless sort of prudence is rather thin. The thicker prudence of the natural law tradition would point out that free riders sacrifice greater goods for lesser ones; they *ought* to desire better for themselves than they do. But they have no *ought*—remember? In their sort of prudence, the good is nothing but the desirable, and the desirable is nothing but what they actually desire. From their point of view, the good for which they feel the greatest desire is the greatest good—just because they desire it most.

Some people would say that the thinness of the oughtless sort of prudence is a problem only for the naive sort of atheist. With a little more sophistication, the atheist can reply that in the same way things *just do* have causal and functional properties, so they *just do* have moral properties. The argument saves oughtness by sheer fiat—or so it seems. But does it really save anything at all? In one way, it makes the atheist's moral case even weaker, because it concedes the arbitrariness of the universe in which he thinks he is living. So we come to the third difference it makes that we have natural knowledge of God: it determines whether we can expect the universe to make any sense at all, morally or otherwise.

* I am paraphrasing the formal analysis of purpose developed by philosopher Robert C. Koons.

In the colloquy between theist and atheist presented above, both parties assumed that the universe is causally and rationally patterned: this causes that, that explains this, such-and-such is a reasonable explanation of so-and-so. But what right has the atheist to this assumption? Why should there be any patterns whatsoever? If the universe *just is*, then why shouldn't the things in it *just happen*? There is no reason to expect them to yield to reasoning, no explanation of why they should even have an explanation. Moreover, we are not out of the woods even if we do find patterns in the universe, for if these patterns too *just are*, then there is no warrant for assuming that they are more than local, accidental, superficial, inconsistent, and ephemeral. The sun may not rise tomorrow morning. Fire may not burn this afternoon. Two plus two may equal now four, now six, now one. For me, conception may *not* be caused by sexual intercourse (that seems to be how some teenagers think). Even if today I am myself, next week I may be someone else (that is how postmodernists think). So why should the natural law have even the force of prudence, much less oughtness? Why should there even be logic? Why should I "watch out" for anything? How could I?

But perhaps the only problem with our sophisticated atheist is that he is not sophisticated *enough*. If without God he has no right to assume Pattern, very well: let him be a sort of Platonist, and posit that Pattern itself is God. Of course Pattern would not be what the theist means by God, but it would be God in the impersonal sense: the deepest reality, the underlying principle of everything, that on which all else depends.

But if he is to be a sort of Platonist, then what does he make of Plato's problem? There are a great many patterns, not just one. This raises the question of what organizes them, what binds them all together, in a unity, a Design. We know of only one thing that is capable of Design, and that is mind—intelligent agency. It is not enough for the universe to resemble a mind in *having* design; let us have no tricks, like calling the patterns "ideas" when we have not earned the right to do so. Behind the universe there must be a *real* mind that is capable of the things that real minds do, like designing. That brings us back to God—God as the theist means God, God with a mind, God in the personal sense.

If our atheist accepts this implication, then he is back in the fold; he is no longer an atheist. But if he denies it—then it will not help him even if Pattern really is the deepest reality, because in that case "Pattern" is merely a fancy name for "patterns," and plurality of patterns without Design is merely chaos; "mere anarchy is loosed upon the world." After all, Plato merely gave names to the ways things hang together; he never explained why they had to hang together, where there was any necessity to it. For example he said that all good things partici-

pate in a sort of super-pattern, or transcendental, called Goodness, and in token of the fact he assumed an underlying unity among the virtues—courage, wisdom, justice, moderation, and all the rest. But with nothing to *bring* these good virtues into unity, there is no reason why they should *be* in unity. Perhaps cowardice is the fount of justice, wisdom comes only to the wanton, and courage makes fools of us all. Perhaps righteousness and peace have not kissed each other, as the Psalmist claims, but tear each other daily into pieces. Don't many people think this way?

Another of Plato's convictions was that Goodness is but *one* of the transcendentals. He supposed there were two more, Truth and Beauty. Even supposing this true, it doesn't help matters, it only makes them worse. For why should the *three* transcendentals hang together? Why shouldn't Goodness be ugly, Beauty lie, and Truth be inimical to the good—not because they *have* come apart, as they seem to in this fallen world, but because they *must* come apart, because that is how they are?

Natural selection gives no reason; a clash between, say, Truth and Goodness would not keep an organism from passing on its genes. In fact there is no reason—unless there is something else at work, *Someone* else at work, Whom Plato may have known but did not name. In the end we find that the sophisticated sort of atheist is no better off than the naive sort. His universe is just as mad, and perhaps more terrifying still. It may contain just as much oughtness as he likes: but what ought to be, what charms us, and what *is* are all at war, and the house of Ought is divided against itself.

Our question has been what difference it makes to the natural law that we naturally have knowledge of God. So far I have been treating this question as though it meant, "What difference would it make to the natural law if we *didn't* have such knowledge?" But there is another way to take it: "What difference would it make to the natural law if we do have such knowledge but *tell* ourselves we don't?" In other words we may ask about the consequences of lying to ourselves about Him. One of these consequences might be called moral "metastasis"—as in the growth of cancers. This is the fourth way it matters to have natural knowledge of God.

Do we not lie to ourselves about ordinary right and wrong? The desire to know truth is ardent, but it is not the only desire at work in us. The desire not to know competes with it desperately, for knowledge is a fearful thing. So it is that we often groan about how difficult it is to know what is right even though we know the right perfectly well. Every honest person can confirm this from his own experience. Just how much lying goes on was recently confirmed during the high-level political scandals of the late '90s, when everyone from television interviewer Geraldo Rivera to comedian Jerry Seinfeld

seemed to agree that "Everybody lies about sex." As Seinfeld put it in interview with Michael Blowen, "Truth and sex don't go together." Presumably he had in mind not only our lying to other people but our lying to ourselves, because one just can't do that much lying without rationalizing it to oneself somehow.

But the problem of lying to ourselves goes far beyond sex. Along with the mainstream of the natural law tradition, I have suggested that one of the things about reality and goodness that we know perfectly well is the reality and goodness of God. Biblical tradition agrees: when Psalm 14 remarks, "The fool says in his heart 'There is no God,'" it doesn't call him a fool for thinking it, but for saying it even though yet deeper in his mind he knows it isn't true. From this point of view, the reason it is so difficult to argue with an atheist is that he is not being honest with himself. He knows that there is a God; he only tells himself that he doesn't.

One need not take this from a theist like me. Consider the remarks of the Harvard population biologist Richard Lewontin—an atheist who thinks matter is all there is—in the *New York Review of Books* (January 9, 1997): "Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science *in spite of* the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, *in spite of* its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, *in spite of* the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism." He continues, "It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counterintuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a divine foot in the door."

What Lewontin is admitting here is that he and those who think like him are only selective skeptics. They are hostile to belief in God because of a prior commitment to a dogmatism that excludes God—a dogmatism about which they are not skeptical at all, which they accept not because of the evidence but in spite of it, and to which they will cling even when it forces them into absurdities. For another example, consider the remarks of the philosopher Thomas Nagel in his book *The Last Word*. The purpose of the book is to defend philosophical rationalism against subjectivism. At a certain point Nagel acknowledges that rationalism has theistic implications. For the moment, the important thing is not whether that is true, but that Nagel thinks that it is. Note well what he says next. After suggesting that contempo-

rary subjectivism may be due to “fear of religion,” he writes, “I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that.” Nagel adds, “My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. . . . Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world.” If Nagel is right, then those who say that theism is a crutch have got it backwards. For our contemporary intellectual culture, it is atheism that serves as a crutch. It couldn’t have been easy to admit that.

So it seems that these men come close to agreeing with me. To be sure they don’t agree that God is real. But they agree that there is something not quite honest in their rejection of Him—something driven either dogmatically, as in Lewontin’s case, or emotionally, as in Nagel’s—rather than forced upon them by the evidence. The view that the atheist is not being honest with himself—that he knows that there is a God, but only tells himself he doesn’t know—is looking better and better. If this apparently preposterous view is true—as I think it is—then it changes everything. For then the important question is not, “Is there a God?”, but “Can I concede one part of my moral knowledge while holding down another?”, or “Can I admit to myself that I know about, say, the goodness of love and the evil of murder, while *not* admitting to myself that I know about the goodness of God and the evil of refusing Him?”

One certainly can do that—lots of agnostics do—but one can never do it well. The gambit slips from one’s control because, at bottom, it is a lie, and lies metastasize; the universe is so tightly constructed that in order to cover up one lie, we must usually tell another. This applies with just as much force to the lies we tell ourselves as to the lies we tell other people. One could imagine a universe so loosely jointed that lies did not require the support of more lies, but the one we live in is not like that. In this one, deception begets deception, and self-deception begets more self-deception; the greater the lie, the greater its metastatic tendency. This tendency is strongest precisely in the case of the greatest self-deception, pretending not to know that God is real, because there are so many things one must *not think of* in order to not think of the reality of God.

One cannot predict in advance *what* stories people will tell themselves to make believe that they do not know the reality of God and their obligation to Him;

every agnostic and atheist devises a different set of plausibility gambits, a different pattern of omissions, of forgettings, of avertings of gaze. But it is extraordinarily difficult—I think impossible—for such self-deceptions not to slop over at some point into what one admits about the moral law. Our minds won’t go like that.

We have been asking how it matters that we have natural knowledge of God, and we have found that it makes four differences: as to whether man may be abolished, whether morality has oughtness or only prudence, whether we have reason to expect the universe to make any moral sense at all, and whether, having lied to ourselves about God, we can be honest about the rest of our natural knowledge.

Part two of the inquiry is how Scripture illuminates our understanding—how it matters that there is a biblical revelation *over and above* the natural knowledge of God. This revelation makes at least three differences, and the first difference has to do with forgiveness.

Clear vision of the moral law is crushing, because the first thing that an honest man sees with this vision is how far he falls short of it. He cannot escape the awareness of a debt that exceeds anything he can pay. Apart from an assurance that the debt can somehow be forgiven, such honesty is too much for us; it kills. The difficulty is that without a direct revelation from the Author of the law, it is impossible to know whether the possibility of forgiveness is real. Therefore we look away; unable to accept the truth about ourselves, we might keep the law in the corner of our eye, but we cannot gaze upon it steadily. Apart from an assurance that the debt can be forgiven—an assurance which transcends what human reason can find out on its own—no human being dares to face the law straight-on.

Yet we can’t quite wipe the law from our intellects. It is woven into the deep structure of our minds, as experts on linguistics say the threads of language are. Unable to make it go away, we use every means we can devise to pretend that we are really being good. Evasions and rationalizations spread through our intellects like the mycelium of a fungus in its host. That is why the ancient world was brutal, as we of all people should understand. Not even the greatest of the pagans could admit what was wrong with infanticide, although they knew that the child was of our kind. Neither can we admit what is wrong with abortion and a host of other evils.

It is hard enough to face the moral law even *with* the possibility of forgiveness. It offends our pride to be forgiven, terrifies it to surrender control. Without this possibility it would be harder still: How could we ever face how wrong we had been about anything? How could we bear to change our minds? The history of ethics would be a history of digging in against plain truths. Consider how many centuries it took natural law thinkers even in

the Christian tradition to work out the implications of the brotherhood of master and slave. At least they did eventually. Outside of the biblical orbit, no one ever did—not spontaneously.

It may seem that the possibility of forgiveness matters only on the assumption that there is, in fact, a God—that without the lawgiver, there would be no law, and therefore nothing to be forgiven. The actual state of affairs is more dreadful, for the Furies of conscience do not wait upon our assumptions. One who admits the Furies but denies the God who appointed them—who supposes that there *can* be a law without a lawgiver—must suppose that forgiveness is both necessary and impossible. That which is not personal cannot forgive; morality “by itself” has a heart of rock. And so although grace would be unthinkable, the ache for it would keen on, like a cry in a deserted street.

The second difference it makes to acknowledge biblical revelation has to do with providence. Self-interest is not the only thing that tempts us to commit injustice. One of the strongest motives to do wrong is to make everything go right, for sometimes justice requires allowing bad things to happen to other people. If we forbid hanging innocent men, the mob may break out in a riot. If we forbid bombing noncombatants, the war may be prolonged. If we forbid giving perjured testimony, the murderer may go unpunished. Surely it isn’t right, we reason, that there are riots, longer wars, and murderers free in the streets. Let us do evil for the sake of good. It doesn’t seem *just* to do justice.

Christian faith undercuts the urge to fix everything on our own through conviction of the final helplessness of man and confidence in the providence of God—through certainty that only God can set everything to rights and faith that in the end, He will. Man can merely ameliorate, not cure; but there will be a Judgment, and there will be a hand that wipes every tear from the eyes of those who mourn.

The final helplessness of man to fix himself may seem fatuously obvious after a century that killed hundreds of millions of people, all with the idea of improving human life. If it is a fatuity, however, it is an unbearable fatuity, one that we persistently refuse to accept. I commented earlier on the idea that one *may* play God if no one is God already. What we have in view here is the conviction that one *must* play God if the Creator is not Judge and Healer too. Immanuel Kant thought that morality would be undermined without a belief in divine judgment, but Kant did not say the half of it. The wrongs of the world would not merely dismay the desire to do right. They would taunt, torture, and drive men to a despair that could be relieved only by committing yet greater wrongs, on the principle that if God does not save us then we must save ourselves.

There may be some few who could resist this terrible conclusion. I have not met them. It is no accident that not even the Stoics, who invented the very term “natural law,” ever rose to the idea of principles which hold without exception, principles which may not be violated even to prevent violations. The problem was not that they failed to find these principles written upon their hearts, but that they could not bring themselves to attend closely to the inscription. It would have been too awful to believe that the goodness of the ends did not justify the wickedness of the means, because how else could the ends be achieved? The same people who said *Fiat justitia ruat caelum*, “Let justice be done, though the heavens fall,” also said *Salus populi suprema lex*, “The safety of the people is the supreme law”—and as they understood these mottoes, the second unraveled the first. Have the Germans begun another uprising? Then raze their villages, rape their virgins, and show them what the *Pax Romana* means. All for justice, all for order, all for peace.

Without confidence in providence, our vision of every Commandment goes askew. For example “Thou shalt not murder” seems to change before our eyes to “Thou shalt keep alive the greatest number possible—at the expense of others, if that is what it takes.” In the novel (and later movie) *Sophie’s Choice*, a Nazi guard at Auschwitz commands the young mother to choose which of her children will be sent to the ovens. If she cooperates in the crime, the one she selects will be burned; if she refuses, then both of them will be taken to their deaths. After a long, hanging moment, she pushes away her smallest child and cries out that he take her—not the other, not her favorite! Her choice is plainly evil; for the sake of a better result, she has united herself with the sin of the murderer. And in the end her favorite child dies too. But without faith in a God who hears the cries of the suffering, how could she choose otherwise? One day I was surprised to hear one of my seminar students argue that it would have been “selfish” for Sophie to refuse to mark one of her children for death. How so? His reply was that she should have been willing to “sacrifice herself”—by which he meant *sacrifice her conscience*. It took me some time to realize that although my agnostic student considered “I must promote life” to be a real moral duty, he viewed “I must not have complicity in murder” to be a merely personal scruple on the order of “I am not the sort of person who skips bathing.” He didn’t deny that conscience speaks differently, but for the sake of a “better” result, he thought, Sophie should have been willing to suffer the agonies of its accusations.

And if there is no God, why not? The motto “Do the right thing and let God take care of the consequences” makes sense only on the assurance that He will take care of the consequences. Without that assurance,

doing the right thing *means* taking care of the consequences—or trying to. And so it is that unless there is providence, the urge to do good irresistibly consorts with evil; unless God is just, our judgments become unhinged.

The third difference biblical revelation makes to moral understanding concerns our ability to recognize our neighbors for what they are. To be a person is to be a proper subject of absolute regard—a “neighbor” in the sense of the Commandments—a being of the sort whom the Commandments are about. It is *persons* whom I am not to kill, *persons* whom I am to love as I love myself. But what is a person? If we accept the biblical revelation that man is the *imago Dei*, the image of God, then every human being is a person—a person by nature, a kind of thing different from any other kind, a being whose very existence is a kind of sacrament, a sign of God’s grace. Trying to understand the nature of man without recognizing him as the *imago Dei* is like trying to understand a bas-relief without recognizing it as a carving of a lion.

The problem with rejecting this biblical revelation is not that one loses the dim, inbuilt sense of awe that clings to human life; we intuit the image of God even if we do not know what it is. The problem is that this inbuilt sense is not enough. We need an explanation of what it is that we are intuiting—of what we experience when we experience the sense of awe. Without this explanation, I may try to hold onto my knowledge of the evil of murdering my neighbor, but I will find it difficult to recognize my neighbor when I see him. It is not impossible; more or less adequate explanations *can* be constructed from materials accessible to natural reason. But that is the long way around, and most people weary long before they reach the end of it. By and large, the ones who do stay on the trail are the same ones who acknowledge the biblical revelation of the *imago Dei*.

In contemporary secular ethics, the ruling tendency is to concede that there are such things as persons, but to define them in terms of their functions or capacities—not by what they *are*, the image of God, but by what they can *do*. To give but a single well-known illustration, philosopher Mary Ann Warren defines “personhood” in terms of consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate about indefinitely many topics, and conceptual self-awareness. If you can do all those things, you’re a person; if you can’t, you’re not. The functional approach to personhood seems plausible at first, just because—at a certain stage of development, and barring misfortune—most persons do have these functions. But to think that they *are* their functions blows the core right out of the moral code.

Warren offers her definition to justify abortion. Obviously, unborn babies are not capable of reasoning,

complex communication, and so on. If they cannot perform these functions, then by Warren’s definition they aren’t persons, and if they aren’t persons, they have no inherent right to life. But it cannot end with abortion. If unborn babies may be killed because they lack these functions, then a great many other individuals may also be killed for the same reasons—for example the asleep, unconscious, demented, addicted, and very young, not to mention sundry other cases, such as deaf-mutes who have not been taught sign language. In Warren’s language, none of these are persons; in biblical language, she refuses to recognize the *imago Dei*. She does claim to oppose infanticide—but only because any given infant is probably wanted by someone. She does not concede that the infant has an *inherent* claim to our regard, and if no one does happen to want it, then, she says, “its destruction is permissible.”

The cure for such blindness is not to tinker with the list of functions by which we define persons, but to stop confusing what persons are with what they can typically do. Functional definitions are appropriate for things which have no inherent nature, things whose identity is dependent on our own purposes and interests. Suppose I am building an automobile and I need to keep two moving parts from touching each other. I don’t need an object of a particular natural kind for that; anything which fills the space can be a spacer. Its very identity as a spacer is relative to how I want to use it, or to what function I value in it.

By contrast, if I am a person then I am *by nature* a rights-bearer, *by nature* a proper subject of absolute regard—not because of what I can do, but because of what I am. Of course this presupposes that I *have* a nature, a “what-I-am,” which is distinct from the present condition or stage of development of what I am, distinct from my abilities in that condition or stage of development, and distinct from how this condition, stage of development, or set of abilities might happen to be valued by other people. In short, a person is *by nature* someone whom it is wrong to view merely as a means. If you regard me as a person only because I am able to exercise certain capacities that interest you, *then you are saying that I am not a person*. And so the functional definition of personhood does not even rise to the dignity of being wrong. It is incoherent.

Some modern people will bite the bullet and agree with me. They will try to rescue their position not by drawing back, but by pushing further still, becoming “post” modern. “Very well!” they might say. “Let us grant that persons in the merely functional sense are not persons in the moral sense. But in that case there *are* no moral persons, because the ‘human beings’ whom you call moral persons do not exist. There are no ‘natural kinds.’ There are no ‘natures.’ There is no ‘what-I-am.’ All value is relative because all meaning is relative; all

meaning is relative because every definition is contrived to the convenience of the definer. The definition of the 'human' is no less contrived than any other." They have a point. We saw earlier that without God, there is no reason to believe in any sort of pattern in things—"natures" included.

But they escape one incoherency only to fall into a greater one. The former incoherency concerned only how we think of persons. The new one concerns how we think of everything—how we think of reality, even how we think of thinking. A condition of being able to say anything meaningful at all is that *not* everything is a creature of our own regard for it. There must exist some things that are what they are despite us; their meanings provide the anchors for all other meanings. If all meaning were relative, then even the meanings of the terms in the proposition "All meaning is relative" would be relative. Therefore the proposition "All meaning is relative" destroys itself. It is nothing but an evasion of reality. That seems a high price to pay, even for the privilege of killing people.

A modernist who rejects the greater of these incoherencies is not yet in the clear; one does not have to believe that all meanings slip away to see the meaning of the person slip away. Though a modernist may keep up the pretense that he is still talking about what persons really are, his functionalist method allows him to know only what he wants them to be—and different modernists want them to be different things. One thinker has greater regard for sentience, another for cognition, another for self-awareness. One thinks the important thing is sociality, another the capacity to make plans. With each different criterion of personhood, a different set of beings is welcomed through the gates of others' regard. This writer says that higher mammals are persons, but human babies not. That one says that human babies are persons, but Grandma not. The one over there says that *some* human babies are persons, but only if their mothers think they are.

Denial of the *imago Dei* is something new, and much more dangerous than a simple return to paganism. As Francis Schaeffer once remarked, the worst that could be said of the pagans was that they had not yet heard that man is made in the image of God. Although they

naturally recognized the dignity of man and the justice that is due to him, their understanding of this intuition was deficient. By contrast, our thinkers have heard that man is made in the image of God, *but deny it*. This puts such a strain on the inbuilt structures of moral knowledge that justice flips upside down. Refusing to learn, they finally distort even what they already know.

What shall we say about the Second Tablet Project? Just that it cannot succeed. The Second Tablet depends on the First; whoever denies his duty to God will find, if he is logical, that he can no longer make sense of his duty to his neighbor. Conscience will certainly persist, reminding him of both, but it will seem to him an absurdity in a sea of absurdities. Though he may admit that he has a nature, he will be unable to say why he should keep it. Though he may admit that this nature is governed by certain laws, he will find that their oughtness creeps out the door and that even their prudence slips away. All this will be needless, for he does have the knowledge of God; he merely denies it. But denial only makes his crisis deeper, for lies metastasize, and the greatest lie metastasizes to the greatest degree.

Then should we say that the Two Tablets are enough if only we take them as a pair? More's the pity, no: not even the pair of them is enough by the light of nature alone. Though natural knowledge is sufficient to illuminate our duty, duty by itself is despair. It cannot assure us of the possibility of forgiveness when we fall short; it cannot assure us of the certainty of providence in the face of evil; and it cannot explain to us the fallen dignity we bear as images of God. In want of the first assurance, we seek refuge from guilt by denying our sins. In want of the second assurance, we seek to make everything go right by doing wrong. In want of the explanation, we find it all too easy to pretend that we do not recognize our neighbors for what they are.

In these senses, moral knowledge is protected and illuminated by the knowledge of God, and the natural knowledge of God is protected and illuminated by the knowledge of His word. Faith and reason contain and depend on each other. May we be spared the illusion of an ethics that stands wholly by itself. FT

Reparations Then and Now

Allen C. Guelzo

On May 4, 1969, James Forman rose to interrupt the Sunday morning services at New York City's Riverside Church to read aloud a "Black Manifesto." The Manifesto was an explosive declaration of independence by a new generation of young black activists who had grown impatient with the slow-moving, nonviolent tactics that had prevailed in the Civil Rights Movement. It was intended to shock, and shock it did, not least because, among its other features, it demanded \$500 million as reparations "due us as a people who have been exploited and degraded, brutalized, killed, and persecuted."

The idea that one party to a conflict can end up owing financial reparations in some form or other to the opposing party is not a new one. The most notorious example is the reparation imposed by the Allied Powers at the end of World War I on Germany by the Versailles Treaty. But the war reparations of Versailles belonged to a very different category from the reparations Forman was demanding. In 1921, reparations were based on the damages inflicted by outright war, not social or political wrongs, and they were imposed by the winners on the losers. In other words, it was the victims who paid reparations, not the victimizers. What made Forman's demand possible in 1969 was an important redefinition of the idea of reparations that grew out of the experience of World War II and the discovery of the extermination of six million of Europe's Jews by the Nazis.

As early as 1943, the World Jewish Congress had begun to formulate demands for a postwar settlement that would include restoration or indemnity for stolen or destroyed Jewish property, reparations for the loss of

Jewish life and community that included payments of up to \$12 billion, and guarantees from the Allies for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. What raised eyebrows about these demands was not their size but the fact that they came from an ethnic group, rather than a nation or state, and a group which was asking that its ethnic identity become the basis for the reparations. This was so unprecedented that the 1945 Paris Conference on Reparations chose to ignore the Jewish demands. However, in 1951, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who viewed Jewish reparations as part of the burden Germans needed to confront frankly in order to wipe out the Nazi past, offered reparations amounting to DM 3.45 billion to the survivors of the Holocaust, and a second agreement in 1953 committed the Federal Republic to still further reparations payments.

The success of the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in gaining reparations was a turning point in the notion of reparations for national crimes. It not only reversed the conventional direction of reparations, but it legitimized demands for reparations for past injustices by groups who had no specific national identity of their own. In 1962, Australian Aborigines filed a suit against the Australian federal government for the recovery of traditional tribal lands. An Aboriginal Land Act was passed in 1976, and in 1998 Australia celebrated (if that is the word) an official Sorry Day for Aborigines as a way of offering a national apology. In 1997, the World Jewish Congress succeeded in exposing the complicity of the Swiss banking system with the Nazi persecution of German Jews, and, after some hesitation, Swiss banks announced their intention to create a Holocaust Fund for Holocaust victims whose family assets had disappeared into Nazi accounts in Swiss banks.

The United States first became involved in the new wave of reparations in 1988, when Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act, allowing the federal government to

ALLEN C. GUELZO is Dean of the Templeton Honors College at Eastern University in St. David's, Pennsylvania, and author of *Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President* (1999), co-winner of the Lincoln Prize for 2000.

compensate Japanese-Americans who had been interned during the Second World War. But the most obvious candidate for reparations, as James Forman had foreseen in 1969, would be the descendants of the African-Americans who, from 1619 until 1865, had been legally enslaved in the United States. Few people took Forman seriously in 1969, but as money began to flow to Holocaust survivors and Japanese-American internees, it became difficult for African-Americans not to wonder bitterly why they should be denied a place at the reparations table. In 1989, Michigan representative John Conyers introduced a bill (H.R. 3745) asking for the establishment of a commission "to examine the institution of slavery" and "to make recommendations to the Congress on appropriate remedies."

Conyers' bill was buried in the House Judiciary Committee for several years. But it was reintroduced in 1993 as H.R. 40 with forty-eight sponsors and the blessing of the Congressional Black Caucus. Then, in December 2000, Charles Ogletree of the Harvard University Law School formed a Reparations Coordinating Committee (originally known as the Reparations Assessment Group) composed of several high-profile veterans of national class-action lawsuits, including Johnnie Cochran, Richard Scruggs (of the tobacco settlement), and Dennis Sweet (of the "phen-fen" suit), who began exploring the possibility of litigation to obtain reparations.

But if the Japanese and Swiss examples offered an incentive for demanding the reparations Forman described, they did not offer much in the way of useful guidance, since three fundamental problems that did not exist in the Jewish or Japanese cases stand in the way of slave reparations.

First, American law, both in terms of statute law and common law, is rooted in long historical assumptions about where rights are located. From the time of the American founding, we have understood rights to be located in individuals. We recognize no titles of nobility: this means not only that the American republic repudiates the notion of a titled aristocracy, but that it does not recognize any special category of rights belonging to a class of people. There is, in the politics of the Founders, no essential quality of nobility that all aristocrats are presumed to share and others not, and which we are all obliged to recognize legally. By the same logic, we recognize no national language, no national church, and no national race, because we do not locate civil status or rights in groups, whether those groups are ethnic, religious, or racial. So, when a crime is committed, we want to know about the guilt or innocence of the individual, not someone's racial group, religion, or other characteristic. And when a civil judgment is issued, we want to compensate the individuals who were actually harmed,

even in a class action, not the race or church or bowling league they belong to.

The grain of American jurisprudence thus runs completely against assigning blame on the basis of group identity (something which we have shown most recently in our instinctive recoil from the practice of racial profiling). It expresses the measure of resistance we have toward identifying individuals as anything but individuals, and it poses a philosophical stumbling block for reparations litigation right on the threshold of the courtroom.

But this only speaks to a general conceptual issue. There are two other equally difficult problems standing in the way of reparations for slavery that were not present in the other reparations cases.

For one thing, what tactics should reparations activists adopt? Advocates like Charles Ogletree hope to use civil litigation, through the sort of class-action lawsuits that won such immense victories as the tobacco settlement. On March 26, a group of New York-based lawyers headed by Edward D. Fagan, who spearheaded successful suits on behalf of Holocaust survivors against European firms that collaborated with the Nazis in using concentration camp inmates as laborers, filed suit in U.S. District Court in Brooklyn against Fleet-Boston Financial, the insurance giant Aetna, and railroad conglomerate CSX Corporation, on the grounds that these corporations are the successors of companies that profited from slavery before the Civil War. The defendants, claims Fagan's suit, "conspired with slave traders, with each other and other entities and institutions . . . to commit and/or knowingly facilitate crimes against humanity, and to further illicitly profit from slave labor." Ogletree and Cochran have promised to file similar suits against other corporate targets and the United States government by this fall.

The success of the Holocaust and tobacco settlements has given this kind of litigation a sort of cachet in the public view. Outside public gaze, however, the truth is that litigation has not been terribly successful in gaining ground for reparations. In 1995, a reparations lawsuit demanding \$100 million was filed against the federal government in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. But the suit, *Cato v. United States*, was tossed out on the grounds that it lacked a "legally cognizable basis." And no wonder: the statutes that made slavery legal were state, not federal statutes, and thus do not render the federal government liable for slavery. After all, the Constitution nowhere contains the word *slave*, an omission that the late Don E. Fehrenbacher suspected was a deliberate tactic of the authors of the Constitution to keep the federal government from having jurisdiction, or responsibility, for slavery. And besides, the federal government possesses sovereign immunity; only if Con-

gress agreed to surrender that immunity beforehand could a class-action suit ever hope to gain a victory through the federal appeals system.

One could turn, in that case, to suing the states that legalized slavery, since that is where the legal center of enslavement rested. The problem here is that the plaintiffs in any such suit would be obliged to sue not only the states we think of as having been slaveholding states—the states of the old Confederacy—but *any* state where slavery had been legalized at any time. That would include Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. The idea of suing Pennsylvania, which voluntarily abolished slavery in 1780, or any other Northern state like it, stretches public credulity. Attorneys-general in those states would unquestionably fight any such suit, and the likelihood of failure in those state courts would cast a shadow over litigation in the others.

Instead of suits against the one-time slave states, one could turn to the descendants of the owners of slaves, and sue them. As Edward Ball demonstrated in his best-selling *Slaves in the Family*, it is not impossible to trace back the family trees of slaves and slaveowners in place after place, with the aid of census records, tax records, and probate records, and identify who exactly was guilty of enslaving whom. Not impossible, but not easy. In the first place, it will be hard to win a civil lawsuit brought against the heirs of anyone who was, before 1861, merely operating under the laws of the time. Second, it will be a challenge to calibrate the exact amount of the guilt slaveholding involved for different individuals. At one point or other, perhaps half of Southern whites owned at least one slave at some time, and a third were long-term slaveholders. It will take painstaking research to determine how much liability adheres to a family that might have owned one or two slaves at different times over two hundred years, and how much to a family that owned hundreds of slaves without interruption, and under conditions that would make any civilized conscience falter. This also assumes that the wealth a family's slaves generated for it is still attachable in some form. More likely, any assets a family once possessed through the labor of its slaves have long since disappeared.

The last real hope of reparations litigation is to target corporations, in the way that the March 26 suit has done, and which Ogletree threatens to do this fall. Once again, there is a certain verisimilitude to the charge that as many as one thousand modern corporations were involved, a century and a half ago, in one or another aspect of bondage. A number of modern urban newspapers, such as the *Baltimore Sun*, the *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, and the *Hartford Courant* ran advertisements before the Civil War for the sale of slaves or the recapture of runaways; all four of the major North American railroads own rail lines that were built with slave labor; the founder of Lehman Bros. bought slaves as workers

for the firm when it was founded in pre-Civil War Alabama. But even here, the odds for legal success remain long. None of these businesses survive in the same organizational state as 150 years ago; some of the names are only historical reminders, left after a century of mergers and acquisitions; and many of them have already put into place elaborate affirmative hiring policies, racial sensitivity training, and programs that underwrite black education.

But if they are not all that vulnerable legally to reparations demands, corporations are vulnerable in other ways. Corporations have products; they also have reputations that sell those products, and even an unsuccessful lawsuit can have damaging impact on the corporation's image and sales. In a major *USA Today* series of articles on reparations, Owen Pell, a lawyer who represented Chase Manhattan Bank against claims made by Holocaust survivors, acknowledged that corporations would rather settle high-emotion, high-visibility suits like those planned by the Reparations Coordinating Committee in some quiet, out-of-court fashion. "Companies have learned you don't judge a lawsuit by its merits," Pell commented. "You judge it by the potential public relations damage." This may, in the end, be the most successful way to use litigation to get reparations promises from anxious corporate executives. But those who rely on this sort of legal bluff will have a public relations problem of their own, since it will be difficult for them to pose as champions of justice in the middle of what looks like just another Jesse Jackson-style shake-down. And there is no guarantee that unsympathetic shareholders might not vent their own outrage with countersuits against the same quailing executives.

The difficulty in identifying whom we might sue for reparations is considerable. But it pales beside the difficulty of identifying who the beneficiaries ought to be. This is what decisively distances the Japanese internees and the Holocaust survivors from the slave reparations question, because in the first two cases there were identifiable individuals to whom benefits, restitution, and indemnity could be paid. But American slavery ended 137 years ago, and at the farthest stretch, only a handful of the grandchildren of those slaves might possibly be alive today. This, of course, is where the notion of group identity enters into the reparations argument, since the crime of slavery—by the logic of modern reparations—was committed, not against individuals, but against a group (African-Americans) and therefore reparations can be paid to a group (African-American descendants).

But that will only be the case if we are able, indeed, to identify such a group with any accuracy. And that may not be so obvious as it seems. The long record of racial mixing under slavery between masters and female slaves

(as in the much-debated case of Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings) produced populations that were so lightskinned that they passed into white society (as several of Sally Hemings' children did) and populations so darkskinned that they lost all memory of the white European genes they inherited. If the group to be identified as the recipients of reparations payments is simply to be "African-Americans," then there will be a surprising number of claimants eligible for reparations payments who have, so to speak, been "white" for several generations.* By the same token, if the object of reparations litigation is to be the descendants of slave-owners, what do we do when many of those who sue are themselves descendants of those same slave-owners, and also belong, by reasons of racial mixing, to the class of those being sued?

Rather than litigation, it has been suggested that reparations activists pursue a legislative agenda, since time after time this has proven to be a more successful strategy. In the 1980s, the Japanese American Citizens League, in its quest for reparations for the World War II-era detention of Japanese-Americans, resisted the temptation to challenge the federal government in court, and instead lobbied Congress to form a nonpartisan fact-finding commission. The commission's hearings then became a rallying point for publicizing Japanese-American sufferings during the internment, while the commission's independent status allowed its findings and recommendations for reparations to appear nonpartisan. And the result was a substantial victory for the families of the internees. Not surprisingly, this is the route that Conyers and his supporters have chosen to follow.

There is a certain chanciness in this tactic, however, in that a legislative commission can only recommend certain results to a legislature, not mandate them. Unlike in the civil courts, a victory in Congress does not necessarily result in an award for damages. Congress, for instance, could very easily have received the report of the internees commission and merely issued an apology that would have closed the door for good on further civil litigation, and the same could very easily happen concerning reparations for slavery. What is just as likely is that a commission will deadlock, and issue no recommendations at all. One of the most hopeful examples of using independent commissions to get around political roadblocks, the Kerrey Commission on entitlements, was loaded with blue-ribbon experts—Senators,

* This is precisely what happened when the Mohegan and Pequot tribes of Connecticut opened casinos on tribal territory in the mid-1990s and proposed to distribute the considerable profits of the casinos to the members of their tribes. "When word got out that being a Pequot was worth a great deal of money," drily commented Scott Malcolmson in *One Drop of Blood: The American Misadventure of Race*, "ancestral memories were rekindled," or in some cases manufactured, to get a share of the boodle.

bankers, philanthropists, college presidents. But when it issued its report in 1995, the membership couldn't even agree on what the problem was, much less how to fix it. Reparations activists consequently run the risk of conjuring up all kinds of irritations in commission testimony, without any guarantee of a substantive result.

Those irritations could arise especially if it appears that the calls for reparations are ignoring the ways in which reparations have already been paid and are being paid. Affirmative action is, for instance, a form of reparations, and it ill-behooves advocates for reparations to appear dismissive of an initiative that has cost more than a little controversy. But I am thinking of another form of reparations for slavery that Americans have paid, and that is what brings me at last to Abraham Lincoln.

Lincoln knew as well as any American of his time what the injustices of slavery involved. To a delegation of black leaders in 1862, he admitted candidly that "I think your race suffer very greatly. . . . Your race are suffering, in my judgment, the greatest wrong inflicted on any people." But Lincoln's notion of the debt created by this injustice was balanced by the kind of payment he saw being made in the carnage of the Civil War. "If I had been allowed my way this war would have been ended before this," he wrote to the English Quaker Eliza P. Gurney in the fall of 1862, but God "permits it for some wise purpose of His own." Lincoln thought, by 1865, that he could discern that purpose, and the purpose was the payment of reparations in a dearer currency than money could calculate.

In his Second Inaugural, little more than a month before his death, Lincoln reminded the nation of the dread warning given to those who had oppressed the innocent and defenseless: *Woe unto the world because of offenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh*. From that biblical lesson, Lincoln asked whether such a woe had indeed come on the nation because of slavery—and was being paid for in blood. "If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came," Lincoln continued, then what other sense can this war have, except that God has willed that the war should be a mechanism of justice, "until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword"?

Those for whom this way of paying reparations was not justice enough, or else the wrong kind of justice,

would have to argue in a higher court than Lincoln had ever practiced in. "As was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.'"

The call for reparations for slavery is not, I believe, an ignoble one. But to the extent that it ignores the finger Lincoln points at the Civil War—to the extent that it forgets the decimation of a generation of young Americans at the beginnings of manhood; to the extent that it forgets the windrows of corpses at Shiloh, the odor of death in the Wilderness, the walking skeletons of Andersonville, 623,000 dead all told, not to mention the interminable list of those crippled, orphaned, and widowed whose pensions became the single largest bill paid by the federal government for the following half-century; to the extent that it ignores how the war cost the United States \$6.6 billion, rocketed the national debt from \$65 million to \$2.7 billion, retarded commodity growth for the next thirty years, and devalued its currency—then the call for reparations opens itself up to a charge of willful forgetfulness so massive that

resentment, anger, and bitterness, rather than justice, will (I fear) be its real legacy. The evils of slavery were real evils; so were the deaths of boy after boy, white and black, blue and gray, as well as the lag of postwar wages for Northern workers and the pauperization of Southern agriculture. In whose balances shall we say the one fails to measure up to the other?

We have also had other evils—among them, the long, disgraceful history of segregation and Jim Crow, of lynch mob and race riot. And in that history, we confront a second case for reparations, a case that I believe needs hearing and satisfying. I believe that it is not beyond our reach or our imaginations as a nation to design a national educational trust for African-Americans which will fund the real educational opportunities that form the first rung in the ladder of American mobility, a ladder that segregation and racism made sure was the first thing stolen from African-Americans after Lincoln's death.

But this is not the same issue as slavery. For that long bill, as Lincoln rightly noted, a precious price has already been paid. ^{FT}

Dead Lovers

Happy young lovers, who've ascended together
into the heavens of Venus and of Love,
where joys, so brief on earth, will now, above
this world, endure forever and forever.
Your happy hours on earth, once undermined
only by their vexing brevity,
are now exchanged for a perfect peace that's free
from all disruptions and fears of any kind.
But sad is he, who lives on earth in vain,
still trapped in love's entanglement, whose grief
increases with love and its inexorable strife.
Sad am I, for my pain brings no relief,
and Love, just to intensify my pain
and wound me more, prolongs my useless life.

Luís de Camões (1524/25-1580)

Translated from the Portuguese by William Baer

Goldhagen v. Pius XII

Ronald J. Rychlak

Tendentious attacks on Pope Pius XII (Eugenio Pacelli) are nothing new. Indeed, they have become commonplace. Yet Daniel Goldhagen's recent 27,000-word essay for the *New Republic*, "What Would Jesus Have Done? Pope Pius XII, the Catholic Church, and the Holocaust" (January 21, 2002), calls for special attention. Based upon his forthcoming book, *A Moral Reckoning* (Knopf), Goldhagen's essay is noteworthy both for the breathtaking scope of its claims and the air of righteous indignation that infuses it. Not content to argue that Pope Pius did less to save the Jews than he should have, as many other scholars have done, Goldhagen goes much further—to attack Pacelli as an anti-Semite and the Church as a whole as an institution thoroughly, and perhaps inextricably, permeated by anti-Semitism. In fact, he even argues that "the main responsibility for producing this all-time leading Western hatred lies with Christianity. More specifically, with the Catholic Church." Such charges demand a thorough response.

In his most recent book, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, Goldhagen asserted that blame for the Holocaust should be placed on ordinary Germans and their unique brand of anti-Semitism. When contemporary historians from both sides of the Atlantic challenged him on this point, he eventually conceded that he had underestimated how factors other than anti-Semitism helped lead to the Third Reich's crimes. "I skirted over some of this history a little too quickly," he said. He has skirted again.

Goldhagen's article is based on no original historical research. It is entirely dependent on secondary sources that are written in English. This contributes to what can

only be judged an inexcusable number of errors, small and large. Several of the dates he provides relating to the establishment of European ghettos are wrong (one by more than fifty years). He is also wrong (by three decades) about the beginning of the process for Pius XII's beatification, and he is wrong about the date that the so-called "Hidden Encyclical" was made public. He is wrong in calling the concordat with the Holy See "Nazi Germany's first international treaty." He is wrong to say that the Belgian Catholic Church was silent; it was one of the first national churches to speak out against Nazi racial theories. He is way off base to suggest that German Cardinals Michael von Faulhaber and Clement August von Galen were insensitive to or silent about Jewish suffering. Goldhagen says that Pius XII "clearly failed to support" the protest of the French bishops, when, in fact, he actually had it rebroadcast on Vatican Radio for six consecutive days. He charges that Pius XII never reproached or punished Franciscan friar Miroslav Filipovic-Majstorovic for his evil actions in Croatia, when, actually, the so-called "Brother Satan" was tried, laicized, and expelled from the Franciscan order before the war even ended (in fact, before most of his serious wrongdoing). Goldhagen also misidentifies the role of Vatican official Peter Gumpel (who is the *relator* or judge, not the *postulator* or promoter, of Pius XII's cause for sainthood), and he is wrong to say that Gumpel was designated by the Vatican to represent it at a meeting with the recently disbanded Catholic-Jewish study group. He seems unaware that Catholic scholars on that committee disassociated themselves from statements issued by their Jewish counterparts following its collapse. He identifies the much-admired king of Denmark during the war as Christian II; it was Christian X. He refers to Pope Pius XI as having been Cardinal Secretary of State; it was actually his successor Pope Pius XII.

RONALD J. RYCHLAK is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of Mississippi School of Law. He is the author of *Hitler, the War, and the Pope* (Genesis).

A few embarrassments like this might be accounted for by positing carelessness. However, Goldhagen's graver errors—each and every one of which cuts against Catholics and the Pope—reveal something much more troubling at work in his essay.

The 1942 Christmas Statement

Goldhagen's efforts to trivialize and diminish Pope Pius XII's famous 1942 Christmas statement and its clear denunciation of Nazi ideology are representative of the one-sided, biased approach that permeates his work. In the 1942 statement, Pius said that the world was "plunged into the gloom of tragic error" and that "the Church would be untrue to herself, she would have ceased to be a mother, if she were deaf to the cries of suffering children which reach her ears from every class of the human family." He spoke of the need for mankind to make "a solemn vow never to rest until valiant souls of every people and every nation of the earth arise in their legions, resolved to bring society and to devote themselves to the services of the human person and of a divinely ennobled human society." He said that mankind owed this vow to all victims of the war, including "the hundreds of thousands who, through no fault of their own, *and solely because of their nation or race, have been condemned to death or progressive extinction*" (emphasis added).

In making this statement and others during the war, Pius used the word *stirpe*, which according to *Zanichelli's Italian and English Dictionary* can mean stock, birth, family, race, or descent, but which had been used for centuries as an explicit reference to Jews. British records (British Public Records Office, FO 371/34363 59337 [January 5, 1943]) reflect the opinion that "the Pope's condemnation of the treatment of the Jews and the Poles is quite unmistakable, and the message is perhaps more forceful in tone than any of his recent statements." The Dutch bishops issued a pastoral letter in defense of Jewish people on February 21, 1943, making express reference to the Pope's statement.

Moreover, a well-known Christmas Day editorial in the *New York Times* praised Pius XII for his moral leadership in opposing the Nazis:

No Christmas sermon reaches a larger congregation than the message Pope Pius XII addresses to a war-torn world at this season. This Christmas more than ever he is a lonely voice crying out of the silence of a continent. . . .

When a leader bound impartially to nations on both sides condemns as heresy the new form of national state which subordinates everything to itself; when he declares that whoever wants peace must protect against "arbitrary attacks"

the "juridical safety of individuals"; when he assails violent occupation of territory, the exile and persecution of human beings for no reason other than race or political opinion; when he says that people must fight for a just and decent peace, a "total peace"—the "impartial judgment" is like a verdict in a high court of justice.

A similar editorial from the *Times* of London said:

A study of the words which Pope Pius XII has addressed since his accession in encyclicals and allocutions to the Catholics of various nations leaves no room for doubt. He condemns the worship of force and its concrete manifestation in the suppression of national liberties and in the persecution of the Jewish race.

Obviously, in contrast to what Goldhagen would have us believe, everyone knew to whom the Pope was referring, including the Axis powers.

According to an official Nazi report by Heinrich Himmler's Superior Security Office (the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*) to Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop's office:

In a manner never known before, the Pope has repudiated the National Socialist New European Order. . . . It is true, the Pope does not refer to the National Socialists in Germany by name, but his speech is one long attack on everything we stand for. . . . God, he says, regards all people and races as worthy of the same consideration. Here he is clearly speaking on behalf of the Jews. . . . [H]e is virtually accusing the German people of injustice toward the Jews, and makes himself the mouthpiece of the Jewish war criminals.

An American report noted that the Germans were "conspicuous by their absence" at a Midnight Mass conducted by the Pope for diplomats on Christmas Eve following the papal statement. German Ambassador Diego von Bergen, on the instruction of Ribbentrop, warned the Pope that the Nazis would seek retaliation if the Vatican abandoned its neutral position. When he reported back to his superiors, the German ambassador stated: "Pacelli is no more sensible to threats than we are."

Vatican Radio

Goldhagen asks rhetorically: "Why, as a moral and practical matter, did [Pius XII] speak out publicly on behalf of the suffering of Poles, but not of Jews? No good answer." He then quotes a Vatican Radio broad-

cast of January 1940, trying to make the point that the Vatican was concerned only about Polish Catholics and could not spare a good word for Jews. In doing this, he badly misrepresents the truth.

As an initial matter, the quote cited by Goldhagen does not limit itself to Christian Poles. It merely refers to "Poles." Of course, writings of that time sometimes distinguished "Poles" and "Jews," using the former designation to refer to Polish Christians, but this was far from always the case. Moreover, Goldhagen implies that Jews were never mentioned on Vatican Radio. This is simply false.

Goldhagen seems to have taken his Vatican Radio quote from Pierre Blet's *Pius XII and the Second World War*. That book presents itself as a synopsis. Had Goldhagen actually researched the Vatican Radio transcripts from January 1940 (the month upon which he focuses) he would have found that Jews were indeed expressly and clearly identified. A key passage states:

A system of interior deportation and zoning is being organized, in the depth of one of Europe's severest winters, on principles and by methods that can be described only as brutal; and stark hunger stares 70 percent of Poland's population in the face, as its reserves of food-stuffs and tools are shipped to Germany to replenish the granaries of the metropolis. Jews and Poles are being herded into separate "ghettos," hermetically sealed and pitifully inadequate for the economic subsistence of the millions destined to live there.

Even Michael Phayer (another critic of the Pope) quotes this explicit defense of Jews in his book *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930-1965* (which is listed as one of the books that Goldhagen reviewed for his essay). On October 15, 1940, Vatican Radio denounced "the immoral principles of Nazism," and on March 30, 1941 explicitly condemned "the wickedness of Hitler." These broadcasts were among the first to break the news of the Nazi persecutions, but they were not the only such stories on Vatican Radio. They continued throughout the war.

The Catholic faithful heard these broadcasts and reacted accordingly. French priest-rescuer (and later Cardinal) Henri de Lubac paid tribute to the Pope's radio station in his book *Christian Resistance to Anti-Semitism*, describing the profound impact it had upon the French resistance. Similarly, Father Michel Riquet, S.J., an ex-inmate of Dachau who was recognized for saving Jewish lives, stated: "Pius XII spoke; Pius XII condemned; Pius XII acted. . . . Throughout those years of horror, when we listened to Radio Vatican and to the Pope's messages, we felt in communion with the Pope

in helping persecuted Jews and in fighting against Nazi violence."

The Hidden Encyclical and Summi Pontificatus

Early in his essay, Goldhagen discusses the so-called "hidden encyclical." The story here is that in June 1938, more than a year before the outbreak of World War II, when Eugenio Pacelli was Vatican Secretary of State, Pope Pius XI commissioned a draft papal statement attacking racism and anti-Semitism. Unfortunately he died before it was completed. According to Goldhagen, Pius XI drafted it, Pius XII buried it, and it remained hidden until it was published in France in 1995.

This story, if true, would help to support Goldhagen's depiction of Pius XII as a villain. But it isn't true. For starters, there never was an encyclical or even a draft encyclical. Pope Pius XI asked for a paper from Fr. John LaFarge, S.J. The thought was that this might one day be used as the basis for an encyclical. LaFarge was not an expert theologian or historian, so he sought help from two other priests, one from France and the other from Germany. This resulted in three different papers, one written in French, one in English, and one in German.

The source upon which Goldhagen relies, Georges Passelecq and Bernard Suchecky's *The Hidden Encyclical of Pius XI*, deals with the French and the English papers, but not the German one. That book also makes clear that—contrary to what Goldhagen reports—Pius XI was not the author of any of the documents. In fact, as that book further makes clear, there is no evidence that either he or Pius XII even *saw* these documents. A copy was sent to Pius XI, but by that time he was already gravely ill. When it was found after his death, there were no notations suggesting that he ever reviewed it. The book also explains that the paper disappeared immediately after Pius XI's death, and the men who were working on the project believed (indeed were certain) that Pius XII had *not* seen it. He therefore could not have buried it. Finally, this matter was made public in 1972 by the *National Catholic Reporter* and again in 1973 by *L'Osservatore Romano*, not in 1995 when Passelecq and Suchecky's book came out.

The primary author of the German draft, Professor Gustav Gundlach, S.J., helped Pius XII with his first encyclical, *Summi Pontificatus*, which was released on October 20, 1939, just after the outbreak of war. Not surprisingly, *Summi Pontificatus* (which expressly mentions Jews and urges solidarity with *all* who profess a belief in God) contains language that is similar to the paper on which Gundlach had worked. In fact, Fr. LaFarge wrote in *America* magazine that it was obvious that *Summi Pontificatus* applied to the Jews of Europe. He was concerned only that Americans might not realize that it also applied to racial injustice in the United States.

Because Goldhagen limited his research to a single and incomplete source, it is not surprising to find that his comments only magnify the errors about the “hidden encyclical.” (A much better book on the subject, edited by Anton Rauscher, recently appeared in Germany.) What is very surprising is that Goldhagen neglects even to mention *Summi Pontificatus*.

In January 2002, documents from the personal archive of General William J. (“Wild Bill”) Donovan, who served as special assistant to the U.S. chief of counsel during the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, were made public and posted on the Internet by the *Rutgers Journal of Law & Religion*. In a confidential report documenting Nazi persecution of the Church, prepared for the Nuremberg prosecution, the situation surrounding *Summi Pontificatus* is discussed as providing grounds for a separate count against the Nazis. The report notes that priests who read that document were reported to the authorities and that Nazi officials stopped its reproduction and distribution.

“This Encyclical,” wrote Heinrich Mueller, head of the Gestapo in Berlin, “is directed exclusively against Germany, both in ideology and in regard to the German-Polish dispute; how dangerous it is for our foreign relations as well as our domestic affairs is beyond dispute.” Reinhard Heydrich, leader of the SS Security Office in Warsaw, wrote, “This declaration of the Pope makes an unequivocal accusation against Germany.” The *New York Times* headline declared: “Pope Condemns Dictators, Treaty Violators, Racism; Urges Restoring of Poland.” Allied forces later dropped 88,000 copies of it behind enemy lines for propaganda purposes.

The Concordat

In 1933, the Holy See and the German government signed an agreement that assured the Church’s ability to hold services and function in general in the coming years. Goldhagen misleadingly reports that “Pacelli hastened to negotiate for the Church a treaty of cooperation, the concordat, with Hitler’s Germany.” He also incorrectly adds that this was “Nazi Germany’s first international treaty.”

Goldhagen was probably fooled by James Carroll’s *Constantine’s Sword*. Carroll artfully states that the concordat was Nazi Germany’s first *bilateral treaty*. In fact, the Four Powers Pact between Germany, France, Italy, and England preceded the concordat’s signing. Moreover, Hitler’s representatives were fully accredited and recognized by the League of Nations and took part in the disarmament discussions in Geneva, which also came before the signing of the concordat. The Soviet Union on May 5, 1933 (more than two months before the concordat was signed) renewed a trade and friendship agreement with Germany, and on that same day

the British Parliament voted to accept an Anglo-German trade agreement. In other words, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the whole League of Nations accredited the new German government before the concordat was signed. Carroll may have been technically correct, if misleading. Goldhagen is just plain wrong.

Goldhagen is also wrong to assert that a “secret annex” gave the Church’s approval to German rearmament. The concordat merely states that *if* Germany were to revive its army, Catholic soldiers would have access to chaplains. That is a matter of protecting the sacraments, not approving rearmament. For Goldhagen to transform it into something nefarious is explicable only as part of his determined effort to defame Catholics and the Pope.

The aforementioned recently released confidential report from the Nuremberg prosecution confirms that the concordat was a “Nazi proposition.” The Nazis accepted terms that the Church had previously proposed to Weimar, but which Weimar had rejected. The Nazis told the Vatican that the choice was to accept those terms (which assured that the Church would be able to function) or face severe persecution. In fact, to prove that they were serious, the Nazis severely persecuted German Catholics in the weeks leading up to the concordat. In a private conversation with the British chargé d’affaires to the Vatican, Pacelli said that the choice was “an agreement on their lines, or the virtual elimination of the Catholic Church in the Reich.”

The concordat, of course, came during the pontificate of Pope Pius XI. Like David Kertzer (*The Popes Against the Jews*), Goldhagen argues that Pius XI was an anti-Semite. This is a rare allegation. Pius XI is usually presented as the good, outspoken Pope, in contrast to the “silent” Pius XII. Not only did Pius XI condemn racism in major statements issued in 1928, 1930, and 1937, but on September 6, 1938, in a statement which—though barred from the Fascist press—quickly made its way around the world, he said:

Mark well that in the Catholic Mass, Abraham is our Patriarch and forefather. Anti-Semitism is incompatible with the lofty thought which that fact expresses. It is a movement with which we Christians can have nothing to do. No, no, I say to you it is impossible for a Christian to take part in anti-Semitism. It is inadmissible. Through Christ and in Christ we are the spiritual progeny of Abraham. Spiritually, we are all Semites.

In January 1939, the *National Jewish Monthly* reported that “the only bright spot in Italy has been the Vatican, where fine humanitarian statements by the Pope [Pius

XI] have been issuing regularly." When he died the following month, the Nazi press denigrated him as "Chief Rabbi of the Western World."

Despite the ludicrous claim that Pius XI was an anti-Semite, Goldhagen twists the facts around so that he can "blame" Pius XII for drafting the concordat (which, of course, ultimately was the responsibility of the sitting Pope, not Secretary of State Pacelli). He also "blames" Pius XII for drafting the 1937 anti-Nazi encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*.

Mit brennender Sorge

Of all Goldhagen's outrages, none is less comprehensible than his depiction of the great encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*—the Vatican's powerful denunciation of German fascism and racism—as an anti-Semitic screed. *Mit brennender Sorge*, issued by Pope Pius XI when Pacelli was his Secretary of State, is one of the strongest condemnations of any national regime that the Holy See has ever published. It condemned not only the persecution of the Church in Germany, but also the neopaganism of Nazi racial theories. The encyclical stated in part that:

Whoever exalts race, or the people, or the State, or a particular form of State, or the depositories of power, or any other fundamental value of the human community—however necessary and honorable be their function in worldly things—whoever raises these notions above their standard value and divinizes them to an idolatrous level, distorts and perverts an order of the world planned and created by God; he is far from the true faith in God and from the concept of life which that faith upholds.

It took direct aim at Hitler and Nazism, saying:

None but superficial minds could stumble into concepts of a national God, of a national religion; or attempt to lock within the frontiers of a single people, within the narrow limits of a single race, God, the Creator of the universe, King and Legislator of all nations before whose immensity they are "as a drop of a bucket" (Isaiah 40:15).

The encyclical also praised leaders in the Church who had stood firm and provided a good example. It concluded that "enemies of the Church, who think that their time has come, will see that their joy was premature."

Unlike most encyclicals, which are written in Latin, *Mit brennender Sorge* was written in German. It was dated and signed by Pope Pius XI on Passion Sunday, March

14, 1937, but it was smuggled into Germany, distributed to all parishes, and read from the pulpits on Palm Sunday, March 21, 1937.

The only reason *Mit brennender Sorge* was read to anyone was because the Nazis were caught off guard. It was not published in German newspapers. An internal German memorandum dated March 23, 1937 called the encyclical "almost a call to do battle against the Reich government." The prosecution report for the Nuremberg trials explained the measures that the Nazis took in retaliation: all available copies were confiscated, twelve printing offices were closed, those convicted of distributing the encyclical were arrested, and the Church-affiliated publications that ran the encyclical were banned. Later on, the mere mention of the encyclical was made a crime in Nazi Germany.

The day following the release of *Mit brennender Sorge*, the *Völkischer Beobachter* carried a strong counterattack on the "Jew-God and His deputy in Rome." *Das Schwarze Korps* called it "the most incredible of Pius XI's pastoral letters; every sentence in it was an insult to the new Germany." The German ambassador to the Holy See was instructed not to take part in the solemn Easter ceremonies, and German missions throughout Europe were told that the German government "had to consider the Pope's encyclical as a call to battle . . . as it calls upon Catholic citizens to rebel against the authority of the Reich."

The persecution of Jews, unfortunately, did not lessen; it got worse following the release of *Mit brennender Sorge*. This reaction is but one of many examples of Nazi retaliation—against Jews and Christians—that Goldhagen denies ever happened. His attempt to convert this strong papal statement into an anti-Semitic, pro-Nazi screed is simply incredible.

Mystici Corporis Christi

Goldhagen also misrepresents Pope Pius XII's 1943 encyclical, *Mystici Corporis Christi*. Since this was primarily a letter on theology, it contained no express references to Hitler or the Nazis. Still, it was an obvious attack on the theoretical basis of National Socialism. As Israeli diplomat Pinchas E. Lapide wrote in *Three Popes and the Jews*: "Pius chose mystical theology as a cloak for a message which no cleric or educated Christian could possibly misunderstand."

In *Mystici Corporis Christi*, Pius wrote: "The Church of God . . . is despised and hated maliciously by those who shut their eyes to the light of Christian wisdom and miserably return to the teachings, customs, and practices of ancient paganism." He wrote of the "passing things of earth," and the "massive ruins" of war. He offered prayers that world leaders be granted the love of wisdom and expressed no doubt that "a most severe judg-

ment” would await those leaders who did not follow God’s will.

Pius appealed to “Catholics the world over” to “look to the Vicar of Jesus Christ as the loving Father of them all, who . . . takes upon himself with all his strength the defense of truth, justice, and charity.” He explained, “Our paternal love embraces all peoples, whatever their nationality or race.” “*Christ, by his blood, made the Jews and Gentiles one, ‘breaking down the middle wall of partition . . . in his flesh’ by which the two peoples were divided*” (emphasis added). He noted that Jews were among the first people to adore Jesus. Pius then made an appeal for all to “follow our peaceful King who taught us to love not only those who are of a different nation or race, but even our enemies.” *Mystici Corporis Christi* also strongly condemned the forced conversions (to Catholicism) that were then occurring in Fascist Croatia, which Goldhagen wrongly claims enjoyed Vatican support.

Vatican Radio used the encyclical as the basis for a broadcast that stated: “He who makes a distinction between Jews and other men is unfaithful to God and in conflict with God’s commands.”

The 1919 Letter

At the center of Goldhagen’s anti-Catholic thesis is the piece of evidence that John Cornwell centrally relied upon in his deeply flawed book, *Hitler’s Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII*. It is a letter, written in 1919 by Eugenio Pacelli, the future Pope Pius XII, when he was papal nuncio in Munich. That year, Bolshevik revolutionaries temporarily took power in Bavaria. Many foreign dignitaries left Munich, but Pacelli stayed at his post and became a target of Bolshevik hostility. On one occasion, a car sprayed Pacelli’s residence with machine-gun fire. Another time, a small group of Bolsheviks broke into the nunciature, threatened Pacelli at gunpoint, and tried to rob him. Yet another time, an angry mob descended on Pacelli’s car, screaming insults and threatening to turn the car over.

When the Bolsheviks seized power, there was valid reason for concern. Their leaders occupied the royal palace and began operating what might best be described as a rogue government. Of particular concern to all diplomats in Munich was that the Bolsheviks violated the sovereign immunity of foreign missions and representatives. Two legations were invaded, and a car was requisitioned from another. The Austro-Hungarian Consul General was arrested without cause and held for several hours.

Alarmed by this behavior and concerned for the safety of people under his charge, Nuncio Pacelli sent his assistant, Monsignor Lorenzo Schioppa, to meet with the leaders of the new government. Schioppa, accom-

panied by a representative from the Prussian legation, met with the head of the Republic of the Councils of Munich, Eugen Leviné. Their purpose was to force Leviné (incorrectly identified as Levien in the later report), “to declare unequivocally if and how the actual Communist Government intends to recognize and oversee the immunities of the Diplomatic Representatives.”

The meeting did not go well. The only “commitment” that the representatives could get from Leviné was that the Republic of Councils would recognize the extraterritoriality of the foreign legations “if, and as long as the representatives of these Powers . . . do nothing against the Republic of the Councils.” Schioppa was warned that if the Nuncio did anything against the new government, he would be “kicked out.” Leviné made it clear that “they had no need of the Nunciature.”

Pacelli wrote a letter back to Rome, reporting on this meeting. John Cornwell translated a few sentences from that letter and set them forth as “proof” that Pacelli was an anti-Semite. The key passage, as translated by Cornwell (and accepted uncritically by Goldhagen), described the palace as follows:

. . . a gang of young women, of dubious appearance, Jews like all the rest of them, hanging around in all the offices with lecherous demeanor and suggestive smiles. The boss of this female rabble was Levien’s mistress, a young Russian woman, a Jew and a divorcée, who was in charge. . . . This Levien is a young man, of about thirty or thirty-five, also Russian and a Jew. Pale, dirty, with drugged eyes, hoarse voice, vulgar, repulsive, with a face that is both intelligent and sly.

To Cornwell and Goldhagen, these words (taken from Schioppa’s report to his superior, Pacelli) prove that Pacelli was an anti-Semite.

In truth, however, this translation is grossly distorted. It uses pejorative words, instead of neutral ones that are more faithful to the original Italian. For instance, the most damning phrase in the translation, “Jews like all the rest of them,” turns out to be a distorted, inaccurate translation of the Italian phrase *i primi*. The literal translation would be “the first ones” or “the ones just mentioned.” (Therefore Goldhagen’s statement that “the Communist revolutionaries, Pacelli averred, were ‘all’ Jews” is wrong. The word “all” appears only in the Cornwell/Goldhagen mistranslation.) Similarly, the Italian word *schiera* is translated by Cornwell as “gang” instead of “group,” which would be more appropriate. Additionally, the Italian *gruppo femminile* should be translated as “female group,” not “female rabble.” Finally, the Italian *occhi scialbi* should be translated as pale (asky, livid) eyes, not “drugged eyes.”

This letter was published in its original Italian in 1992. Church historian John Conway—an Anglican and a distinguished scholar—reviewed the book in which it was included for the *Catholic Historical Review*. Neither he, nor anyone else at that time, suggested that the letter was anti-Semitic. When the entire letter is read in an accurate translation, it is not anti-Semitic. The tone of anti-Semitism is introduced only by Cornwell's dubious translation.

Many Bolsheviks were cultural Jews, of course, though alienated from the Jewish faith and very often from their own families. Pacelli (and Schioppa) were perfectly well aware of this. They perceived the threat to the Church as a threat from Bolshevism, not Judaism or Jews as such. It should also be noted that the message was written fourteen years before Hitler came to power and the Jewish persecution began. At this time, the people being described were not victims, but leaders of a revolutionary and oppressive regional government.

Rather than using unfair translations and fabricating an argument, Goldhagen could have looked to direct, relevant evidence from that same period. During World War I, the American Jewish Committee of New York petitioned the Vatican for a statement on the "ill-treatment" suffered by Jewish people in Poland. The response came on February 9, 1916 from the office of the Secretary of State, where Eugenio Pacelli was—by absolutely every account—working hand-in-hand with Cardinal Secretary of State Gasparri. It said:

The Supreme Pontiff . . . as Head of the Catholic Church, which, faithful to its divine doctrine and to its most glorious traditions, considers all men as brothers and teaches them to love one another, he never ceases to inculcate among individuals, as well as among peoples, the observance of the principles of natural law and to condemn everything which violates them. This law must be observed and respected in the case of the children of Israel, as well as of all others, because it would not be conformable to justice or to religion itself to derogate from it solely on account of religious confessions. The Supreme Pontiff at this moment feels in his fatherly heart . . . the necessity for all men of remembering that they are brothers and that their salvation lies in the return to the law of love which is the law of the gospel.

This response was published in the *New York Times* on April 17, 1916 under the headline: "Papal Bull Urges Equality for Jews." It also appeared in *Civiltà Cattolica* on April 28 of that year, and in the London *Tablet* on April 29. Goldhagen, of course, fails even to mention it.

Papal Efforts in Italy

Among the secondary sources on which Goldhagen relies is Susan Zuccotti's controversial book *Under His Very Windows*. Zuccotti found that Catholic clergy and lay persons defied the Nazis and the Fascists by providing food, clothing, and shelter to Jews and other refugees throughout Italy. As a result of these efforts, while approximately 80 percent of European Jews perished during World War II, 85 percent of Italian Jews survived Nazi occupation. Despite this, Zuccotti gives no credit to Pope Pius XII, allegedly because she could not find written evidence of a directive from him to the Catholics in Italy. Goldhagen expands this to say that "there is no evidence of the Pope's guiding hand." The identical argument is used by Holocaust deniers to absolve Hitler of responsibility for the death of six million Jews. They too point out that there is no "written evidence" of Hitler's guiding hand, much less of a direct order.

While Zuccotti is anything but friendly toward Pius XII, and though she overlooks much evidence in his favor, she actually identifies very substantial evidence of the "Pope's guiding hand." For instance, she discusses a bishop who made a presentation during the war while he held in his hands a letter from Pius directing Catholics to protect Jews. (Zuccotti discounts this report only because other witnesses did not see the actual text of the letter.) She writes about the nuns who said the Pope ordered their convents opened to Jewish refugees. Zuccotti discusses a letter from A. L. Eastman, of the World Jewish Congress, thanking the Pope for helping free imprisoned Jews. She quotes the papal nuncio in Vichy, praising Pope Pius XII for condemning the persecution of Jews and others. She notes gratitude from Jewish people to the Pope following the war. She mentions thanks given to the Pope from Jewish chaplains. At other points along the way she brings up other evidence, including more letters of thanks from Jewish people and testimony from the future Pope Paul VI regarding his efforts on behalf of Jewish victims as having been made at the direction of Pope Pius XII.

It is true that Zuccotti refuses to believe that there was much papal involvement in rescue efforts, but that is her extremely grudging interpretation of the evidence. Yet she admits that Catholic rescuers "invariably believed that they were acting according to the Pope's will." Her principal argument is that there is no *written* evidence. Certainly there is a wealth of other types of "evidence of the Pope's guiding hand." Goldhagen's claim that Zuccotti has "devastated Pius XII's reputation" goes far beyond anything that the historical facts justify.

Using Zuccotti's argument, Goldhagen wildly charges that Pius "did not lift a finger to forfend the

deportations of the Jews of Rome.” In addition to voluminous other evidence to the contrary, there is proof showing this to be false in Adolf Eichmann’s memoirs, which were released after the Zuccotti book was written. The memoirs confirm that following the notorious roundup on October 16, 1943, the Vatican “vigorously protested the arrest of Jews, requesting the interruption of such action.”

At Eichmann’s 1961 trial, Israeli Attorney General Gideon Hausner said in his opening statement that “the Pope himself intervened personally in support of the Jews of Rome.” Documents introduced in that trial also confirm Vatican efforts to halt the arrests. In rejecting Eichmann’s appeals, the Israeli Supreme Court expressly noted the Pope’s protest regarding the deportation of Hungarian Jews. Jewish historian Michael Tagliacozzo (himself a survivor of the Roman raid) explained:

The documents clearly prove that, in the early hours of the morning, Pius XII was informed of what was happening and he immediately had German Ambassador von Weizsäcker called and ordered State Secretary Luigi Maglione to energetically protest the Jews’ arrest, asking that similar actions be stopped. . . . In addition, by his initiative he had a letter of protest sent through Bishop Alois Hudal [delivered by Fr. Pfeiffer] to the military commander in Rome, General Rainer Stahel, requesting that the persecution of Jews cease immediately. As a result of these protests, the operation providing for two days of arrests and deportations was interrupted at 2 p.m. the same day.

Instead of the 8,000 Jews Hitler requested, only 1,259 were arrested. After examination of identity documents (the type routinely provided to Jews by Church officials), over 200 of them were released. From then on, the Germans did not conduct another major roundup in Rome. Such evidence overwhelms Goldhagen’s argument regarding an alleged lack of papal involvement.

The Soviet-German War

Like many other papal critics, Goldhagen claims that the Pope favored the Germans in their war against the Soviet Union. The historical record does not support this charge. It is true that in the early and mid-1930s, Hitler and Mussolini were seen by many world leaders (including some officials of the Holy See) as the best defense against the spread of communism. This was, after all, the time of Stalin’s show trials and other measures of mass terror. And it was long before the worst

Nazi atrocities. Moreover, it is now clear that Church leaders were right to fear communism. After the Allied victory, the Soviets expanded their sphere of influence (and their persecution of the Church) throughout most of Eastern Europe, including half of Germany. They murdered millions of people.

Despite his concern over the spread of communism, however, Pius was neither blind to other threats nor unable to recognize virtue in the Soviet people. As early as 1926, at the direction of Pope Pius XI, then-Nuncio Eugenio Pacelli attempted to secure a concordat with the Soviet Union. In 1942, Pius told Fr. Paolo Dezza, S.J. (made a cardinal in 1991): “The Communist danger does exist, but at this time the Nazi danger is more serious. They want to destroy the Church and crush it like a toad.” When the Axis sought to have him bless the German “crusade” into the godless Soviet Union, he refused. In April 1943, Hungarian Prime Minister Nicholas de Kallay met with Pius XII. He recorded:

His Holiness brought up the matter of conditions in Germany. He depicted the conditions prevailing in Germany, which fill him with great sadness, in dramatic words. He finds incomprehensible all that which Germany does with regard to the Church, the Jews, and the people in occupied territories. . . .

He is quite aware of the terrible dangers of Bolshevism, but he feels that, in spite of the Soviet regime, the soul of the large masses of the Russian people has remained more Christian than the soul of the German people.

In fact, by cooperating with Franklin Roosevelt’s request to support extension of the lend-lease program to the USSR, Pius actually gave economic and military aid to the Soviets. (Later, his repeated appeals on behalf of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg again revealed his ability to look beyond the “Communist” issue.)

The recently disbanded Catholic-Jewish study group found that the evidence *does not* support the conclusion that Pius favored the Germans over the Soviets. It is no longer surprising that Goldhagen fails to mention this. However, it does seem shocking that Goldhagen quotes the notorious pro-Nazi Bishop Franz-Justus Rarkowski without mentioning that: 1) he was virtually forced upon the Church by the Nazis (under the threat of having *no* military ordinary or military chaplains); 2) the Church banned Rarkowski from participation in the German episcopacy; 3) Vatican Radio under Pius XII explicitly denounced Rarkowski; and 4) Vatican Radio declared that: “Hitler’s war is not a just war and God’s blessing cannot be upon it.”

The German Catholic Clergy

Goldhagen is particularly critical of the Catholic clergy in Germany. He makes the sweeping and indefensible claim that "the great majority" of Catholic military chaplains "weighed in on the side of the perpetrators, condoning and blessing their crimes. . . . This virtually unknown and unmentioned chapter of the Catholic clergy's role in the Holocaust has barely been investigated." In fact, this subject has been *extensively* analyzed and interpreted by contemporary German historians, but their findings do not support Goldhagen's conclusion.

Catholic clergy were among the first people in Germany to recognize the threat posed by the Nazis. In 1930, the bishops of Berlin and Westphalia condemned the Nazis in pastoral letters. In the spring of 1931, the Bavarian bishops also condemned National Socialism and described it as heretical and incompatible with Catholic teaching. Similar statements were made by bishops in Cologne, Paderborn, and the upper Rhine.

The report from the Nuremberg prosecutor's office outlines dozens of cases where Catholic priests were persecuted due to their opposition to the Nazis. It also shows that the Nazis took steps to silence the Church:

On 28 October 1935 the Propaganda Ministry imposed censorship before publication on all Church periodicals, and on 30 November 1935 this was extended to all writings and picture material multigraphed for distribution. After 1937, the German Catholic bishops gave up all attempts to print their pastorals, and had them merely read from the pulpit.

Of course, sometimes it was impossible even to read statements from the pulpit. The Bavarian bishops' pastoral letter of September 4, 1938 was confiscated and forbidden, as was the pastoral letter of the Bishops Conference of Fulda, dated August 19, 1938.

Goldhagen charges the German clergy with collaboration in turning over genealogical records to the Nazis. What he does not mention is that much of this information was already available to the Nazis by virtue of the German census. To the extent that information was uniquely in the hands of the clergy, and was demanded by the Nazis (under severe threats, one might add), the collaboration of the German Catholic clergy was far from wholesale. As early as 1946, Monsignor J. Neuhäusler, who himself was imprisoned in Dachau, published a massive series of primary documents demonstrating extensive Church resistance to Nazi anti-Semitism, including refusal to hand over genealogical records. The pastoral letters of the German bishops (which were misrepresented in Guenter Lewy's *The*

Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, on which Goldhagen seems to rely) have now been published in full. They vindicate Albert Einstein's famous statement in 1940 that the only organization in Nazi Germany that spoke out against evil was the Church.

Goldhagen's campaign of character assassination against Catholic people goes well beyond Popes Pius XI and Pius XII, but his targets among the German clergy are very poorly chosen. Declassified documents from the OSS show that American intelligence during the war knew well that two of the German Catholic leaders Goldhagen focuses upon (Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich and Bishop von Galen of Münster) were particularly strong in their opposition to the Nazis. (The formerly secret documents are collected in *American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler*, edited by Jürgen Heideking and Christof Mauch.)

In the 1930s, Cardinal Faulhaber wrote Secretary of State Pacelli, describing the persecution of the Jews as "unjust and painful." In 1935, at an open meeting, Nazis called for him to be killed. In February 1936, the police confiscated and destroyed one of his sermons (this happened twice again the following year). On October 25, 1936, members of the Hitler Youth hurled insults at him as he was entering his car. In August 1938, the Nazis searched his office. In late November 1938, after he had given a speech, a uniformed detachment arrived in front of his residence and threw stones at the windows. They shouted "Take the traitor to Dachau" and shattered window frames and shutters. In May 1939, demonstrations against Faulhaber took place throughout Bavaria, and posters were hung saying: "Away with Faulhaber, the friend of the Jews and the agent of Moscow." After the war began, Faulhaber cited Pius XII's encyclical *Summi Pontificatus* in an address condemning Nazis, resulting in a headline reading "Cardinal Faulhaber Indicts Hitlerism" in the London *Tablet*.

After the war, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, one of the leading American voices for the Jewish cause, called Faulhaber "a true Christian prelate" who "had lifted his fearless voice" in defense of the Jews. In fact, Wise felt that Faulhaber had been a much better friend to the Jews of Europe than had Pastor Martin Niemöller.

Bishop Galen also took a leading role in opposing Nazi racial laws. On February 9, 1936, he made a public anti-Nazi speech at Xanten Cathedral. In response, the Nazis charged that Galen was trying to shelter "the corrupters of our race." Galen also helped Pius XI draft the anti-Nazi encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*. Later, Pius XII sent Galen a letter praising his "open and courageous pronouncements" and telling him that letters he had mailed to the Holy See laid the groundwork for the 1942 Christmas message. Upon his death, the regional association of the Jewish communities wrote to the Capitular Vicar in Münster, saying: "Cardinal von Galen was one

of the few upright and conscientious men who fought against racialism in a most difficult time. We shall always honor the memory of the deceased Bishop.”

Goldhagen notes Galen’s protests against the euthanasia program, but he argues that the Nazis did not retaliate against him and asks why the German bishops and the Vatican did not “rally behind Bishop Galen.” In fact, on December 2, 1940—well before Galen’s famous sermons against euthanasia—Pius XII published an official Vatican statement in the Catholic press that unequivocally condemned the killing of “life unworthy of life.” This decree went into every diocese in Germany, and was favorably and publicly commented on by the German bishops. On March 9, 1941, in a public sermon, Cardinal Konrad von Preysing (whom Goldhagen wrongly portrays as a critic of Pius XII) made reference to Pius XII, “whom we all know—I should say from personal experience—as a man of global horizons and broadmindedness [who] has reaffirmed the doctrine of the Church, according to which there is no justification and no excuse for the killing of the sick or of the abnormal on any economic or eugenic grounds.” Other German bishops followed suit, culminating in (not beginning with) Galen’s famous sermons of July and August of 1941.

To compound his errors, Goldhagen charges that Galen’s protests were successful in ending the euthanasia program and that the Nazis did not retaliate. In fact, the euthanasia campaign was not ended, but continued under greater secrecy until the end of the war. Moreover, as one of Galen’s successors, Richard Lettmann, the Bishop of Münster, explained: “After having preached these sermons the Bishop was prepared to be arrested by the Gestapo. . . . The Bishop was deeply dejected when in his place twenty-four secular priests and thirteen members of the regular clergy were deported into concentration camps, of whom ten lost their lives.” The Nuremberg prosecution report also shows that Galen was at times forbidden to speak to the public or to give blessings. In fact, as a result of his outspokenness, Galen’s diocese suffered a far higher death rate than most others. None of these crucial facts are mentioned by Goldhagen.

Cardinal Adolph Bertram of Breslau, also singled out by Goldhagen, first expressed his opposition to National Socialism in 1930, when he refused a religious funeral for a well-known Nazi official. In a widely publicized statement, he criticized as a grave error the one-sided glorification of the Nordic race and the contempt for divine revelation that was increasingly taught throughout Germany. He warned against the ambiguity of the concept of “positive Christianity,” a highly nationalistic religion that the Nazis were encouraging. Such a religion, he said, “for us Catholics cannot have a satisfactory meaning since everyone interprets it in the way he

pleases.” In response to Bertram, the Nazi press cited some of Pope Leo XIII’s pronouncements about the relations of practicing Catholics to political parties to bolster the argument that Catholics could be National Socialists. Secretary of State Pacelli then ordered a lengthy article to be published in the Vatican newspaper correcting the Nazis’ distortions of Leo’s pronouncements, and saying that a Christian should not belong to any political party which works against Christian ideals.

Goldhagen also makes the allegation that Bertram scheduled a Requiem Mass upon Hitler’s death. In point of fact, this is what we know: Bertram was elderly and ill when the war ended. When he died (just weeks later), his papers included a handwritten order scheduling a Requiem Mass for all Germans who died in the war, including Hitler (who was originally reported to have died while fighting), and for the protection of the Catholic Church in Germany. This order was never sent, and the Mass was never held. Bertam’s personal secretary later reported being unaware of this paper or any such proposed order. In fact, the order itself was crossed through with two broad strokes. In other words, the evidence suggests that *someone* (perhaps Bertram, but perhaps not) considered scheduling a Requiem Mass but that Bertram canceled it. Goldhagen here seems to have been misled by Klaus Scholder’s *A Requiem for Hitler: And Other New Perspectives on the German Church Struggle*. The cover of that book shows part of the order, but omits the portion showing that it was crossed through. Once again, Goldhagen’s sloppy reliance on secondary sources has led him to make a serious mistake.

On a related note, Goldhagen asserts that the Polish ambassador pleaded with Pius in vain for the Jews, and that by 1944 Pius XII was so “sick” of hearing about the Jews that he got angry with the ambassador. Goldhagen gives no documentation for this charge. This is hardly surprising, since it is untrue. Pius XII was upset about reports the ambassador was receiving from people *outside of occupied Poland* who, relying on erroneous information, complained that the Pope was doing *too much for Jews*, but not enough for Poles. The Polish ambassador to the Holy See during the War was Kazimierz Papée, whose 1954 *Pius XII i Polska (Pius XII and Poland)* discussed Pius XII’s wartime policies and said that *he agreed with them*. That record is comprehensively analyzed—and supported—in Papée’s book, of which Goldhagen makes no mention.

The French Bishops

Goldhagen says that Pius XII “clearly failed to support” the protest of the French bishops. This is yet another falsehood. At the direction of the Pope, the protests were broadcast and discussed for several days

on Vatican Radio. Statements such as "he who makes a distinction between Jews and other men is unfaithful to God and is in conflict with God's commands" were broadcast into France, in French, on Vatican Radio. Pierre Cardinal Gerlier, a French Catholic bishop who condemned Nazi atrocities and deportation of the Jews, explicitly stated that he was obeying Pius XII's instructions when he made these statements (*Australian Jewish News*, April 16, 1943).

When the deportations began from France, Pius issued a formal protest to Head of State Marshal Henri Pétain, instructed his nuncio to issue another protest, and recommended that religious communities provide refuge to Jewish people. In fact, the American press reported that the Pope protested to the Vichy government three times during August 1942. The result of the protests, unfortunately, was that they angered Vichy leader Pierre Laval, and he reaffirmed his decision to cooperate in the deportation of all non-French Jews to Germany. (This is yet another example of the retaliation that Goldhagen says did not take place.) On August 6, 1942, a *New York Times* headline proclaimed: "Pope Is Said to Plead for Jews Listed for Removal from France." Three weeks later, a headline in the same paper told the story: "Vichy Seizes Jews; Pope Pius Ignored."

The *Canadian Jewish Chronicle* ran the following headline on September 4, 1942: "Laval Spurns Pope—25,000 Jews in France Arrested for Deportation." In an editorial dated August 28, 1942, the *California Jewish Voice* called Pius "a spiritual ally" because he "linked his name with the multitude who are horrified by the Axis inhumanity." In a lead editorial, the London *Jewish Chronicle* said that the Vatican was due a "word of sincere and earnest appreciation" from Jews for its intervention in Berlin and Vichy. Stephen S. Wise wrote in 1942:

It appears to be more than rumor that his Holiness Pope Pius XII urgently appealed through the papal nuncio to the Vichy government to put an end to deportations from France, and the appeal of the Pope is said to have been reinforced by petition and protest from the Cardinal Archbishops of Paris and Lyons. . . . If such papal intervention be factual, then Pius XII follows the high example set by his saintly predecessor, whose word in reprobation of anti-Semitism, "spiritually we are all Semites," will never fade out of the memory of the people which does not forget but forgives.

In August 1942, Archbishop Jules Gérard Saliège, from Toulouse, sent a pastoral letter to be read in all churches in his diocese. It said: "There is a Christian morality that confers rights and imposes duties. . . . The Jews are our brothers. They belong to mankind. No

Christian can dare forget that!" The Vatican newspaper *L'Osservatore Romano* praised Saliège as a hero of Christian courage, and when the war ended Pope Pius XII named him a cardinal.

Goldhagen quotes the recent statement of some French bishops (not *the* French bishops as he mistakenly reports) in which they confessed to the failings of French Catholics during the war. But that statement was critical only of those areas and dioceses in France that fell prey to anti-Semitism. As with the 1995 statement from German bishops, there was no criticism of Pope Pius XII or the Holy See.

Papal Efforts in Hungary

Even Goldhagen has to admit that Pius XII intervened in Hungary, but he attempts to diminish the importance of the Pope's actions by suggesting that his famous open telegram protesting Jewish deportations was isolated and late. Again, the facts are against Goldhagen—or, more to the point, he has set himself against the facts. Jenő Levai, the great authority on Hungarian Jewry, who had direct access to primary archival evidence, documented the Church's rescue efforts in his appropriately titled *Hungarian Jewry and the Papacy: Pius XII Was Not Silent*.

Almost from the first day following the March 1944 invasion of Hungary, Papal Nuncio Angelo Rotta worked to help improve the treatment of the Jews. He issued baptismal certificates and passports that enabled thousands of Jews and converted Jews to leave Hungary. The Holy See also informed other nations about the conditions in Hungary, and this brought international pressure on the Hungarian government. Rotta made several oral protests regarding anti-Jewish decrees, and on behalf of Pope Pius XII he was the first foreign envoy to submit a formal written protest. Shortly thereafter, Rotta received a letter of encouragement from Pius in which the Pope termed the treatment of Jews as "unworthy of Hungary, the country of the Holy Virgin and of St. Stephen." From then on, Rotta regularly protested against the treatment of the Jews and the inhuman character of the anti-Jewish legislation.

On June 25, Pius himself sent the well-known open telegram to the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Miklós Horthy. Goldhagen acknowledges this telegram, but it is worth quoting:

Supplications have been addressed to us from different sources that we should exert all our influence to shorten and mitigate the sufferings that have for so long been peacefully endured on account of their national or racial origin by a great number of unfortunate people belonging to this noble and chivalrous nation. In accor-

dance with our service of love, which embraces every human being, our fatherly heart could not remain insensible to these urgent demands. For this reason we apply to your Serene Highness appealing to your noble feelings in the full trust that your Serene Highness will do everything in your power to save many unfortunate people from further pain and suffering.

Pius XII also sent a telegram to Hungarian Cardinal Justinian Serédi asking for support from the Hungarian bishops. Serédi responded by issuing a statement of his own. It said:

We would forfeit our moral leadership and fail in our duty if we did not demand that our countrymen should not be handled unjustly on account of their origin or religion. We, therefore, beseech the authorities that they, in full knowledge of their responsibility before God and history, will revoke these harmful measures.

This strong statement, issued pursuant to a request from the Pope, was read publicly in the Catholic churches until Nazi authorities confiscated all copies.

On June 28, Archbishop Francis Spellman of New York broadcast a strong appeal to Hungarian Catholics deploring the anti-Jewish measures, which, he said, "shocked all men and women who cherish a sense of justice and human sympathy." These measures were, he said, "in direct contradiction of the doctrines of the Catholic faith professed by the vast majority of the Hungarian people." He called it incredible "that a nation which has been so consistently true to the impulses of human kindness and the teachings of the Catholic Church should now yield to a false, pagan code of tyranny." *Time* magazine reported: "This week listeners at Europe's thirty-six million radio sets might have heard New York's Archbishop Francis Joseph Spellman preaching civil disobedience. The Archbishop's . . . broadcast . . . eloquently urged Hungary's nine million Catholics to disobey their government's new anti-Semitic decrees." The Allies dropped printed copies of it over Hungary. Spellman later confirmed that he had made the statement at the *express request* of Pope Pius XII.

Admiral Horthy complained to the Germans that he was being bombarded with telegrams from the Vatican and others and that the nuncio was calling on him several times each day. In the face of these protests, Horthy withdrew Hungarian support from the deportation process, making it impossible for the Germans to continue. Horthy's reply cable to the Pope said: "It is with comprehension and profound gratitude that I receive your cable and request you to be convinced that I shall do all within my power to make prevail the demands of

Christian humanitarian principles." Horthy agreed to work against the deportations, and he even signed a peace agreement with the Allies. For once it appeared that Pius XII's pleas on behalf of the victims might actually have had a positive effect. The Germans, however, would not be dissuaded by mere words.

The Germans arrested Horthy in October, put Hungary under the control of Hungarian Nazis, and the deportations resumed. The Pope and his representatives then made many more protests to German authorities, issued a report documenting the Vatican's work with the Jews of Hungary, and encouraged Catholics to help the victims. In October, Pius joined in an effort to raise money to support Hungarian refugees, urging the faithful to redouble their efforts on behalf of all victims of the war, regardless of their race. Almost every Catholic church in Hungary provided refuge to persecuted Jews during the autumn and winter of 1944.

On November 10, 1944, Nuncio Rotta protested to the German foreign ministry, saying that "from a humanitarian perspective but also to protect Christian morality, the Holy See protests the inhumane attitude adopted toward the Jews." When Nazi officials suggested that Jews were merely being sent to Germany to work, not for any evil purpose, Rotta sarcastically responded:

When old men of over seventy and even over eighty, old women, children, and sick persons are taken away, one wonders for what work these human beings can be used? . . . When we think that Hungarian workers, who go to Germany for reasons of work, are forbidden to take their families, we are really surprised to see that this great favor is granted only to Jews.

The nunciature in Budapest had been bombed and half destroyed, communications with the Vatican were extremely difficult, and the lives of those Catholic officials still in the city were in constant danger. Nuncio Rotta sent a message to Rome asking what to do. The reply from Pope Pius was: "If it is still possible to do some charity, remain!"

The Germans were finally forced out of Budapest two days before Christmas, 1944. Despite the terrible losses that had taken place during their occupation, most of the Jews in Budapest were saved from the gas chamber.

The World Jewish Congress, at its December 1944 war emergency conference in Atlantic City, sent a telegram of thanks to the Holy See for the protection it gave "under difficult conditions to the persecuted Jews in German-dominated Hungary." Similarly, the American Jewish Committee sent an expression of deep thanks to Pius and Cardinal Luigi Maglione for having helped stop the deportations from Hungary. On May 25, 1945, Nuncio Andreas Cassulo informed the Vatican:

[Chief] Rabbi Safran has expressed to me several times . . . his gratitude for what has been done for him and for the Jewish community. Now he has begged me to convey to the Holy Father his feelings of thankfulness for the generous aid granted to prisoners in concentration camps on the occasion of the Christmas festivities. At the same time, he told me he had written to Jerusalem, to the Chief Rabbi [Herzog], and also elsewhere, in America, to point out what the nunciature has done for them in the time of the present difficulties.

Chief Rabbi Safran also told other Jewish leaders about the Catholic Church's efforts to protect Jewish people. Apparently, however, no one told Goldhagen.

Slovakia and Croatia

In attempting to implicate Pius XII in the atrocities carried out in the Nazi satellite states of Slovakia and Croatia, Goldhagen again makes many inexcusable errors. He mentions the work of Livia Rothkirchen, a respected authority on the annihilation of Slovak Jewry, but he fails to mention that in documenting and appropriately condemning the savageries committed by anti-Semitic Slavs, Rothkirchen emphasizes that they were done in spite of, not because of, Pope Pius XII. In fact, she concludes her major work on the subject with the statement that the several letters of protest delivered by the Vatican during the years 1941-1944 "prove sufficiently that the Vatican objected to the deportation of Jews from Slovakia."

Goldhagen suggests that Vatican action in Slovakia came only after it was clear that the Allies would win the war. In fact, the Nuremberg race laws were introduced in that country on September 9, 1941. Two days later the Vatican's chargé d'affaires in Bratislava (the capital of Slovakia), went to see President Jozef Tiso to stress "the injustice of these ordinances which also violate the rights of the Church." Shortly thereafter, Slovakia's representative to the Vatican received a written protest from the Holy See that these laws were "in open contrast to Catholic principles."

When Jews were deported from Slovakia in 1942, the Vatican Secretary of State immediately filed a protest. On March 21, 1942, a pastoral letter was read by episcopal order in all Slovak churches. The letter spoke of the "lamentable fate of thousands of innocent fellow citizens, due to no guilt of their own, as a result of their descent or nationality." Under direct orders from Pius XII, the Slovak Minister to the Holy See was summoned and requested to take immediate action with his government. The Vatican also instruct-

ed the chargé d'affaires in Bratislava once again to contact President Tiso and seek relief.

Between 1941 and 1944, the Vatican sent four official letters and made numerous oral pleas and protests regarding the deportation of Jews from Slovakia. A letter sent from Pius himself, dated April 7, 1943, could not have been more clear:

The Holy See has always entertained the firm hope that the Slovak government, interpreting also the sentiments of its own people, Catholics almost entirely, would never proceed with the forcible removal of persons belonging to the Jewish race. It is therefore with great pain that the Holy See has learned of the continued transfers of such a nature from the territory of the Republic. This pain is aggravated further now that it appears from various reports that the Slovak government intends to proceed with the total removal of the Jewish residents of Slovakia, not even sparing women and children. The Holy See would fail in its Divine Mandate if it did not deplore these measures, which gravely damage man in his natural right, merely for the reason that these people belong to a certain race.

The following day, a message went out from the Holy See instructing its representative in Bulgaria to take steps in support of Jewish residents who were facing deportation. Shortly thereafter, the secretary of the Jewish Agency for Palestine met with Archbishop Angelo Roncalli (later Pope John XXIII) "to thank the Holy See for the happy outcome of the steps taken on behalf of the Israelites in Slovakia." Goldhagen's suggestion that this was some sort of self-serving effort to protect the image of the Church is unworthy of a writer who claims scholarly credentials.

Goldhagen's treatment of Croatia is similarly egregious. The slaughters committed against Serbs and Jews are well documented, and the collaboration of *some* members of the Catholic clergy is rightly condemned. But postwar Communist propaganda, now acknowledged by all reputable scholars to have been fabricated, is the original source of the allegations against Pope Pius XII and most of the higher-ranking Catholic clergy in Croatia. The Holy See actually filed several protests and papal interventions.

In October 1942, a message went out from the Vatican to its representatives in Zagreb regarding the "painful situation that spills out against the Jews in Croatia" and instructing them to petition the government for "a more benevolent treatment of those unfortunates." The Cardinal Secretary of State's notes reflect that Vatican petitions were successful in getting a suspension of "dispatches of Jews from Croatia" by January 1943, but

Germany was applying pressure for “an attitude more firm against the Jews.” Another instruction from the Holy See to its representatives in Zagreb directing them to work on behalf of the Jews went out on March 6, 1943.

Croatian Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, after having received direction from Rome, condemned the brutal actions of the government. A speech he gave on October 24, 1942 is typical of many that he made refuting Nazi theory:

All men and all races are children of God; all without distinction. Those who are Gypsies, black, European, or Aryan all have the same rights. . . . For this reason, the Catholic Church had always condemned, and continues to condemn, all injustice and all violence committed in the name of theories of class, race, or nationality. It is not permissible to persecute Gypsies or Jews because they are thought to be an inferior race.

The Associated Press reported that “by 1942 Stepinac had become a harsh critic” of the Nazi puppet regime, condemning its “genocidal policies, which killed tens of thousands of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and Croats.” He thereby earned the enmity of the Croatian dictator, Ante Pavelic. (When Pavelic traveled to Rome, he was greatly angered because he was denied the diplomatic audience he had wanted.)

On October 13, 1946, when the postwar Communist authorities tried to concoct a case against Archbishop Stepinac, American Jewish leader Louis Braier stated:

This great man of the Church has been accused of being a Nazi collaborator. We, the Jews, deny it. He is one of the few men who rose in Europe against the Nazi tyranny precisely at the moment when it was most dangerous. He spoke openly and fearlessly against the racial laws. After His Holiness, Pius XII, he was the greatest defender of the persecuted Jews in Europe.

Despite the defense, as well as protests from Pope Pius XII, Stepinac was convicted and sentenced to sixteen years of hard labor. Due to protests and indignation throughout the democratic world, and Jewish testimony as to the good work he had done, he was moved to house arrest in 1951. Almost immediately, Pope Pius XII raised him to the cardinalate.

One of the first acts of parliament in the newly independent state of Croatia in 1992 was to issue a declaration condemning “the political trial and sentence passed on Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac in 1946.” Stepinac was condemned, declared the parliament, “because he had acted against the violence and crimes of the Communist authorities, just as he had acted during the

whirlwind of atrocities committed in World War II, to protect the persecuted, regardless of . . . national origin or religious denomination.”

Ignoring all the facts, Goldhagen ends his grossly inaccurate portrait of Croatia by making another outrageous error: “Forty thousand . . . perished under the unusually cruel reign of ‘Brother Satan,’ the Franciscan friar Miroslav Filipovic-Majstorovic. Pius XII neither reproached nor punished him . . . during or after the war.”

Actually, the so-called “Brother Satan” was tried, defrocked, and expelled from the Franciscan order before the war ended. In fact, his expulsion occurred in April 1943, before he ran the extermination camp (April-October 1943). For Pius XII to have punished him “after the war” would have been difficult indeed. Goldhagen must be unaware that this renegade priest was executed by the Communists in 1945. Many other Croatian priest-collaborators were also punished by the Church (though Goldhagen overstates the number of such priests). All of this is well documented in the archives of the Franciscans, the Croatian archives, and depositions regarding Stepinac’s beatification.

Once again, Goldhagen has attempted to indict Pius by telling the reader the very reverse of the truth. This is explicable only as a premeditated defamation of the wartime Pope and of Catholic people in general.

Holland

Like most papal critics, Goldhagen fails to give important details about the deportation of Jews from Holland. Dutch bishops had warned their followers about the dangers of Nazism as early as 1934, and in 1936 they ordered Catholics not to support Fascist organizations or they would risk excommunication. They forbade Catholic policemen from hunting down Jews, even if it meant losing their jobs. In the summer of 1942, as Jews were being deported from Holland, the Nazis warned Christian leaders not to interfere.

Despite the warning, on July 26, 1942 the Catholic Archbishop of Utrecht had a letter read in all of the Catholic churches, condemning the treatment of the Jews:

Ours is a time of great tribulations of which two are foremost: the sad destiny of the Jews and the plight of those departed for forced labor. . . . All of us must be aware of the terrible sufferings which both of them have to undergo, due to no guilt of their own. . . . We have learned with deep pain of the new dispositions which impose upon innocent Jewish men, women, and children the deportation into foreign lands. . . . The incredible suffering which these measures cause to

more than ten thousand people is in absolute opposition to the Divine Precepts of Justice and Charity. . . . Let us pray to God and for the intercession of Mary . . . that He may lend His strength to the people of Israel, so sorely tried in anguish and persecution.

The result of this statement was tragic. It led directly to the deportation and death of many people, including Edith Stein (canonized as St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross).

On July 30, 1942, a memorandum from the SS declared: "Since the Catholic bishops—without being involved—have interfered in these affairs, the entire population of Catholic Jews will now be sent off this week yet. No intervention will be considered." Up until this time, a Dutch Jew holding a Catholic baptismal certificate was exempt from deportation. As part of the Church's rescue efforts, such certificates were distributed freely during the war.

The official announcement from the General-Kommissar stated: "If the Catholic clergy can thus ignore negotiations, then we in turn are forced to consider the Catholic full-blooded Jews as our worst opponents and to take measures to ship them off to the East as quickly as possible." Since Protestant leaders had refrained from making statements that outraged the Germans, Jews holding Protestant baptismal certificates were not deported at that time. Jewish converts to Catholicism (including Edith Stein) and Jews with false baptismal certificates, however, were deported.

The language from the Nazi officials makes clear that the deportations were made in direct response to the Bishop's letter. Even if Jews with Protestant baptismal certificates were later deported, this situation provides yet another clear example of the type of retaliation that Goldhagen claims did not happen. Many similar situations that would have influenced Pius XII's thinking along these lines are set forth in my book, *Hitler, the War, and the Pope*, and, contrary to Goldhagen's assertion, there is nothing "disingenuous" about the arguments contained therein. The simple fact is that no one spoke out more explicitly than the Dutch bishops, and no country had a higher percentage of Jews killed.

The Example of Denmark and Other Evidence

Goldhagen writes: "Rychlak and the Pope's other defenders fail to discuss the famous and most relevant case for assessing the efficacy of acting on behalf of Jews: the case of Denmark." In fact, I explicitly discussed the case on page 137 of my book:

On April 9, 1940, German troops swept across the Danish border. Danes, including King Chris-

tian X, Catholic bishops, priests, and students, demonstrated solidarity with the Jews by wearing the yellow star in public. Privately, the Danes hid and eventually smuggled almost the entire Jewish population of eight thousand to safety. The Catholic Church played an important role in this rescue, and Pius XII was noted for his contribution to the effort.

Footnotes direct the reader to three different references for this information. It turns out that King Christian may not have ever actually worn the yellow star. Some writers also say that he never even threatened to do so. Legend has it that he did, however, and I certainly did not conceal this information.

As Goldhagen himself concedes, eventually the Germans deported about five hundred Jews from Denmark. Fortunately, many others had escaped by that time. Those who were deported were for the most part sent to a "show" camp at Theresienstadt, where about 90 percent of them survived. Of course, those Jews displaced others who had been living at Theresienstadt. They were sent on to death camps, so the net effect was not what Goldhagen would lead his readers to believe. The main thing for Goldhagen, however, seems to be that he thinks Pius should have set aside all of his other information and relied solely on the approach taken by the churches (including the Catholic ones) in Denmark. That, of course, would have been foolish.

The Pope knew of the retaliation following *Mit brennender Sorge*. He had the example from Holland. He had sent an express condemnation into Poland to be read, but the Archbishop of Krakow, Adam Sapieha, burned it, saying that it would bring too many reprisals. In fact, the Nuremberg report documents case after case of retaliation against clergy (Catholic and Protestant) following statements or other agitation against the Nazi regime.

Rather than endangering others with grand public gestures, Pius ran a rescue operation. Churches, convents, monasteries, seminaries, and the Vatican itself offered shelter, without any distinction based on race, religion, or nationality. A wartime U.S. intelligence document reported that the bombardment of the papal summer retreat Castel Gandolfo "resulted in the injury of about one thousand people and the death of about three hundred more. The highness of the figures is due to the fact that the area was crammed with refugees." No one but Pope Pius XII had authority to open these buildings to outsiders, and the intelligence reports indicate that he personally protested the bombing. In 1988, a beautifully decorated, enormous wooden cross was on display there. It had been given to Pius XII at the end of the war by the Jews who lived there during those terrifying days.

Rescuer John Patrick Carroll-Abbing reported giving assistance to Jews pursuant to the Pope's order that "no one was to be refused" shelter. In fact, in an interview given shortly before his death, Carroll-Abbing said: "I can personally testify to you that the Pope gave me direct face-to-face verbal orders to rescue Jews." Asked about the charge that rescuers acted without papal involvement, he denied it and added:

But it wasn't just me. It was also the people I worked with: Fr. Pfeiffer and Fr. Benoît and my assistant, Msgr. Vitucci and Cardinals Dezza and Palazzini, and of course Cardinals Maglione and Montini and Tardini. We didn't simply assume things; we acted on the direct orders of the Holy Father.

Goldhagen concedes that Fr. Benoît "shepherded hundreds of Jews to safety," but he suggests that this was done with virtually no support from Rome. In fact, Benoît spoke movingly of Pius XII and his undertakings on behalf of Jews. Fernande Leboucher, who worked with Benoît as perhaps his closest collaborator, estimated that some \$4 million was channeled from the Vatican to Benoît and his operation. Even Zuccotti reported that the Vatican provided *some* money to help Benoît's operation.

The last thing a rescue operation wants is attention, particularly when it is likely to bring about reprisals. Goldhagen focuses only on potential reprisals against Jewish people. Such reprisals occurred; but the Pope was also concerned about Catholics. For one thing, Catholic rescue efforts could be harmed, causing further suffering for Jews. More importantly, as Pius said, martyrdom cannot be imposed on someone, but must be voluntarily accepted. Catholic doctrine would not permit the Pope to sacrifice some lives to save others, even if a utilitarian equation might suggest that would be appropriate. (The Church did not, however, vary its approach based upon the identity of the victim. Goldhagen's speculations notwithstanding, the Vatican under Pope Pius XII acted in the same way whether the victims were Catholic priests or Jewish peasants.)

Marcus Melchior, the Chief Rabbi of Denmark during the war, well understood this situation. He explained that Pius had no chance of influencing Hitler, and added that if he had been more confrontational, "Hitler would have probably massacred more than six million Jews and perhaps ten times ten million Catholics, if he had the power to do so." Sir Francis D'Arcy Osborne, British Minister to the Holy See from 1936 to 1947, said:

Pius XII was the most warmly humane, kindly, generous, sympathetic (and, incidentally, saint-

ly) character that it has been my privilege to meet in the course of a long life. I know his sensitive nature was acutely and incessantly alive to the tragic volume of human suffering caused by the war and, without the slightest doubt, he would have been ready and glad to give his life to redeem humanity from its consequences.

Similarly, the Chief Rabbi in Rome during the German occupation, Israel Zolli, said that "no hero in all of history was more militant, more fought against, none more heroic, than Pius XII."

Goldhagen naively suggests a cookie-cutter approach to resisting the Nazis. The historical facts show that sometimes a confrontational approach worked with the Nazis, but other times it did not. Robert M. W. Kempner, the Deputy Chief U.S. Prosecutor at the Nuremberg war trials, explained that a public protest against persecution of the Jews could only lead to "partial success when it was made at a politically and militarily opportune moment." He added that Pius made such protests through nuncios when and where possible. Confrontation would not, however, have been advisable with Hitler. "Every propaganda move of the Catholic Church against Hitler's Reich," he wrote, "would have been not only 'provoking suicide' . . . but would have hastened the execution of still more Jews and priests."

Catholics Who Converted from Judaism

Goldhagen often refers to the Holy See's efforts as being directed towards Catholics who converted from Judaism, as opposed to Jews who were not Catholics. As his wording implies, to the Catholic Church, and in contrast with Nazi philosophy, Jewishness is a matter of religion, not race. Again, however, Goldhagen's allegations run wildly afoul of the facts.

Vatican officials had legal standing to object to persecution of Catholics. Unfortunately, they did not have similar standing when it came to non-Catholics—be they Protestants, Jews, or unbelievers. As it turns out, the Nazis rarely responded positively when protests were made on behalf of Catholics. (At Nuremberg, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop stated that there was a whole desk full of protests from the Vatican. Most went unanswered; many were not even read.) A regime that would not heed Church protests on behalf of its own members would certainly never have listened to Vatican protests on behalf of non-Catholics. The best the Church could do was to try to pass off non-Catholic victims as Catholics and try to intervene to save them on that basis. That is what the Church did by, for example, distributing tens of thousands of false baptismal certificates. (Obviously, these were unnecessary for actual Jewish converts to Catholicism who possessed authentic ones.)

Goldhagen also asserts that Pius did not privately instruct cardinals, bishops, priests, and nuns to save Jews. How does he know this? Catholic rescuers—including people such as Cardinal Pietro Palazzini and Tibor Baranski who were later recognized by Israel as Righteous Gentiles—testified that they received precisely such orders from the Pope. Several other witnesses also testified that such instructions were sent out in the form of letters. Still others, including Fr. Marie-Benoît, Carroll-Abbing, Pope John XXIII, and Pope Paul VI, all testified that they received such instructions from Pope Pius XII in face-to-face meetings, or through other direct channels.

Goldhagen even tries to link the Vatican and Pacelli with the notorious anti-Semite Julius Streicher. Streicher's venomous writings tell a different story. He railed against the Pope's support for Jewish people:

The Jews have now found protection in the Catholic Church, which is trying to convince non-Jewish humanity that distinct races do not exist. The Pope has made his own the false conception of racial equality—and the Jews, with the help of Marxists and Freemasons, are doing their best to promote it. But the Pope's attitude will surprise no one who is familiar with the shrewd schemes of Vatican politics.

Pacelli's opposition to Streicher's worldview was well-known. In *Three Popes and the Jews*, Pinchas Lapide cites a public address by Pacelli in Rome which repeated Pope Pius XI's eloquent statement that "spiritually we are all Semites."

Postwar Statements

Following the arguments of Phayer and Zuccotti, Goldhagen asserts that even after the liberation of Rome, Pius remained "silent" about Jews and anti-Semitism. This is nonsense. Pius made one of his most fervent pleas for tolerance in August 1944, after the liberation of Rome. As reported by Dr. Joseph Lichten, the late director of the International Affairs Department for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Pius said: "For centuries, they [Jews] have been most unjustly treated and despised. It is time they were treated with justice and humanity. God wills it and the Church wills it. St. Paul tells us that the Jews are our brothers. Instead of being treated as strangers they should be welcomed as friends."

In a major address to the College of Cardinals on June 2, 1945, after the surrender of Germany, Pius XII spoke of the background and impact of the anti-Nazi encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*:

In these critical years, joining the alert vigilance of a pastor with the long-suffering patience of a

father, our great predecessor, Pius XI, fulfilled his mission as Supreme Pontiff with intrepid courage. But when, after he had tried all means of persuasion in vain . . . he proclaimed to the world on Passion Sunday 1937, in his encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*, what National Socialism really was: the arrogant apostasy from Jesus Christ, the denial of his doctrine and of his work of redemption, the cult of violence, the idolatry of race and blood, the overthrow of human liberty and dignity.

On August 3, 1946, in a statement that Goldhagen mentions only to belittle (he also ignores or dismisses papal condemnations of anti-Semitism in 1916, 1928, 1930, 1942, and 1943), Pius declared: "There can be no doubt that peace can come about only in truth and justice. This presupposes respect for the rights of others and for certain vested positions and traditions, especially in the religious sphere, as well as the scrupulous fulfillment of the duties and obligations to which all inhabitants are subject." He continued:

That is why, having received again during these last days numerous appeals and claims from various parts of the world and from various motives, it is unnecessary to tell you that we condemn all recourse to force and to violence, from wherever it may come, as also we have condemned on several occasions in the past the persecutions which a fanatical anti-Semitism unleashed against the Jewish people.

Pius condemned racism until the end of his life. In 1957, he received a delegation from the American Jewish Committee. The Committee's representatives described the Pope as a "great friend" in the battle against racism and anti-Semitism in the United States. The Pope, in turn, praised the Committee's work, and issued a statement condemning anti-Semitism. There is simply no legitimate excuse for Goldhagen to have ignored all of these statements.

Fr. Peter Gumpel

Goldhagen's lowest blow is saved for the end of his article and directed at Fr. Peter Gumpel, S.J. An official of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, Gumpel is the *relator* or independent, investigating judge for the cause of Pius XII's sainthood. In what is arguably the most shameful sentence in his entire polemic, Goldhagen writes: "Perhaps the Church protects Fr. Gumpel in his post because only an anti-Semite and a historical falsifier can be counted on to present Pius XII in the glowing manner required for canonization."

Gumpel is a warm man, though he can seem rather formal to those who do not know him. He is a German Jesuit, in his late 70s, with English as his fifth or sixth language. (He is fluent in English, German, Dutch, French, Italian, and nearly fluent in Spanish. He also reads Danish, Portuguese, Latin, classical Greek, and Hebrew.) He was born in 1923 to a distinguished German family.

He was still a boy when Hitler came to power. His family stood in opposition to the Nazis, and this led to the Nazis killing his grandfather as well as other relatives. Gumpel himself was twice sent into exile. The first time he went to France. Later he went to Holland. There, he became active in the underground, putting his life at risk to help escort Jews across the Belgian border.

One night, a teenaged Gumpel received a phone call saying that the Nazis had captured his mother and that she would be killed. Fortunately, a German officer who had been a friend of Gumpel's grandfather intervened and saved his mother's life. The horror of that night has, however, never left him, nor has his abhorrence of Nazism and anti-Semitism. One can sense it in the scorn with which he pronounces the word "Nazi."

Gumpel's experiences during World War II led directly to his decision to enter the priesthood. He joined the Jesuits in 1944. He studied in England for four years and earned several degrees, including a doctorate in the history of Church doctrine. He began teaching at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, and in 1972 he was assigned to the Congregation for the Causes of Saints. He also served on the faculty at the Gregorian and at the Pontifical Oriental Institute.

That Goldhagen would call this good man an anti-Semite is depressingly unsurprising. Goldhagen's analysis of matters like this is shockingly biased. (Witness the way Pacelli's 1933 promise not to interfere "in Germany's internal political affairs" is converted into "the Church's intention to let the Germans have a free hand with the Jews.") His evidence in this case comes from truncated quotations that have been taken out of context. In fact, Gumpel has repeatedly condemned anti-Semitism and affirmed his allegiance to the teachings of Vatican II.

The charge that Gumpel is a "historical falsifier" is perhaps even more outrageous, if that is possible. Goldhagen provides no evidence to support it. Indeed, he leaves the reader entirely in the dark about what it is that Gumpel is alleged to have falsified. This practice of blackening someone's reputation by publicly making unspecified and unsubstantiated charges in a situation where the person has little chance of offering a defense is nothing short of slander.

The New Republic's Obligation

Pope John Paul II has made it a priority to undertake

the very serious work of bringing Catholics and Jews closer together. The Church, most prominently through the Holy Father, has frequently apologized for sins of the past. Sincere efforts have also been made to rid the Church of hostility toward people of other faiths, most obviously at Vatican II.

Goldhagen mocks these efforts. He is particularly harsh on the 1998 Vatican document, *We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah*. That statement explained the difference between anti-Judaism, of which the Vatican admitted "Christians have also been guilty," and the racial anti-Semitism embraced by the Nazis. This latter evil contradicts core Catholic beliefs, and the Church has always condemned it. Goldhagen, however, rejects the distinction.

Goldhagen seems to want nothing less than a renunciation of Christianity. He accuses Pope Pius XII of collaborating with the Nazis and treats the Cross as a symbol of oppression. He lectures about how portions of the New Testament were fabricated and asserts that the very term "New Testament" is offensive. His agenda-driven approach, coupled with sloppy fact-checking and poor analysis, results in one of the most unjust broadside attacks launched against Catholics in a mainstream publication in several generations.

The *New Republic* owed its readers, and more importantly the Catholic people against whom Goldhagen made his reckless charges, the duty of investigating his claims at least minimally before publishing them. While some difference in analysis is certainly to be expected on this topic, Goldhagen's factual errors and his evident malice go beyond all bounds of reason. Eugene Fisher of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, a leader in the promotion of good will between Jews and Christians, called this article "a travesty. And a hate crime." He was right.

At one point in the article, Goldhagen presents a series of questions, rhetorically asking whether Pope Pius XII's supporters can answer them. His response to each of his own questions is, "No good answer." In fact, for each question (with the sole exception of the one about Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, which is a non sequitur) there are perfectly good answers, and they are easily accessible. Goldhagen simply ignores them.

Why did the *New Republic* choose to pass off to its readers this fabrication as scholarly history? The only apparent answer is that the editors were so anxious to vilify Catholics, their Church, and Pope Pius XII—so willing to join in Goldhagen's vicious attacks—that they did not want to learn the truth: Goldhagen's thesis is based upon selective sources, doctored quotations, sloppy inaccuracies, half-truths, and outright falsehoods. People of good will, regardless of their faith, are right to reject it. FT

Books In Review

Kids Will Be Kids

MEDIEVAL CHILDREN. By NICHOLAS ORME. Yale University Press. 387 pp. \$39.95.

Reviewed by Charlotte Allen

NICHOLAS ORME, a professor of history at Exeter University in Great Britain, has published more than a dozen books about ordinary life in the Middle Ages. His latest one, *Medieval Children*, is a delightfully encyclopedic survey of everything imaginable concerning young people from birth to adolescence during a time span extending from the Anglo-Saxon era until the sixteenth century: toys, games, church-going, family life, education, jobs, even fickle teenage crushes.

Orme, however, has more in mind than simply using the rich collection of sources he has amassed to tell readers everything they would like to know about medieval childhood. His book is a deliberate counterattack against a notion that still has quite a bit of popular currency: that the whole concept of "childhood" as a distinct phase of human life is a social construction, an invention of bourgeois modernity whose origins go back no further than the seventeenth century. The instigator of this theory was the French historian Philippe Ariès, who contended in a widely read book, translated into English as *Centuries of Childhood* (1962), that medieval people regarded youngsters as inadequate adults, too small to work productively, and that most parents, perhaps because of

the high rate of infant and childhood mortality during the Middle Ages, declined to form strong affective bonds with their offspring. Moreover, we were told that those offspring married in their teens and spent only short portions of their lives with their mothers and fathers.

Following in Ariès' footsteps, the Princeton University historian Lawrence Stone argued in his *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500-1800* (1977) that the premodern family was a large, porous, multi-generational unit that accommodated a constantly shifting membership of husbands, wives, in-laws, shirttail kin, and assorted offspring whose ties to others in the household were largely loose and opportunistic.

This sort of message resonated across the ideological spectrum. It was naturally appealing to Marxists inclined to view the nuclear family as an oppressive creation of modern capitalism, and also to Freudians inclined to view the nuclear family as a wellspring of Oedipal tension and all-around neurosis. Radical feminists who believed that women could and should raise their children unencumbered by such patriarchal impediments as husbands bought into the Ariès-Stone interpretation of family history, as did advocates of easy divorce, who maintained that there was nothing particularly natural about the two-parent household and that children were tough enough to take the household disruptions to which their fulfillment-seeking parents might subject them. Many secular social conservatives also enthusiastically adopted the Ariès paradigm. For Protestant apologists, it represented yet another opportunity to bash the Catholic Middle Ages as morally lax and to demonstrate that Martin Luther's "domestic church" marked the first time Western European fathers took an interest in their children's Christian upbringing. And for those who regarded the rise of capitalism as a good thing, what

could be better than its fostering of the middle-class Victorian household that sentimentalized children and devoted substantial and emotional resources to their rearing and education? To this day, it is not unusual to hear highly educated people remark offhand that "there was no such thing as childhood in the Middle Ages."

Orme's book joins a large number of more recent studies suggesting that the Ariès paradigm has little to do with medieval reality. The most stunning riposte was *The Ties That Bound* (1982) by Barbara Hanawalt, then a historian at the University of Minnesota. Hanawalt, unlike Ariès, actually looked at medieval documents, specifically the coroners' rolls and other court records of the peasantry of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England that tell as much about how people lived as how they died. She concluded that although medievals did not sentimentalize childhood to the extent that Victorians did, they were deeply attached to their children and saw them as different from adults, with their own distinct children's culture.

IN FACT—surprise, surprise—children of the Middle Ages by and large lived with both their parents in nuclear, not extended, families, with perhaps one or two siblings at most. Rather than marrying in adolescence, they tended to delay wedlock until they were in their twenties just like most of today's young people, and when they did marry—again, just like most of today's young people—they were not keen on having their in-laws and other relatives underfoot, preferring to form their own households in which their children were the chief objects of parental attention and gifts of property. Hanawalt's book and several others that followed it suggested that childhood (not to mention the nuclear family) might be a natural human phenomenon after all.

Orme, who also focuses primarily on England, is very much of the

CHARLOTTE ALLEN is the author of *The Human Christ: The Search for the Historical Jesus* (1998).

Hanawalt school, which includes such other prominent medievalists as Shulamith Shahar, Pierre Riché, Danièle Alexandre-Bidon, Sally Crawford, and Ronald Finucane, along with the folklorists of children's culture Iona and Peter Opie. Orme's aim is to demonstrate that the line between modernity and premodernity is not a bright one when talking about family life.

As he points out, the very vocabulary that medievals used in reference to the young indicated that they were capable of distinguishing, via separate words, not only when childhood began and ended, but several stages of childhood, between infants and little boys and girls as well as between adolescents and full-grown adults. He shows that medieval parents looked forward to the births of their offspring, marking childbearing, baptism, and the churching of the mother with elaborate and festive rituals. They had a notion of the family as an ideal institution, frequently making images, especially on the tombstones of the fourteenth century, of husband and wife surrounded by their loving children. One fourteenth-century writer, Geoffrey de la Tour Landry, declared that parents should pray for

their children every day. Adults delighted in the baby talk of their infants, imitating their sounds—"ba-bay" and "da! da!"—in songs about Jesus nursing in his mother's arms or jokes about how to address Daddy.

Medieval Children contains one hundred twenty-five illustrations, most in color, most taken from manuscripts. Many represent adults' loving views of children just having fun: boys spinning tops, or egging on a cockfight, girls taking in a puppet show, adolescents wrestling, a toddler manipulating a surprisingly modern-looking walker. Adults made ingenious toys for youngsters: hobbyhorses, toy knights, dolls, dollhouse-size plates and candlesticks, marbles, balls, board games, puppets, chessmen and dice, pint-sized lances and bows and arrows. A 1559 painting by Pieter Bruegel that adorns the cover of Orme's book depicts seventy-five different children's games, including hoop-rolling, swimming, wrestling, and handstands. People of the time made rhymes and games and songs that were passed down orally for centuries to our own time. There was even a medieval version of "Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John / Bless the bed that I lie on."

THE PLEASURE THAT medieval adults took in children, whether in making objects with which to amuse them or in recording their play in manuscript illustration, is palpable in Orme's book. They venerated child-saints, and in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there were cults of supposed victims of ritual murder by the Jews, a routine (if grotesque) medieval allegation. They watched their children astutely enough to realize that the onset of puberty in girls comes at a much earlier age than for boys.

Medieval adults also took seriously their responsibility to educate the young. Many children picked up their ABCs and simple prayers written on hornbooks and in primers from their parents, probably their mothers in many cases, as female literacy during the Middle Ages was far more widespread than is commonly thought. (The ubiquitous medieval image of St. Anne giving a reading lesson to her daughter, the Virgin Mary, seems to assume that it was not unusual for a woman to be literate.) Orme suggests that some medieval literature—animal stories, fables, Arthurian romances, rhymes and songs that dealt with children—might

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have been specifically written for young audiences. Teenage girls especially seemed to enjoy love stories. Later, schoolmasters entertained their charges with off-color and scatological rhymes to translate into Latin; "He lay with a harlot all night" is a sample of one those exercises.

Life was certainly not as comfortable for medieval children as it is for today's, as Orme points out. The poorer ones had to go to work as servants at puberty or before; they typically spent their entire teenage years or more in service. The killer epidemics of the Middle Ages, especially the Black Death of 1348-1349, hit young people hard. Children born with deformities could be barred from the priesthood or even marriage—although they were often the objects of compassion as well. Orme describes two fourteenth-century Siamese twins born in Yorkshire who managed to live to about age eighteen, undoubtedly thanks to the care and sympathy of others.

Orme has written a rich, satisfying, and highly readable compendium of just about every practice and custom pertaining to children in the Middle Ages. But he has done something more: he has made it clear that they were indeed children, in the eyes of society and in their own eyes, and that medieval adults left them free to enjoy the pastimes, rhyming games, jokes, and rough sports that seem to have distinguished all the world's children since time immemorial. As Orme writes: "Medieval children shared many of the thoughts and interests of children today. They responded to wordplay, both in speech and in writing. They liked animals and imagined them as people. They had an interest in magic and the supernatural. They mocked one another, and derided unpopular occupations and races. They savored scatological and sexual matters." In other words, medieval children were kids, kids we ourselves would recognize on a playground or in a school-

room today. Of course that's because childhood is a natural phase of life, not a "social construction," as ahistorical theorists would have us believe.

Flirting with Exceptionalism?

THE OLD RELIGION IN A NEW WORLD: THE HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY. By MARK A. NOLL. *Eerdmans*. 340 pp. \$24.

Reviewed by Philip Gleason

HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN religion have been congratulating themselves of late on the booming state of scholarship in their field. In the past thirty years, according to the editors of a recent anthology, no field of U.S. history "has enjoyed a greater renaissance." Moreover, what used to be called "church history" was concentrated in seminaries and denominational colleges; today, religious history pours forth from major research universities. Mark Noll teaches at Wheaton College, which might be described as pan-denominationally evangelical, but he is an outstanding historian of American religion, and his book confirms the excellence of work being done in the field. Before taking it up, however, a look at the larger picture is in order.

It is certainly true that religious history is booming, but rapid growth has generated some problems too. One is the troubling fact that the new research has had little impact on the writing of general U.S. history textbooks, where religion is still virtually invisible. There is also sharp disagreement over whether personal religious beliefs can legitimately enter into the historian's scholarly work. For despite the rise of postmodern "perspec-

tivism," a religious position is not as acceptable as, for example, a feminist stance. However, these issues have gotten less attention than a more diffuse concern about what American religious history really is, and how it should be approached.

The explosion of scholarship itself naturally blurred the boundaries of the field. In addition, more general shifts in American society—racial strife, massive immigration, multiculturalism, identity politics, postmodernism, and a succession of culture wars—abetted "revisionist" tendencies among all historians, including those who work in the field of religion. Some scholars question the idea of *American* religious history as too narrowly nation-bound, if not offensively nationalistic. Other revisionists deny the possibility of any master narrative, or call for a de-centering that

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would recast the story of religion in America as multiple stories, most of them previously overlooked.

Virtually all agree that historical scholarship must reflect the fact that the U.S. is a post-Protestant land. Others argue that the recent influx of Muslims, Buddhists, and other non-

Christians—along with the historic presence of Jews and Native Americans—requires giving the religions of these groups something like equal billing with Christianity. The role of women in American religion also claims greater attention. The same is true of “spirituality,” understood as

the way religion is internalized and reflected in the lives of ordinary believers.

Where does Noll's book fit into this picture? In tackling that question, we begin with a quick look at its contents and structure. *The Old Religion in a New World*, Noll reports, is a revision, expansion, and update of a volume he published a few years ago in Germany as an introduction to the subject for readers in that country. One of its principal aims is to highlight aspects of North American Christianity that distinguish it from Christianity in Europe. To supplement the text, Noll has added two appendices of statistical information on church membership and its regional distribution in the U.S. and Canada, an eight-page chronology of significant events, and a bibliography listing some five hundred books under three major headings and forty-plus subheads.

The contents proper include an introduction, six narrative chapters, five thematic chapters, and a short epilogue. The narrative stresses religious diversity from colonial days on; the hegemonic cultural role of evangelicalism in the early nineteenth century, and its waning influence after the 1830s; the impact of increasing racial and ethnic pluralism after the Civil War; and a mixed scene in the first half of the twentieth century, marked by deep divisions in mainline Protestantism, the impressive growth of Catholicism, and the emergence of new Pentecostal, charismatic, and neo-evangelical impulses. Since the upheaval of the 1960s and the influx of Hispanic and Asian immigrants, the religious picture has become even more mixed, with conservative Christians taking a more active interest in politics and what Noll calls “charismatic spirituality” exerting a pervasive influence on religion itself.

IN SITUATING Noll's book within the context of recent scholarship on American religion, the most obvious point to be made is that it couldn't

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have been written without the flood of new research. In a chapter selected at random, only fifteen of the sixty books and articles cited were published before 1975. It is likewise obvious that Noll has few peers in his mastery of this enormous literature, and in his ability to synthesize it cogently and present the results in lucid and readable prose. His brief but meaty sketches of Christianity's development in Mexico and Canada provide a useful comparative dimension, and the attention he gives to the views of foreign observers reflects the same aspiration to transcend a narrowly national perspective.

Noll's emphasis on diversity as a defining feature of the American religious scene is also in keeping with recent interpretive trends. Present from the beginning and nourished by the freedom of action valued so highly in the national culture, pluralism among Christian denominations has reached staggering proportions (there are, for example, twenty-two distinct Orthodox churches, thirty-six branches of Methodism, 241 of Pentecostalism), and produced a bewildering array of church-related or religiously inspired organizations that extends from Bread for the World to the National Catholic Conference of Airport Chaplains. Along the same line, Noll singles out racial and ethnic diversity as a key element in the distinctive development of American Christianity. He discusses African-American churches in considerable detail, and ethnicity gets careful attention in the narrative treatment of Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Orthodoxy, as well as in a thematic chapter on religious-cultural assimilation.

Noll takes note of the role played by women at various points in the narrative—most notably in discussing Phoebe Palmer's influence in the antebellum shift toward inward spirituality and "holiness"—but he does not treat gender as a way of looking at the whole subject. His thematic chap-



ter on day-to-day spirituality is more clearly in accord with the latest thinking. It covers such topics as the intermingling of formal religion and magic, spiritual reading, hymns, and "material Christianity" (that is, the use of religious artifacts). Noll finds that most of these popular beliefs and practices are as characteristic of Christianity in Europe as in the United States. Two, however, he identifies as distinctive to this country: the emphasis on personal conversion, and the salience of the Bible in American history and culture. He links conversion to Americans' deep respect for the principle of free choice by individuals, and he calls the Bible the only form of religious authority "exempted from America's profound suspicion of the past."

While he thus incorporates in his work a number of revisionist tendencies, Noll is quite clearly a traditionalist in terms of aim and approach. First

of all, he has no qualms about offering a master narrative—a synthesis that provides a comprehensive and coherent story. True, he presents it as the story of American Christianity, rather than American "religion." But the Christian story reaches so far into the nation's past, and is so interwoven in the fabric of national development, that it inevitably comes across as pretty nearly the whole story of American religion. Noll sees the present religious situation as problematic; indeed, he might even concede that "post-Christianity" is a future possibility. But his book leaves no doubt that he would regard *historical* "equal billing" for non-Christian religions as a gross distortion of the past.

ON THE POST-PROTESTANT question, Noll's position is more complex. He brings out Protestantism's overwhelming dominance of the religious scene throughout the nineteenth

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century, and its continuing importance in the twentieth. He also argues that Protestantism played a centrally shaping role in the broader national culture before the Civil War. He cites here the relevance of the idea of covenant for the polity, and the nice fit between Protestant voluntarism and republican liberty. He even strikes a Weberian note in stressing the point that most of the Protestants of the colonial period were Calvinists of one sort or another. That made a difference culturally because Calvinism tied religious concerns more closely to this-worldly activity than was true of other forms of Protestantism.

But Noll also shows that harmony between the dominant religion and the national ethos could lead Protestants to bless prevailing social trends uncritically, thus inadvertently rein-

forcing secularizing tendencies. And he readily concedes that America is now a post-Protestant land, if by that one means that Protestantism has long since lost its cultural dominance and, though still quite significant religiously, takes its place today as only one among many traditions of belief.

That might be sufficiently post-Protestant to satisfy most revisionists, but Noll's efforts to break out of the narrowly national mold would probably be viewed as less satisfactory. The problem here is "American exceptionalism"—which to the historically virtuous is a grievous matter indeed. The objection that Noll does not claim that American Christianity is an "exception" to anything would not acquit him of offense, since whatever even squints toward national uniqueness falls under the ban. Noll, of course, explicitly sets out to high-

light the differences between American and European Christianity; moreover, purists would probably complain that his sidelights on Mexico and Canada—despite being intended to enlarge our horizons—actually serve to reinforce the perception of American distinctiveness.

Noll's book would be open to objections of this sort, but if made how seriously should they be taken? Not at all, in my opinion. Chauvinism, to be sure, distorts, and must be guarded against. But to make a bugaboo of "American exceptionalism" is just as great a distortion, and it is one to which U.S. historians who came of age since the '60s are far more susceptible. In the case at hand, Noll draws attention to real conditions and actual developments—most notably separation of church and state, unprecedented religious, ethnic, and racial

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diversity, and the relative harmony that has prevailed between dominant religious and political principles—that have combined historically to make American Christianity distinctive. Surely there is nothing wrong with that.

This book is a splendid achievement, which triumphantly vindicates the author's way of combining new historiographic perspectives with a traditional approach. It is the finest introduction to the subject available, and should be read by anyone who wants to understand our national religious past.

Living in Interesting Times

THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM: THE COMING OF GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY. By PHILIP JENKINS. *Oxford University Press.* 304 pp. \$25.

Reviewed by David Martin

RECENTLY A Hungarian Catholic sociologist suggested to me that as far as the future social geography of religion was concerned Rome might as well be in the center of Africa as the center of the Mediterranean. The same goes for Latin America, of course. The largest church in the world is in the Ivory Coast, and between Rio and São Paulo there is a new cathedral perfectly adapted to a papal blessing for "the City and the World."

Contemporary Christianity has shifted south, and its preponderant weight has gone pear-shaped, which is the gist of Philip Jenkins' remarkable and disturbing synthesis, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*. The bare facts may be old news, but few have spelled out the trouble they portend for the cultural

DAVID MARTIN is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the London School of Economics.

empire of the liberal establishment of the North Atlantic. Perhaps the broadest public hint so far was provided by the 1998 Lambeth Conference (which in part stimulated Jenkins' book), where southern Christians used their numerical clout to promote opinions thoroughly unfashionable in the north. Queen Victoria's ex-empire from southern Africa to Singapore struck back.

When it comes to the much larger sphere of Roman Catholicism, today's tussles were prefigured five centuries ago, when the Spanish arrived in Chile and the Philippines, and the Portuguese in Congo. According to Jenkins, the key to the ecclesiastical politics consequent on the shift in demographic influence since then is obvious: there are now, for example, only five million Dutch Catholics, and the Vatican can count.

What Jenkins documents without precisely saying so is the dead end seemingly reached by the master narratives generating and generated by the European experience. 1789 petered out in 1989. The Rest of the World had been scheduled to follow the path of ex-Catholic France and post-Protestant Sweden. Philosophy decreed that religious fantasy should empty itself in politics, while liberal theology required faith to demythologize or die. But the corridors of history turned out to be as perverse and cunning as ever.

In the burgeoning Rest of the World we now see a sizable number of Fanon's "damned of the earth" mobilizing behind the banners of the redeemed, and (as I've suggested elsewhere) you can see that as a global version of Elie Halévy's thesis about Methodism sidelining revolution in industrializing England. Just as Wesley's movement was repudiated by, and escaped, episcopal oversight, so the ebullient Christianity of "the South" is repudiated by and escapes mainstream Protestant oversight. There is naught here for the comfort of Bishop Spong or the Jesus Seminar,

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and what we see bears a disconcerting resemblance to New Testament Christianity. Indeed, were New Testament scholars (or Reformation historians) to leave their academies for the fields currently "white unto harvest" they might learn a lot about the dynamics of religious revolution rele-

vant to A.D. 50 or A.D. 1520. Similarly, rationalist Catholic elites might discover just what acculturation means in terms of social reality rather than policy recommendation. It might also be worth noticing just where in the world the Catholic clergy of the future are going to come from.

Alternatively, those millions who "stand before God" in Schiller's prophetic "Ode to Joy" turn out behind the antique drum of a radical Islam. Admittedly, the philosophes admired Islam as a relatively rational religion, but nothing in the Enlightened master narrative prepared us for this half a millennium later. The much promoted empowerment of "The Other" was not really supposed to negate the ideology of its promoters. Hence the unreasoning dismissal of contemporary religious dynamism under the blanket pejorative of "fundamentalism," implying that it is only a reaction to modernity rather than an alternative way to name it and claim it.

IF JENKINS' PRINCIPAL SUBJECT is the southward shift of Christianity, his answering second subject is the encounter of Christianity and Islam as they expand into the unoccupied territories between them all the way from West Africa to Irian Jaya. Again, though this may not be hot news to specialists, especially since Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* (1996) stirred things up, Jenkins is pushing the argument on and into new territory.

First, he takes issue with Huntington by arguing that the population explosion consequent on "birth control lag" among southern Christians will not only sideline white, and especially white European, Christianity, but virtually equal the population explosion of Islam. Second, and more speculatively, Jenkins suggests on the basis of the kind of arguments advanced by Paul Gifford for Zambia (and, in a forthcoming publication, for Ghana also) that we may see a partial reversion to older models of Christendom. This does not mean a reversion to medieval organicism or to a synthesis of church and state, but it may be that some African countries will mobilize their identities in Christian terms.

More immediately alarming is the third leg of Jenkins' argument, which



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simply states an obvious fact that has thus far been politically incorrect to articulate. Whatever the superiority of Islam in tolerating minorities during its millennium of imperial dominance, in the future a globally subordinate Islam will turn increasingly intolerant. That will be so even allowing for the many divisions in Islam itself. Indeed, one might speculate that Islam is now entering that phase of militant ethno-religion signaled in Christendom by the Iberian expulsions after 1492. Clearly that spells danger from Sudan to Indonesia, even though the latter country has so far managed to devise a non-Islamic identity. The places where ethnicity and religion correspond are especially ripe for conflict.

In Africa over a third of a billion Christians are juxtaposed to a roughly equal number of Muslims, and in Nigeria the two are precariously balanced. As for the European border with the Middle East, there has historically been an extrusion of ethno-religious (and other) minorities in both directions. Ethnic cleansing is no novelty, as Muslims in Crete and Bulgaria, and Christians in Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq know very well, but henceforth the Islamic Middle East will become increasingly homogeneous, with its Christian populations moving elsewhere, particularly to the Americas. Meanwhile, a pluralistic Europe may receive some seventy million economic migrants, most of them Muslim, raising the Muslim minority from one percent to approximately 12 percent. One has to hope that recent tensions in Britain with a Muslim minority of 2.5 percent are not an augury of what that could mean.

There are, it seems to me, contrary global tendencies, one mainly pluralistic in partial association with Christianity, and one homogenizing, in partial association not only with Islam but with supposedly tolerant faiths like Hinduism and Buddhism. Maybe the conventional characterizations of

these faiths in terms of comparative tolerance lack adequate sociological contextualization. With respect to Jenkins' speculation about a new homogenizing "Christendom" in parts of southern Christianity, I rather doubt it, given the riotously fissiparous nature of African Christianity. Some countries in Africa are indeed entering a phase of national mobilization and there are ethnoreligious models for emulation available, for example in the Hebrew Scriptures, but if I read Paul Freston's *Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America* (Cambridge University Press, 2001) correctly, these tendencies are not all that pervasive. Certainly global Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant, has moved away from established churches, messianic nationalism, and *intégrisme*, towards voluntarism and pluralism.

The sub-themes of *The Next Christendom* mostly relate to the decline in the numerical and intellectual influence of Europe. One consequence is that Orthodox Christianity, stepping eastward from Serbia to the Urals (and via earlier Russian expansion to Kamchatka), will stay static, and so no

longer be *the* third party of global Christianity. Judaism will also stay static, with some complicated geopolitical consequences in terms of alliances. A U.S. decreasingly European in the origins of its people will, nevertheless, become increasingly Christian, perhaps increasingly Catholic, if one assesses the overall impact of Hispanic immigration and of a differentially Christian immigration from all over the Pacific rim.

JENKINS DESERVES PRAISE for his willingness to assess realities rather than focus on vague aspirations and righteous indignation. The effect of his book's trenchant realism is to highlight the dilemmas that follow from the fact that "we're all liberals now." In particular we have to note the price tag attached to acculturation and indigeneity in terms of the disavowal of liberal Western tutelage on such issues as gender and sexuality. We have also to recognize that we cannot be morally relativistic, and at the same time lambast southern Christians as backward people misled by Texans on the rampage. If we are going to be nonjudgmental and sensi-



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tive to the values, choices, and creativity of others, then even fellow Christians should benefit.

Yet another new world is appearing (to quote a British foreign secretary of the nineteenth century) to “redress the balance of the old,” and we cannot dismiss it airily as just needing to go to school in our better universities. The Christian mainstream, and especially the education it provided, contributed massively to the emergence of the ex-colonial world, and a Kofi Annan (Methodist) or a Julius Nyerere (Catholic) are witnesses to that. But the simple facts are that the new world in the south is not made in the northern image, whether with respect to northerners who expected its Catholicism to be liberationist when it more often turned out charismatic or traditional, or with respect to the liberal mainstream of Protestantism. In “the South,” even the mainstream is relatively conservative, as Lambeth showed in 1998. We live in interesting times, and should perhaps reflect gratefully that nobody identified the likely perpetrators on September 11 as Pentecostals from Brazil or Benin.

Traveler with Blinders

THE BODY AND THE BLOOD: THE HOLY LAND'S CHRISTIANS AT THE TURN OF A NEW MILLENNIUM, A REPORTER'S JOURNEY. By CHARLES M. SENNOTT. *Public Affairs*. 479 pp. \$30.

Reviewed by Habib C. Malik

TRAVEL LITERATURE presents the reader with singular challenges, foremost among them the need to discern the limitations of the genre. When an accomplished writer such as V. S.

Naipaul, for instance, journeys through Islamic lands and writes anecdotally about their culture and attitudes, his accounts, while highly readable and stimulating, do not escape the stigma of prejudice. When a journalist travels and records impressions gathered usually in haste, the problem of fair representation is compounded by the fact that journalists by trade tend to seek “the scoop” and have little time for in-depth analysis or a balanced airing of perspectives. Reporters often read up hurriedly on a region before covering it, and what they read mostly boils down to the popularized narratives of other reporters who have done the same thing before them. Soon a literature accumulates that is superficial in its evaluations, sensationalist in its emphases, and incestuous in its biases. There is nothing wrong with the first impressions or immediate impacts served up in unpretentious travel chronicles that aim mainly to entertain. But these ought not to be confused with serious scholarship offering responsible and measured assessments of complex issues with long, convoluted histories.

The predicament of the Middle East's native Christian communities is not a subject to be treated glibly, nor one to be left solely to the devices of foreign correspondents. There is, to be sure, room for empirical investigation through interviews conducted by careful and discriminating reporters. Charles M. Sennott, former Middle East bureau chief for the *Boston Globe*, is the latest in a series of journalists to traverse the Levant in search of a prism through which to view the morass of the Arab-Israeli conflict. His chosen focus in *The Body and the Blood* is the region's indigenous Christians, and his “journalistic pilgrimage,” as he calls it, recapitulates the stations of Jesus' earthly life and aims “to document the dramatically diminishing Christian presence in this land where the faith began.”

Sennott concentrates on Palestinian Christians, since the path of Jesus' life, which he says he uses as “a narrative theme and an organizational device,” moves mainly west of the Jordan River, with occasional excursions into Egypt and Lebanon. Already here there is a problem of misfocus. Palestinian Christians receive disproportionate attention, given their actual importance in the overall tapestry of Middle Eastern Christianity. The two largest and most significant Christian communities are those of Egypt and Lebanon, and neither interprets its history or its existential anxieties in the region the way the Palestinian Christians do. By highlighting the Christian Palestinians with their highly politicized faith, Sennott ends up legitimizing the view that confrontation with Israel is the overriding theme of Christian life in the Middle East. But this is an error, the result of a misplaced emphasis. Sennott should have been more cautious about accepting the preoccupations of Palestinian Christianity, which is hardly representative of the Christian communities of the wider region.

For Palestinian Christians, Palestinian nationalism, not religious identity and faith, is their ultimate allegiance. Many in fact relish cultivating a secularist outlook that they feel strengthens the bonds of unity with their fellow Palestinian Muslim nationalists. The myth circulating in Palestinian intellectual circles is that sectarian hatreds and interconfessional bloodletting is happily absent from their land, where Muslims and Christians find themselves united as Palestinians against the Zionist usurper and occupier. With the recent resurgence of militant Islamism among the Palestinians, this bluff has been called. Palestinian Christians, including the self-styled secularists in their ranks, have found themselves increasingly sidelined and rendered largely irrelevant.

The fact is that if the Islamists ever fulfilled their dream of defeating

HABIB C. MALIK teaches history and cultural studies at the Lebanese American University (Byblos campus) in Lebanon.

the Israelis and hurling the Jews into the sea, they would hardly be predisposed to share power with Palestinian Christians, secular or otherwise. Instead, they would proceed to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state that would be guaranteed to suppress all its non-Muslim inhabitants without exception. In other words, Israel or no Israel, the mirage of Palestinian nationalism will not save the Christians from the oppression that awaits them at the hands of the radical Islamists who are increasingly calling the shots in Palestinian society.

MUCH OF THIS ESCAPES Sennott, who, like the very Christian Palestinians he observes, turns a blind eye to the endemically subordinate status that has always defined that community. Palestinian Christians are no different from 90 percent of the Middle East's Christians in being essentially *dhimmi*—namely, second-class citizens who are denied many of their basic rights and freedoms. Unsurprisingly, sensitivity to the reality of *dhimmitude* is almost entirely lacking in Sennott's account, as he wanders through one Palestinian village after another attempting to tease out the story of the Christians there. Without probing the subtle and insidious effects of prolonged subjugation under *dhimmitude*, very little can be understood about the plight of Palestinian or Middle Eastern Christians generally, and one is ultimately unable to fathom the roots of the Christian anguish that prevails in cultures in which Islam predominates.

Although Sennott gets it more or less right when discussing Hanan Ashrawi, the most eloquent spokesperson for the Palestinians, he stops short of drawing the necessary conclusions. An academic, a woman, and a Christian, Ashrawi represents the highest and most influential level a non-Muslim has attained in Arafat's Palestinian Authority. Her articulate television soundbites in English

defending Palestinian aspirations have become a staple for Western audiences.

Yet Ashrawi, as Sennott indicates, has privately displayed increasing unease about the growing control that Palestinian Islamists have been exercising among her people, as evidenced by the overtly religious character of the latest intifada. Sennott relates how she correctly warned that the disappearance of the Christians would adversely affect the standing of women in Palestinian society. Still, Sennott does not see that Ashrawi's reluctance to dwell upon her Christian identity, an attitude long predating the current wave of violence and motivated by her desire to emphasize a shared Palestinian nationalism with the Muslims, is an expression of a deep-running and symptomatic *dhimmitude*. Downplaying her religious affiliation has done Ashrawi and others like her little good when Islamism reared its head on Palestinian streets. Today, Ashrawi can be seen to bemoan the sad state to which she and her fellow secular nationalists have been reduced. In the end, *dhimmitude* inevitably leads to the fate of another

high-profile Palestinian woman, Suha Arafat: conversion.

Turning to the Coptic Christians of Egypt, Sennott describes in some detail a series of disturbing incidents experienced firsthand. They mainly involved punitive measures taken against the Copts, both by the authorities and vigilante Islamists, following a double murder in a small town that was pinned on a local member of the Coptic community. The entire sequence of events represents a template of recurring persecutions directed at the Copts, the Middle East's most typical *dhimmi*. For the past 1,400 years, the Copts haven't known what it means to lead a free and dignified existence. Although they are the largest native Christian community in the Arab world, numerical size is really irrelevant here since chronic *dhimmitude* renders its victims incapable of making a positive contribution to their surroundings. Any accurate account of this tragic community would have to focus on the persistent abuse and repression that has afflicted it. It is thus unfortunate that Sennott expresses such deep skepticism



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about the horror stories published by the Coptic associations of America—especially when Sennott himself provides graphic accounts of their mistreatment in Egypt.

IT IS WHEN HE COMES to the Maronite Christians of Lebanon that Sennott displays the worst side of journalistic travel literature. Not only does he choose the occasion of Israel's chaotic withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000 to pronounce solemnly, and disdainfully, on Maronite history and on the community as a whole; he also traffics in the quasi-racist jargon of earlier journalistic gurus, Robert Fisk and Jonathan Randall, who have written about the Maronites.

As the last remaining free, though embattled, Christian community in the Arab world, the Maronites long ago made the historic decision to resist *dhimmitude*, and their destiny ever since has been to pay a high price

in blood and treasure. Sennott views the entire community and its tenacious struggles against oppression through the lens of the collapse of Israel's proxy, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), and especially through the eyes of SLA leader Akl Hachem, who was assassinated by Hezbollah. For Sennott, Maronite rejection of external Syrian occupation and internal Islamization, along with their battles in the 1970s against Arafat's armed state-within-a-state, are all signs of "cultural arrogance," and their thirst for a free existence in dignity merely an expression of "megalo-maniacal imagination."

The primary accomplishment of Sennott's book is to underscore the well-known fact of steady Christian demographic decline throughout the Middle East. On the real danger afflicting these Christians—the spread of *dhimmitude*—it has precious little to offer.

Back to the Future

WARRIOR POLITICS: WHY LEADERSHIP DEMANDS A PAGAN ETHOS. By ROBERT D. KAPLAN. *Random House*. 198 pp. \$22.95.

Reviewed by John J. Reilly

ROBERT KAPLAN has spent the past twenty years reporting on local collapses of civilization, chiefly in sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. He tells us that, in the future, we should expect more collapse rather than less, and over a wider area. Indeed, he declares that "the paramount question of world politics in the early twenty-first century will be the reestablishment of order." The period we have entered will be "the most important decades of American foreign policy"—the years during which the terms of the emerging global civilization will be written. We need more than merely new policies to navigate this stretch of history, Kaplan believes. In *Warrior Politics*, he provides nothing less than the outline of an imperial ethos to guide American elites.

Kaplan says about Western foreign policy pretty much what one wag once said of Queen Victoria: we have pursued goodness to the point of self-indulgence. The result has too often been bloody chaos. Take East Timor, for example. Before the UN insisted on conducting an independence referendum in the region, two things were clear. First, the people would vote for independence from Indonesia. Second, Indonesian partisans would exact revenge violently, unless a foreign security force was placed on the ground to keep the peace. The UN, or rather its members, would not provide such a force, but the do-gooders of the world nonetheless insisted on the international norm of

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self-determination. The result was disaster.

Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the West in general and the U.S. in particular have been guilty of many such exercises of catastrophic good intentions. We punished military governments in places like Pakistan and Nigeria because they were not democracies, though we knew those countries could unravel if civilians took over. We imposed economic sanctions on nations with imperfect human rights records, even though we needed their help in combating forces that were lethally disposed toward us. Often enough, such policies have been driven by nothing more than the irresponsible harping of the press. We could not have continued to conduct foreign policy like that forever. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, we haven't been. *Warrior Politics* does not directly discuss those attacks, but it does explain how our past actions made them more likely.

In essence, Kaplan accuses the Wilsonian tradition of American foreign policy of seeking to apply civic norms to international society. Kaplan describes these norms variously as "Judeo-Christian" and "Kantian." To use such norms internationally is a category mistake, he claims. Civic morality, in Kaplan's view, is a morality of intent. We seek to respect the rights of others, and we ask that others respect our rights. The measure of how well we live up to this standard is the disposition of our will to respect it. However, as Hobbes was rude enough to point out, rights become an issue only after order has been established. Only the Leviathan state can provide civic order, and there is as yet no global Leviathan capable of enforcing universal norms. In the world as it is today, the best we can do is an ethics of result. The goals may well accord with Judeo-Christian ideals, but the means to achieve them often cannot.


Among the many technical points Kaplan never clarifies is how the ethical dilemmas of international states-

manship differ from those of sovereigns acting domestically. Obviously, the duties of private persons differ from those of magistrates, since the latter are responsible for the well-being of people other than themselves. This is the case regardless of whether they are focused on domes-

tic or international problems. Is the ethics of keeping the peace abroad really so different from keeping the peace at home? Kaplan's analysis assumes so, but we are not told why.

KAPLAN IS AT PAINS to emphasize that he is not endorsing amorality, but rather


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


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
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a morality that is not Judeo-Christian. He calls this ethos “pagan,” though he asserts it formed the core of Winston Churchill’s ethics, not to mention the views of such nominally Christian political theorists as Machiavelli and Hobbes. The actual pagans he discusses at length are Sun Tzu, author of the fourth century B.C. Chinese classic *The Art of War*, and Thucydides. *Warrior Politics* is really a meditation on the ideas of these five men, plus those of Malthus, with reference to the needs of the twenty-first century.

The “warrior ethos” that Kaplan endorses takes something from each of them: Churchill’s animal spirits, Thucydides’ caution against arrogance, Machiavelli’s injunction to “anxious foresight,” Hobbes’ assessment of man as a dangerous predator, and the willingness of Malthus to consider that history need not tend toward the increase of human happiness. Inspired in part by an unpublished essay by Michael Lind on the “honor paradigm” in international relations, Kaplan says that the wise statesman of the twenty-first century should be guided by something rather like the code *duello*.

In civil society the state protects us, but in lawless regions we must look to self-help, or to strong protectors. The safety of the weak, in fact, depends on the willingness of the strong to use violence on their behalf. In such an environment, the strong dare not suffer insult, lest their credibility diminish and so invite further attacks against them and their clients. There are limits to violence, however. The strong act from self-interest, but only to the point dictated by necessity. To use more force or cruelty than the occasion demands provokes one’s enemies to unite in self-defense.

Kaplan imagines a world in which conventional military conflict is rare but continues through “asymmetrical” means. Terror and assassination will become, he thinks, the preferred methods of attack, not by the weak, but by the ambitious. The leaders of

the West, and particularly the United States, must be prepared to function in a world in which democratic mass armies no longer ensure security. Future wars “will feature warriors on one side, motivated by grievance and rapine, and an aristocracy of statesmen, motivated, perhaps, by ancient virtue.”

THE ROLE OF THE United States in all this is unique. While not quite a world Leviathan, it is clearly a planetary hegemon. It does not have the luxury that Great Britain had after the Second World War of handing its place in the world over to a compatible power. If anyone is going to embed human rights and the rule of law in the world system, it has to be us. As Kaplan puts it, “Global institutions are an outgrowth of Western power, not a replacement for it.” At least on a military level, that power lies almost exclusively with the United States.

Kaplan suggests that the world is moving to a greater level of institutional unity. He dwells on an analogy between modernity and the Warring States Period in China. That era resulted, after three appalling centuries, in the Han Dynasty at the end of the third century B.C. Kaplan characterizes the dynasty as a loose system of “governance” for the newly unified but highly diverse Chinese world. Inevitably, he also makes the analogy between the United States and Rome; the point of departure is the frequently made comparison between the Second Punic War and World War II.

The role of the United States, then, will be to oversee the formation of a global civilization we would want to live in. Yet Kaplan believes that American patriotism must be preserved if America is to guide globalization. That is, Americans must cultivate Flag Day and the Fourth of July in the interests of national unity. Kaplan’s model here is the myth-making patriotism of Livy, though one may note that Livy idealized the Roman Repub-

lic after it had collapsed, in the first generation of the Empire.

Warrior Politics does not propose a formal system of ethics, not even an ethics of statecraft. Still, while describing an ethos is not quite the same as elaborating an ethics, we may note that the ethical systems that come down to us from the ancient pagans have little to do with the “ancient pagan ethos” of international relations that Kaplan submits for our approval. The eminently pagan Epicureanism and Stoicism were very much philosophies of self-cultivation, not blueprints for empire-building.

Indeed, all of Kaplan’s attempts to apply philosophy to history are problematic. For example, his axiom that “unarmed prophets always fail” has as many historical exceptions as confirmations. He does mention that the unarmed followers of Jesus did “help bring down the Roman Empire,” but without discussing the case in detail. More shocking to FIRST THINGS readers, perhaps, will be his silence about Christian political theory. Though he mentions Niebuhr’s “Christian Realism” favorably, he does not describe it. He makes a passing friendly reference to Richelieu’s and Bismarck’s “pietism,” but only because he believes that it left them free during business hours to maneuver as Realpolitiker. And his remarks about Just War theory are confined to this: “Grotius’ ‘just war’ presupposed the existence of a Leviathan—the pope or the Holy Roman Emperor—to enforce a moral code.”

Warrior Politics is a call for the American political class to redefine itself in terms of a new goal: the maintenance and consolidation of an international system that is, in some respects, a loosely organized global empire. This is a tall order by anybody’s standards, maybe taller than Kaplan realizes. By telling statesmen to seek the attainable “common good” of peace rather than the “highest good” of justice, he is in effect calling for the end of political modernity, the great age of trou-

ble-making reform. Something else he may not realize is how many of the important questions he raises have long been addressed systematically by theologians and ethicists. Universal peace sounds like a good idea, but it will require a thicker foundation than the code *duello*.

the extreme anti-Semitism of the Nazis, there was also the role of the American bishops in influencing the Church to recognize a democratic view of modern society, one that does not view the state as the enforcer of any particular religion. Feldman is good at documenting the Catholic

and Jewish sources, but he seems to be uncomfortable, perhaps unfamiliar, with the profound theological thinking on both the Catholic and Jewish sides that has made this new relationship much deeper than one of mere secular tolerance. Feldman clearly approves of the new relation-

BRIEFLY NOTED

CATHOLICS AND JEWS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA. By EGAL FELDMAN. *University of Illinois Press.* 323 pp. \$34.95.

The book is an account of the history of Jewish-Catholic relations in America for the past one hundred years or so. The author, an American Jewish historian, carefully traces the course of this history and how it turned from being the story of a rather bad relationship into the story of a much more positive relationship. The bad part of the relationship was due to traditional Christian anti-Judaism, and to modern Catholic resentment at the loss of the "Christian civilization" of the Middle Ages, which was sealed by the secularization of society beginning in the late eighteenth century. Whereas many Catholics looked back to the premodern European world with great longing, most Jews associated that world with the widespread persecution of the Jews sanctioned by the Church and were thus happy to be rid of it. Many Catholics saw Jews as, in effect, gloating over the Catholic loss of political and cultural power. This political and cultural battle was brought to America by both Catholic and Jewish immigrants from Europe. Two factors shaped the change in the relationship that began in earnest at Vatican Council II in the 1960s. In addition to the impact of the Holocaust and the painful recognition by Catholics of how easily Christian anti-Judaism lent itself to

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ship, but he seems to have little trust either in its religious integrity or in its ability to endure. Because of this, when dealing with the Jewish sources, he tends to overemphasize the caution exercised by some of the Jewish participants (including this reviewer) in the dialogue and to underemphasize their considerable enthusiasm for it. For this reason, the book functions better as a historical record than as an analysis of why what has happened did happen to the Catholic-Jewish relationship in America.

— David Novak

LINCOLN'S GREATEST SPEECH: THE SECOND INAUGURAL. By RONALD C. WHITE, JR. *Simon & Schuster*. 254 pp. \$24.

With well over half a million soldiers dead but the end of the Civil War in view, Abraham Lincoln gave his Second Inaugural Address on March 4, 1865. In that short speech, Lincoln delivered a solemn and profound meditation on the war, slavery, reconciliation, and divine purpose. "For too long," writes Ronald C. White, Jr. in *Lincoln's Greatest Speech: The Second*

Inaugural, "the Second Inaugural Address has lived within the shadow of the Gettysburg Address." With this book, White moves it out of that shadow with a masterly explication of both the text and context of the speech. He brings full meaning to Lincoln's words by finding the source of his ideas in nineteenth-century Protestant thought, particularly the Presbyterianism that Lincoln always hovered near. White emphasizes a fundamental distinction between fatalism, a secular doctrine of predestination that many assume Lincoln always subscribed to, and providence, the notion of a personal God who operates in and through history. In his immense struggle to make sense of the carnage over which he had presided, Lincoln in the second inaugural embraced the latter and reached a Calvinist conclusion: "The Almighty has His own purposes." As Allen Guelzo recognized in his masterful 1999 biography, *Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President*, a theological approach to Lincoln is the best way to comprehend his thinking, and White understands this as well. And unlike Garry Wills' absorbing but flawed *Lin-*

coln at Gettysburg, White wisely avoids distracting ideological detours and instead concentrates on his subject. At the inaugural reception at the White House that evening, Lincoln asked Frederick Douglass what he thought of the address that he had heard earlier that day. Douglass responded: "Mr. Lincoln, that was a sacred effort." He was right.

— Gregory J. Sullivan

HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? By ROBERT A. DAHL. *Yale University Press*. 198 pp. \$19.95.

Brevity may be the soul of wit, but it is not the soul of constitutional discussion. Robert A. Dahl, emeritus professor of political science at Yale University, has written a very short book on an immense subject: the democratic underpinnings of the U.S. Constitution. Dahl spends seven short chapters ostensibly tackling such questions as the Framers' understanding of the Constitution, comparing the U.S. Constitution to those of twenty-two other democracies, criticizing the composition of the U.S. Senate and the electoral college, and arguing for a Constitution that is more purely democratic. Dahl is concerned less with analyzing competing views of constitutional government than with arguing for changing the U.S. Senate to a body that reflects population (like the House) rather than equal representation for each state. He uncritically assumes that pure democracy is preferable to delegated, representative decision making. Dahl blithely asserts, without support, that the Framers were simply wrong to have feared unmediated democracy. He claims that his purpose is not to propose particular changes to the Constitution, but to change "the way we *think* about our Constitution." Yet most of the book is dedicated to advocating specific changes. However, Dahl is pessimistic that his proposals will ever be adopted and acknowledges that "hid-

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den costs and uncertainties" will follow from any constitutional change. Therefore, he proposes greater discussion of our Constitution (and alternatives to it) in the academy, media, and among the citizenry. He also advocates expanding political equality by equalizing "the distribution of *political resources*." Dahl fails to expand upon this loaded phrase, as he does most of the other questionable suggestions crammed into this ambitious, if surprisingly unserious, book.

— Ian Drake

THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO GADAMER. Edited by ROBERT J. DOSTAL. Cambridge University Press. 317 pp. \$23 paper.

In a century when the most acclaimed intellectuals embraced theoretical and practical extremism of one kind or another, the late Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) stood out as a model of philosophical moderation and good sense. Though he owed his greatest intellectual debt to Martin Heidegger, with whom he studied in the 1920s, Gadamer never followed his teacher in supporting Hitler or in rejecting liberal modernity tout court. In his masterwork, *Truth and Method* (1960; English translation, 1975), he used the "hermeneutic" method of interpreting (mainly religious) texts to examine human life and experience. But unlike the French postmodernists who treat human practices as "texts" in order to "deconstruct" them in the name of anarchistic irrationalism, Gadamer made a far less radical and more fruitful proposal. Philosophy (as well as the other "human sciences") had to begin, he claimed, by recognizing that all human activity and thought, including philosophic and scientific reflection, is rooted in a prereflective "understanding" of the world. That is, philosophy and science emerge out of, and to some extent inevitably remain dependent upon, pre-philosophic traditions and prejudices.

A number of implications follow from this seemingly simple insight. Among the most important is that the modern drive for autonomy from tradition and prejudice cannot succeed, and may even mark a low point in philosophical self-awareness, since those who encourage it fail to understand the crucial and inescapable role of understanding in human life. They do not see that theory is a practice of reflecting on practice, not a form of liberation from it. Plato and Aristotle, whose philosophical work emerged directly out of the common-sense experience of the world and referred constantly back to it for confirmation, had no such illusions about the autonomy of their own intellectual activity—and much of Gadamer's work, before and since 1960, attempted to reawaken our appreciation for the comparatively mundane mode of thinking they engaged in. In books and essays on the good, the beautiful, education, poetry, literature, science, the relation between religion and ethics, and even the "enigma of health," Gadamer spent his extraordinarily long life in constant pursuit of that most elusive of goals, philosophical wisdom. Pope John Paul II paid tribute to the enduring importance of his ideas by relying heavily on *Truth and Method* in explaining the theoretical basis for the Roman Catholic Church's 1999 statement, *Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of the Past*. A more academic tribute can be found in the book under review. As with all of the entries in the *Cambridge Companion* series, the *Cambridge Companion to Gadamer* contains serious scholarly essays on various aspects of the philosopher's thought by leading researchers in the field. It will be of greatest use for specialists already familiar with his work. Others will have to seek out one of the many collections of his essays available at any good bookshop. Hans-Georg Gadamer, requiescat in pace.

WHAT'S SO GREAT ABOUT AMERICA. By DINESH D'SOUZA. Regnery. 256 pp. \$27.95.

Dinesh D'Souza is an American patriot, and he wants us to know why we should be too. Some will say such efforts are superfluous in the wake of September 11, but D'Souza is right to point out the enduring need for "patriotism of the reflective sort," which he does an admirable job of articulating here. An immigrant to the United States (born in India, he was naturalized an American citizen in 1991), D'Souza draws memorable contrasts between the remarkable freedom and economic prosperity that Americans all too often take for granted and the poverty and oppression that prevails in so many other parts of the world. We have, he wishes to remind us, much to be thankful for—and much that is worth fighting for. If at times he goes overboard in his effort to show that virtually every aspect of "American life *as it is lived today* [is] the best life that our world has to offer," D'Souza's enthusiasm and love for his country is, more often than not, charming and contagious.

BOSTON'S CARDINAL: BERNARD LAW, THE MAN AND HIS WITNESS. Edited by ROMANUS CESSARIO. Lexington. 368 pp. \$26.95 paper.

This book's biographical sketch of the Cardinal by Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard Law School provides abundant reason for hoping, and believing, that he will not be remembered chiefly in connection with the sex abuse scandals in the Boston Archdiocese, but there is no denying that the appearance of the book is unfortunately timed. From his childhood in Latin America and the Caribbean, through his years at Harvard, to his priestly work against racial segregation in Mississippi, to his years as bishop in Missouri and archbishop in Boston, Bernard Law has com-

bined astonishing energy, intellectual acumen, and an unqualified devotion to Christ and the Church. His influence on the Church in the U.S., where he is the senior cardinal, and in the world will, one expects, be gratefully acknowledged by generations to come. The homilies, speeches, and occasional remarks gathered here testify also to his literary gifts, addressing with craftsman-like care a remarkable range of causes to which he has given himself: ecumenism, interreligious dialogue, racial justice, the culture of life, and economic and human development in the poor nations of the world. Then there is the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, which he first proposed at the 1985 extraordinary synod of bishops in Rome. Above all, he has been, in Glendon's phrase, a "gatherer of peoples" in his eighteen years in Boston. Those who know him only through recent news reports should read *Boston's Cardinal*. As should everyone who does not shrink from being challenged by a life and ministry of great devotion.

POVERTY AND LEADERSHIP IN THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE. By PETER BROWN. *University Press of New England*. 160 pp. \$15.95 paper.

Peter Brown of Princeton is author of the justly acclaimed *Augustine of Hippo: A Biography*. The present book, delivered as lectures sponsored by the Historical Society of Israel, is the story of the Christian discovery of "the poor." There was philanthropy in the pagan world of the third century, when Christians were five to ten percent of the population, but it was typically bestowed upon "the city" and aimed at the glorification of the giver. The poor were a "gray mass" that did not impinge upon public consciousness. All this changed with the ascendancy of Christianity. Bishops took the "care of the poor" as a primary responsibility, in exchange for which the state

granted tax exemptions and other immunities, in a manner not entirely unlike what are called "faith-based initiatives" today. In order to generate sympathy, bishops frequently employed rhetorical hyperbole in describing the plight of the poor. Brown wryly notes that modern historians of a socialist bent have frequently taken those descriptions at face value, depicting the late Roman and medieval periods in terms of constant class struggle. The chronically poor who were in need of assistance he estimates at somewhat over five percent of the population, which is approximately the same estimate for developed societies today. Brown shows how charity, hospitals, child care systems, and similar institutions arose from the Christian discovery and privileging of "the poor," a social category previously unrecognized. This instructive story is winsomely told in Peter Brown's usual elegant and understated manner.

TOBACCO: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF HOW AN EXOTIC PLANT SEDUCED CIVILIZATION. By IAIN GATELY. *Grove*. 405 pp. \$25.

Of course the book will infuriate the tobacco prohibitionists, but as Gately points out, prohibition movements come and go while the seductions practiced by the *nicotina rustica* leaf go on and on. The author's photo shows him with cigar, so one assumes he is not a disinterested observer of the tobacco wars. But neither is *Tobacco* a tract in the combat. Gately provides a witty, informative, and frequently surprising account of how tobacco, beginning in South America thousands of years ago with cigars three feet long, conquered the world. Its wide acceptance in Europe in the sixteenth century was greatly boosted by the best medical authorities, who lauded its powers to ward off or cure a multitude of human ills, from melancholy to dementia. He cites

many notable philosophers and poets who praised the benefits of the leaf, but somehow missed Johann Sebastian Bach's marvelous *Erbauliche Gedanken eines Tobackrauchers*, which ends each stanza with the refrain, "And so on land, on sea, at home, abroad / I'll smoke my pipe and worship God." *Tobacco* is a first-rate entertainment and is sure to offend anti-tobacco crusaders who need to lighten up, even if they decline to light up.

ST. GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS. By JOHN A. MCGUCKIN. *St. Vladimir's Press*. 433 pp. \$22.95 paper.

Gregory (330-390) is probably the most influential of the Cappadocian fathers and in the East is known simply as Gregory the Theologian. McGuckin, professor of church history at Union Theological Seminary in New York, offers a richly detailed account of his life and thought that, while engaging the pertinent scholarly disputes, is also accessible to the general reader. One wishes there were more on his friendship with Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, the other great Cappadocians, rather than a concentration on their fallings out. Readers should not be put off by the opening chapter in which the author punches his ticket on the usual gender and class concerns, going so far as to indulge in speculation about Gregory's possible Oedipal problems. Once the story gets going, there is much to be learned both about Gregory's theological achievements and about the interaction of the aristocracy, to which Gregory belonged, with the growth of Christianity after Constantine's decree of tolerance. McGuckin's most controversial proposal is that Gregory "corrected" the Council of Constantinople (381), which did not in its conclusions—embodied in what is commonly called the Nicene Creed but, more accurately, the Niceno-Constantinopolitan

Creed—explicitly affirm that the Holy Spirit, along with the Father and Son, is God. That is the affirmation that Gregory fought for, and, when the council balked, Gregory creatively reinterpreted the council as having said what he wanted it to say, McGuckin argues, and that reinterpretation has carried the doctrinal day in both East and West. McGuckin leaves no doubt that he—along with, he says, Gregory—has an understanding of the “development of doctrine” considerably more jagged and episodic than the understanding proposed by, for instance, John Henry Newman.

CHRISTIAN CONTRADICTIONS: THE STRUCTURES OF LUTHERAN AND CATHOLIC THOUGHT. By DAPHNE HAMPSON. *Cambridge University Press*. 323 pp. \$60.

In a compelling and stubborn work of historical theology, the author accuses virtually all of those working in Lutheran-Catholic dialogue of profound unclarity and systematic misunderstanding of one another's theological positions. The author sharpens to a fine point both Lutheran and Catholic ways of structuring the relationship between the self and God, arguing that disagreements over justification run so deep as to make them virtually irreconcilable. Unfortunately, what begins as an earnest and sympathetic engagement of theological dialogue descends into a browbeating of the “ignorant,” “clueless,” and “incomprehending” interlocutors who have attempted to move the dialogue forward. The argument becomes more annoying still when the author uses perceived disagreements as a platform to promenade her own amusing New Age feminism. For a better appreciation of what is at stake for all Christians on these issues see Louis

Bouyer's classic, *The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism*.

GETTING RIGHT WITH GOD: SOUTHERN BAPTISTS AND DESEGREGATION, 1945-1995. By MARK T. NEWMAN. *University of Alabama Press*. 336 pp. \$39.95.

Though most Southern Baptists at one time supported segregationist political attitudes, what has gone largely undocumented was their wide-ranging diversity of religious opinions on desegregation. Newman carefully parses the issue in arguing that Southern Baptists were not only far from being monolithic in their racial views, but that their eventual embrace of desegregation grew largely out of their primary religious identity.

THE LAST LONG PASTORATE: A JOURNEY OF GRACE. By F. DEAN LUEKING. *Eerdmans*. 196 pp. \$20 paper.

The author is pastor emeritus of Grace Lutheran Church in a Chicago suburb, and in this memoir reflects on the satisfactions and discontents, but mainly satisfactions, of pastoral ministry. In the battles that split the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod in the 1960s and 1970s, Lueking was a leader of the “moderate”—opponents said “liberal”—party. His book gracefully and gratefully recounts one modest ministry that provides a prism through which to view larger changes in American Christianity.

CHRIST'S FULFILLMENT OF TORAH AND TEMPLE: A THOMISTIC THEOLOGY OF SALVATION. By MATTHEW LEVERING. *University of Notre Dame Press*. 240 pp. \$24.

The author, who teaches theology at Ave Maria College in Ypsilanti, Michigan, provides an instructive survey

and analysis of Thomas' understanding of the connections between Old and New Testaments, with special attention to the ways in which the Christian understanding of salvation includes the fulfillment of Israel's law and worship.

SELLING THE OLD-TIME RELIGION. By DOUGLAS CARL ABRAMS. *University of Georgia Press*. 168 pp. \$35.

Selling is the key word. In candid detail Abrams traces how fundamentalism's move from aloofness to engagement was made possible, in large part, by using popular patterns of consumption to peddle doctrinal rigidity.

ARCHITECTURE IN COMMUNION. By STEVEN J. SCHLOEDER. *Ignatius*. 265 pp. \$24.95 paper.

The subtitle is “Implementing the Second Vatican Council through Liturgy and Architecture,” and the book is about doing just that. Christian architecture has a history and its own language of speaking both to “the world” and to those gathered in adoration. Everyone involved in the building or restoration of churches should read *Architecture in Communion*.

THE LIVING CHRIST: THE EXTRAORDINARY LIVES OF TODAY'S SPIRITUAL HEROES. By HAROLD FICKETT. *Double-day*. 227 pp. \$22.95.

Fickett combines fast-paced storytelling with spiritual insight in recounting some truly extraordinary lives, including that of Pope John Paul II. Most of the other heroes and heroines, however, are little known or unknown. All of them challenge us to settle for nothing less than spiritual and moral greatness.

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SCANDAL TIME (CONTINUED)

Don't be fooled by the parentheses. "Continued" is the operative word. As in going on and on. I have said it before: we have probably not yet felt the full fury of the storm aroused by the grave misgovernment of the Catholic Church in America. I do not want to write about this, and I wouldn't blame you if you do not want to read about it. Since all this broke in January, I have given no less than thirty hours per week to the subject, talking with endless reporters, and doing radio interviews. (I've been turning down as many as half a dozen television interviews per day, because they take so much time in traveling to studios, and mainly because most of them provide an opportunity for no more than a few sound bites and a food fight.) Please, I'm not whining. It is just to say I'm weary of the subject, but recognize the probability that it will not let us go.

For weeks now, the media have been in a feeding frenzy. I do not say that in criticism of the media. Let it be stated unambiguously: the leaders of the Catholic Church, meaning mainly the bishops, are responsible for the crisis and for the consequent frenzy. Of course some reporting is sensationalistic, and of course it is amusing to see the *New York Times*, day after day, running essentially the same story on the front page, as though they're afraid people are going to forget about it. But, regrettably, there are also new developments, and no doubt will be more, that legitimate the major attention paid.

There is this difference: for the first time in years, I

have the impression that most journalists are really trying to understand what is happening, or at least to find a story line that makes sense of what is happening. In other words, the story doesn't conveniently fall into the conventional left/right, liberal/conservative boxes on which reporters usually depend. Recall that the story started out as a "pedophilia" scandal. The story has rightly moved beyond that now. The scandal is only very marginally about pedophilia. With very few exceptions, it is about adult men having sexual relations with adolescent and older teenage boys. So everybody has by now heard a great deal about "ephebophilia." It is not necessary, however, that we learn a new vocabulary. There's a perfectly good old fashioned word for same-sex sex. Homosexuality is very close to the center of the crisis. At the epicenter is the grave negligence of bishops. Not all bishops, to be sure, but too many. And, as in the case of Palm Beach, Florida, not only grave negligence but active complicity. Two months ago a lawyer and friend of the Church told me that before this is over we will see a bishop or two in jail. I thought that hyperbolic. Now I am not so sure.

It is not the greatest crisis for the Church since the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, as one columnist has written. And it may not even be the greatest crisis the Church has experienced in America. Remember, for one instance, the nineteenth-century controversy over lay control. At stake was whether Catholicism in America would be governed by the traditional hierarchy or adopt a more "democratic" polity along the lines of Protestant denominationalism. For another instance, the massive, mainly Irish, immigration of an earlier time, joined to the virulent anti-Catholic bigotry of the Protestant majority, posed a crisis that went on for decades. Then there was the "Americanist" crisis at the beginning of the twentieth century when, in the view of many, Rome's hostility to key ideas and institutions of the American experiment forced Catholicism into a countercultural ghetto. Today's relentless immediacy of a media culture requires and induces historical amnesia. In its American experience, never mind the many previous

centuries, the Church has hit rough spots much rougher than this. But, once again, this is a crisis.

The Rallying of the Faithful

The crisis is not that millions of Catholics are going to abandon the Church. The papers are full of reports about alienated, devastated, and angry Catholics, and many of them are disappointed and angry with good reason. But they are not leaving, and are not about to leave, the Church. One national poll found that three percent of Catholics interviewed were “reconsidering their relationship to the Church” because of the scandals. That’s less than the margin of error in survey research. I would not be surprised if at least three percent of Catholics are at any given time reconsidering their relationship to the Church, for one reason or another. In the current circumstance, it seems that the more general reality is that Catholics are rallying to the defense of the Church, or at least to the defense of their own parishes and priests. Mass attendance is up, offerings are up, words of encouragement and support are the order of the day. That is the case in my parish and, having talked with people all over the country, it seems to be the general picture. There are exceptions, of course. An acquaintance who is a convert from the Episcopal Church says he is thinking about reverting. At least there, says he, you can take your vice without the scandal. I don’t know whether he’s serious about that.

“Once a Catholic, always a Catholic,” or so the saying has it. I have traditionalist friends, priests and lay people, who are unhappy with that. They say there are not sixty-five million Catholics in the U.S., but, at the most, only twenty million or so *real* Catholics. In their view it would be good riddance if the majority of impostors packed up and took themselves elsewhere. I don’t think so. Other traditionalists say they themselves are sometimes tempted to leave but they are “going to stay and fight.” As though there is somewhere else to go. Such ways of thinking and speaking strike me as profoundly untraditional. Dare I say profoundly Protestant? To such traditionalist friends, I say, I was a Protestant and did not become a Catholic in order to be a Protestant. Catholics speak of the Church as our Holy Mother. A holy and loving mother does not disown her miscreant children. And she remains our holy and loving mother, even when those to whom she entrusts leadership turn out to be unholy or misguided in their understanding of the duties of love.

But, as I say, the evidence is that the Catholic faithful are rallying. Their allegiance to the Church, or at least to their parish church where Mass is said, is deeply heartening. It is, after all, the Mass—which is to

say Christ in the Real Presence—that has always held the Church together. At the same time, there is a troubling aspect to this demonstration of loyalty. It may lead some priests, and especially some bishops, to the conclusion that we’re simply going to ride out the storm. “This, too, will pass.” Of course, this will pass, and the Church will ride out this storm and all the storms to come until Our Lord returns in glory. We have his promise on that. If the gates of hell will not prevail, no number of abusive priests or negligent bishops will prevail.

That is ultimately important but it is not the immediate point. The point is that this is a crisis, and this crisis must be permitted to do its work. That work involves scrupulous self-examination, candid confession, firm contrition, and believable amendment of life. And the doing of that hard work is chiefly up to the bishops. They are the ones who got us into this mess and, given what we believe is the divinely constituted structure of the Church, they are the ones who have to lead in getting us out. Faithful Catholics owe it to the Church and owe it to their bishops not to let them off the hook. In this instance, the virtue of docility includes a respect for bishops that requires recalling them to the duty and the dignity to which they were ordained. Too many of them have neglected that duty and debased that dignity.

One little-remarked dimension of the troubles is that they represent a severe setback for those who have argued that the Church in America should have more authority to govern itself in greater independence from Rome. The claim that the U.S. bishops have demonstrated their capacity for self-government may strike many as a sick joke. Perhaps the June meeting of bishops will restore a measure of credibility to the U.S. conference. But the national conference is not the issue, nor should it be, except to the degree that it can encourage or pressure bishops to do their job. It is, after all, the bishop in the place who is the pastor of the local church, meaning the diocese.

The Nerve to Govern

As I write, the Pope has taken the extraordinary step of summoning the American cardinals for consultation. This comes only days after his meeting with representatives of the bishops conference who said the Pope was leaving it up to them to deal with the problems. Apparently they misunderstood him, or he was subsequently given reason to change his mind. The bishops have said that their June meeting will produce yet another set of “guidelines” for dealing with sex abuse. The summoning of the cardinals suggests that the Pope expects a great deal more than that in response to the crisis.

There is general agreement that the bishops of today are a more solid lot than was the case, say, twenty years ago. Yet, at least on the national scene, there are few who have demonstrated real leadership in the present crisis. And some to whom people might have looked for leadership, such as Cardinal Law of Boston, have turned out to be more part of the problem than of the solution. Resisting and protesting every inch of the way, I have been dragged by the accumulating evidence to the conclusion that I cannot wholeheartedly defend his decision to stay on. A friend of his and of mine says he is just waiting for a moment in which he can exit with more public grace. His friends should not leave it to his enemies to point out that the disgrace already incurred may well preclude that option.

Today's newspaper brings another report, this one about a seminary in the Southwest where the influence of the "lavender mafia" and the consequent and predictable scandals are coming to light. "I have no control over the seminary," the bishop is reported as saying. That is simply false, and represents a grave dereliction of duty. Canonically and pastorally, he does have control of the seminary. It is in his diocese. What he should have said is that he does not have the nerve to exercise the control that was entrusted to him by the Church, and that he accepted by solemn vows before God and man. At the epicenter of the continuing crisis is the simple, however difficult, virtue of fidelity. What is this crisis about? The answer is that this crisis is about three things: fidelity, fidelity, and fidelity. The fidelity of bishops and priests to the teaching of the Church and to their solemn vows; the fidelity of bishops in exercising oversight in ensuring obedience to that teaching and to those vows; and the fidelity of the lay faithful in holding bishops and priests accountable.

I have been told that the proposition is "controversial," but I suggest it is almost embarrassingly self-evident: if bishops and priests had been faithful to the teaching of the Church and their sacred vows, there would be no scandal. Those who would confuse the subject reflexively reach for complexity. No, I am sorry, it is as simple as that. We are reaping the whirlwind of widespread infidelity. If you ask why infidelity became so widespread, the answers do become more complex. Although I expect they all come back to the haunting question of Jesus in Luke 18: "When the Son of man returns, will he find faith on earth?"

Celibacy Not the Issue

Contrary to much current discussion, the problem is not the rule that priests must be celibate. When there is a rise in the incidence of burglary, do we say it

throws into question laws against burglary? When husbands and wives commit adultery, do we say the problem is the virtue of marital faithfulness? Of course not. And if, as now almost everyone recognizes, the scandals are inextricably tied to homosexuality in the priesthood, nobody is suggesting that the remedy is to allow homosexual priests to marry. (Except, of course, for those who advocate same-sex "marriage.") The problem is fidelity, or, more precisely, infidelity. Every priest—voluntarily and with ample opportunity for careful thought beforehand—took a solemn oath to live, by the grace of God, in uncompromised chastity and celibacy. The sadness is that some of them, homosexual and heterosexual, did not really mean it. Because at seminary they were taught, explicitly or by example, that they were not expected to really mean it. Because bishops turned a blind eye to what seminarians were being taught; or, even worse, bishops by their own example indicated that sacred vows do not really mean what they really say, and what the Church says they mean.

But the issue is not celibacy. It is correctly observed that the discipline of celibacy is precisely that, a discipline and not a doctrine. It could be changed. I do not think it should be, but that is for the Magisterium to deliberate and decide. It is frequently being said now that the celibacy rule is a late-medieval imposition aimed at protecting the Church's property from nepotism. That is not true. The celibacy rule is grounded in the words and example of Jesus, Paul, and the earliest apostolic churches. At Nicea in 325 the West wanted it to be firmly adopted by all the churches, but the Eastern churches—in which to this day only the bishops are required to be celibate—defeated that move. In 386 Pope Siricius reinforced the rule of celibacy, a measure reaffirmed by Innocent I (d. 417) and Leo the Great (d. 461). The fact that it had to be repeatedly reinforced suggests that there has always been a problem with its observance. As there is today, much more so than in this country, in Latin America and Africa. Perhaps in the next pontificate or in the one after that, the rule will be reconsidered. I believe it would be a great loss were it rescinded. To explain why I believe that would require another essay. Suffice it to say that it would be disastrous for the rule to be changed, or even formally reconsidered, under the public pressure of the present scandals.

The celibacy rule is so offensive to many of today's commentators, Catholic and otherwise, because it so frontally challenges the culturally entrenched dogma that human fulfillment and authenticity are impossible without sexual intercourse of one kind or another. Among the many oddities of the present circumstance is that a new twist is being given to the old maxim, Hate the sin but love the sinner. It is commonly said that the

maxim has been discredited. It is not explained why or by whom it has been discredited. Hating the sin but loving the sinner—it seems to me, as it has seemed to innumerable worthies through the centuries—gets it just right. There is reason to believe that the maxim is said to be discredited by people who love the sin. Great public indignation is expressed at priests who violate their vow of celibacy. It is frequently the same people who say that celibacy is unnatural and oppressive. In effect, the maxim is now, Love the sin but hate the sinner. Love the fact that people give sexual expression to “who they really are”—whether heterosexual or homosexual—but hate these men for belonging to an institution that teaches that sexual expression is not necessary to being who you really are. In this view, it is intolerable that the largest and most influential moral authority in the world persists in rejecting the sexual expression of the cultural commandment to “follow your bliss.”

I asked an assistant to check out what the gay papers and websites have been saying about the scandals. (NB: In this context, “homosexual” means someone with dominantly same-sex desires, while “gay” refers to a person whose self-identity is determined by such desires.) After one day, he couldn’t stomach any more of the pornography that is endemic to that subculture, but he came up with a sizable portfolio of reporting and editorial comments. For the most part, it would seem that “the gay community,” as it regularly calls itself, is keeping a careful distance from the criminal aspects of the scandals, repeatedly insisting that it does not endorse man-boy sexual relations. At the same time, there are expressions of sympathy for priests who are acting out their homosexual desires and accounts of gays who claim to have had affairs with priests. One young Jesuit describes in detail how grateful he is to his superiors for helping him to understand, affirm, and give expression to his sexual needs. In the gay community, it would seem, the maxim is: love the sin and love the sinner, but hate anyone who calls it a sin or him a sinner.

A Counterintuitive Claim

It is true, as some readers have noted, that we have in these pages tried to maintain a certain distance from the question of homosexuality in the priesthood. Publications such as the *National Catholic Reporter*, on the left, and *Catholic World Report* and the *Wanderer*, on the right, have over the years given the question more attention. We countered Father Donald Cozzens’ *The Changing Face of the Priesthood*, which offered an alarming (alarmist?) picture of the homosexualization of the priesthood, with Msgr. Earl Boyea’s “Another Face of the Priesthood” (FT, February 2001), which

attempted to put Cozzens’ claims into perspective. We had Avery Cardinal Dulles review the McDonough-Bianchi study of the Jesuits, *Passionate Uncertainty* (FT, April), and he did so in his usual balanced manner, correcting some of its more exaggerated claims.

Now there is Michael Rose’s forthcoming book, *Goodbye, Good Men*, which I have had a chance to read. It is a depressingly detailed account in support of the thesis that the so-called crisis in priestly vocations is “artificial and contrived.” Diocesan vocation directors and “formation teams” in the seminaries systematically weed out the “good men” who do not jump through the hoops of psychological testing. They are deemed to be “rigid” or “inflexible” if, for example, they agree with the Church that it is not possible to ordain women, or if they are not “comfortable” with homosexuals in the priesthood and are therefore suspected of the sin of “homophobia.” A subtheme of the Rose book is that some bishops actually want to intensify the vocations crisis in order to promote the abandonment of the celibacy rule and the ordination of women. A large part of the book is based on interviews with manly men who were repelled by seminaries dominated by the “lavender mafia.” Rose names names, and I have checked with people familiar with some of the incidents he recounts. It seems that his reports are generally reliable, but, even if the situation in vocation offices and seminaries is only half as bad as he suggests, it is very bad indeed.

Rose duly notes that in some dioceses vocations are flourishing: Denver, Colorado; Arlington, Virginia; Lincoln, Nebraska; Peoria, Illinois; and Rockford, Illinois, are among the outstanding examples. Without exception, they are dioceses with bishops noted for their orthodoxy. Which brings us back to fidelity. It is simply counterintuitive to claim, as many do, that there is no connection between dissent from the Church’s teaching on doctrine and dissent from teaching on morality. The Church teaches authoritatively on “faith and morals,” and the two are inseparable. For a long time, most blatantly in the organized opposition to the encyclical *Humanae Vitae* in 1968, systematic dissent was inculcated, also in the seminaries. In 1972, the Catholic Theological Society of America (CTSA) established a commission whose findings were published in a 1979 book from Doubleday, *Human Sexuality*. The seeds of everything that has come to light in recent months are to be found there.

Human Sexuality was “received” by the CTSA, which also “arranged” for its publication “as a service to the membership of the Society and a wider public of interested persons.” The book is thoroughly revisionist from A to Z, flying in the face of the Church’s teaching on contraception, celibacy, chastity, homosexuality,

and even—albeit more delicately—on bestiality. Had the CTSA formally approved the study, it would have created a frontal confrontation with the Magisterium. But the book has been widely used in seminaries. Seminarians and priests of the time who had a woman or a male lover on the side could, and did, cite *Human Sexuality* to reasonably claim that a very large part, if not the majority, of the academic theological establishment countenanced their behavior. The CTSA report left no doubt that it represented the avant garde, that the Church's teaching would eventually catch up with "the latest research," and that, while waiting for the Church to catch up, priests should exercise discretion in deviating from the present and woefully benighted official teaching. Thus did academic and theological dissent promiscuously issue permission slips for an era of wink-wink, nudge-nudge, the consequences of which are now on scandalous public display.

Many of the bishops did not and do not have the intellectual self-confidence to challenge the academic theological establishment. A few hardly bother to disguise the fact that they agree with the positions espoused by, for instance, *Human Sexuality*. One bishop, in his self-serving statement of resignation after an unsavory incident with a teenage boy was revealed, went so far as to suggest that his problem was that he was a particularly caring and intelligent person who was attuned to the latest thinking about matters sexual. Most of the publications cited above that have been paying major attention to what is called the homosexualization of the priesthood allow that, at least in diocesan seminaries, the situation has been much improved in the last ten or fifteen years. As has been frequently noted, almost all the current scandals are from twenty or thirty years ago. We should not be surprised, however, if the relentless probings that are now inevitable turn up more recent incidents.

Homophobiaphobia

In all this, relatively little attention has been paid the religious orders where, according to some accounts, deviations from the Church's moral teachings are more common than among diocesan clergy. One reason less attention has been paid is that the orders have their own chain of command and, as one bishop remarked, "The media are out for the blood of bishops." In fact, orders operating within a diocese are accountable to the bishop, but not so directly. An obvious exception in terms of public attention is the Society of Jesus, Jesuits still having a certain panache. (Catholic lay people of a certain age announce with some pride that they are "Jesuit educated." That claim is becoming less common and will possibly disappear in

another generation.) Cardinal Dulles has written here that, despite the "gaying and graying" of the society, Jesuits have been through hard times before and the charism of Ignatius of Loyola will rebound in the future. We must pray he is right. The aforementioned *Passionate Uncertainty* and other reports suggest that the corruption is far advanced. Everybody has their own stories. A young scholastic tells me that he and others were hit on by superiors and decided to lodge a complaint with higher-ups in the society, only to discover that "the higher up we went, the deeper in we were to the lavender regime." Nonetheless, there are still a few virile young men entering the society, determined to revive the Ignatian charism in all its integrity, and one must pray them well.

In 1979, a high-ranking prelate in the Roman curia asked Humberto Cardinal Medeiros, then Archbishop of Boston, about reports of widespread homosexuality among clergy and seminarians. The inquiry was sparked by tapes on homosexuality produced by Fr. Paul R. Shanley that had come to the prelate's attention. Shanley, it may be remembered, is the flagrantly gay priest who, among other things, publicly supported the North American Man-Boy Love Association. The fact that, under Cardinal Law, he was shifted from parish to parish and finally fobbed off on other dioceses was, for many loyal supporters of Law, the final straw. In a confidential document now made public under court order, Medeiros responded to the Vatican inquiry: "The danger in the seminaries, your Eminence, is obvious. . . . Where large numbers of homosexuals are present in a seminary, other homosexuals are quickly attracted. Other healthier young men tend to be repelled." "Since our seminaries reflect the local American culture," he continued, "the problem of homosexuality has surfaced there in a manner which is widespread and quite deep." He was confident, however, that the problem had been remedied. "We have a seminary which has now—within a five-year period—become almost fully transformed into a community of healthy, well-balanced young men. Our numbers are much smaller but now we will attract more young men who will be the right kind of candidate." People who know the Boston seminary very well tell me that Medeiros' confidence, with very few exceptions, was warranted.

One reason the media began searching for a new story line once the issue moved from pedophilia to homosexuality is, of course, the fear of being accused of homophobia. There was quite a ruckus in March when Joaquin Navarro-Valls, the Vatican spokesman, opined that homosexuals "just cannot be ordained." He went so far as to suggest, but did not develop the idea, that homosexuals who had been ordained were not validly ordained, homosexuality being an

“impediment” to ordination in the same way that there may be impediments to a valid sacramental marriage. This gets into sticky territory, given confused and conflicting notions about sexual orientation. (See above on the distinction between “homosexual” and “gay.”) It seems more than likely that, in centuries past, some priests who have been canonized as saints would meet today’s criteria as having a “homosexual orientation.” The issue was not then, and should not be today, the nature of the temptations resisted but the fidelity of the resistance.

The Triumph of the Therapeutic

You have undoubtedly read in the press that the rule for homosexual priests is like the presumably discredited rule in the military, “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” In fact, quite the opposite is the case today, and has been for some time. Seminarians are incessantly asked, and encouraged to incessantly tell, about every quirk and wrinkle in their sexual make-up and imagination. This is “the triumph of the therapeutic” that Philip Rieff wrote about in his classic 1965 book of that title. It is most particularly depressing to hear bishops offer assurances, in response to the present scandals, that they are going to add more psychological testing to the process of forming priests. Psychological testings and probings are, one may suggest, at least as much a part of the problem as of the solution.

The same bishops, more understandably, offer assurances about prompt reporting of criminal abuse to civil authorities. In such preoccupation with the psychological and legal, what risks getting lost is the commonsensical and the moral. Psychobabble and legalities aside, bishops have the job of seeing to it (*episcopos* = oversight) that their priests teach and live in fidelity to the truth about faith and morals expounded by the Catholic Church. In respectfully holding their bishops to account, the Catholic faithful should cut through all the chatter about more psychological testing, updated bureaucratic procedures, and new guidelines for reporting, and ask the simple question, Have you been doing your job? The three-fold job to which bishops are ordained is to “teach, sanctify, and govern.” It is obvious that some bishops have failed to teach and govern, with dire consequences also for sanctification. Had they been doing their job, we would not now be inundated by scandal. If one asks why they did not do their job, the answers are no doubt various, ranging from indolence, naiveté, willful ignorance, doctrinal dissent, and cowardice to active complicity in evil and the fear of blackmail. Some of the answers may be excusable, all are forgivable, but none is edifying.

What the bishops do in their June meeting will not be very credible if they do not forthrightly address the question of homosexuality and its obvious connection with the sexual abuse of adolescent and older teenage boys. This necessarily involves a thorough reform of what Michael Rose calls the “Gatekeeper Phenomenon.” The gatekeepers are the clerical and lay staff of the diocese or religious order who control the various stages of formation on the way to the priesthood, beginning with the admission of candidates to the seminary. They typically include vocations directors, psychologists, nuns and former nuns, seminary rectors, and what are called “formation teams.” The would-be priest runs a gauntlet that, the accumulating evidence indicates, all too often screens out healthy heterosexual men who are religiously orthodox, traditional in their piety, and resistant to manipulative therapeutic techniques that only thinly disguise an ideology of dissent.

As one seminary rector says, “For those men who are exclusively heterosexual in orientation and devoutly orthodox in faith, the difficulty in becoming a priest at the present time must be faced in an objective and dispassionate manner.” Such men who want to make it through the therapeutic gauntlet must keep their cool, resist any temptation to criticize the system, and, above all, learn how to achieve the psychobabble goal of “transparency” while being anything but transparent about who they are and what they really believe. Unwelcome theological convictions must be hidden, along with unfashionable devotional practices. The seminarian who takes the bait and strikes back at the therapeutic regime will likely be sent for special psychological counseling, which provides the formation team with additional material for a recommendation that he be rejected for ordination. To be sure, this oppressive regime does not obtain in all seminaries, but the evidence suggests that it is widespread, and was even more common ten and twenty years ago, thus lending support to the claim that the crisis in priestly vocations is, in large part, “artificial and contrived.”

It should be said that not all that is submitted as evidence is convincing. Michael Rose, for instance, interviews 125 seminarians or former seminarians from fifty dioceses, and the cumulative effect is devastating. At the same time, I cannot help but suspect that some of the rejected whom he interviewed really are rigid and refractory in ways only marginally related to orthodoxy or traditional piety, and would likely not have made good priests. Yet Rose’s account, supported by many others, generally rings true. A friend who is now a happy family man and distinguished academic tells how, when he was a young man, he discerned that he had a vocation to the priesthood. He joined a

religious order and, along with other novices, was sent on retreat. As the novices got off the bus, they were joyfully greeted by older members of the order who gathered around giddily discussing which of the novices was the cutest. He soon packed up and left. That was more than twenty years ago.

Losing Our Native Language

Not very long ago, anyone relating such incidents might have been accused of telling tales out of school. Now the tales are on the front page of every newspaper, and the corruption they reflect must be candidly addressed. Consider again the notorious Fr. Paul Shanley of Boston. In addition to his other activities, he and a gay priest friend owned and operated tourist resorts in California that catered to the gay subculture, including sex at poolside. What would have happened if, even a year ago, Cardinal Law had confronted them and other blatantly gay priests with the alternative of living in obedience to their vows or leaving the priesthood? We can be sure that a powerful protest would have been launched, strongly supported by, among others, the *Boston Globe*, against the Cardinal's campaign of "homophobic repression." It would have taken great courage on the Cardinal's part.

Catholics tell the story of a ten-year-old attending the ordination of a bishop with his father. There comes the point in the ceremony where the opened book of the Gospels is held above the head of the bishop. "What are they doing?" the boy whispers to his father. "Shh," the father responds, "I think this is when they remove the backbone." It's an old story and is not entirely respectful, of course, but the fact that it is told is reflective of a Catholic sensibility that is not devoid of a certain whimsy about the Church's leadership.

In another diocese, priests and nuns are involved in a very public "ministry" to gays and lesbians. They make no secret of the fact that their aim is to help people "affirm" and "celebrate," as they do, a way of life that the Church teaches is gravely sinful. The bishop told them he will not interfere or pry, but if they occasion public scandal, he will show no mercy. The sobering implication is that, for this bishop, grave sin and clerical defiance of the Church's teaching are not as grave a cause for concern as the prospect of legal, financial, and public relations liability. As anyone attentive to the news now knows, this bishop is by no means alone. The dismal reality is that the Church's native language of sin and grace, right and wrong, truth and falsehood, is in danger of being displaced by the vocabulary of psychology, law, and public relations. What profit is it to a bishop if he masters the arts of damage control but is no longer a bishop? One must

resist the perhaps cynical answer that he may be made an archbishop.

We are now at the point where public prosecutors are in a position to give or withhold from Catholic bishops a clean bill of moral health. Morally approved bishops cooperate fully with the state's oversight of their oversight. Having squandered their moral authority to judge right and wrong, and having abandoned the Church's native language of sin and grace, bishops appeal for exoneration to the legal and therapeutic. "I followed the advice of the experts." The telling subtitle of Philip Rieff's classic text *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* is *Uses of Faith After Freud*. Rieff argued that Freud, like most modern thinkers, assumed that human nature is a "jostling democracy of contending predispositions" arranged in no fixed hierarchy. He wrote that psychological maturity is not achieved by writing oneself permission slips to unleash instinctual desires. Maturity is won by the trained capacity to negotiate the conflicting discourses between cultural norms and instinct. Post-Freudian psychology took a very different course, endowing therapy with the power to release and then synthesize the "jostling democracy" of passions. Psychology as an all-purpose tool for achieving a satisfying way of life became, as Rieff put it, "a therapeutic parody of a moral demand system."

The Triumph of the Therapeutic was published in 1965, the final year of the Second Vatican Council. Rieff warned then that authentic spiritual renewal in Catholicism was liable to be confused with the therapeutic ethic, turning the spiritual prudence of pilgrims into the lifestyle ambitions of tourists. Psychology can serve many good purposes, Rieff wrote, but it must not be allowed to become a therapeutic ideology that aspires, like religion or morality, to order the entirety of human life. That, tragically, is what psychology became in too many seminaries and programs of pastoral formation, including the "treatment centers" to which priests and religious are sent when their behavior becomes unacceptably egregious. What Vatican Council II meant by "pastoral" was widely confused with openness to the therapeutic. Euphemisms were concocted to make the pastoral and the therapeutic seem part of a single continuum of spiritual insight and growth.

Perhaps no book on the priestly life and pastoral care has done more damage than the late Henri Nouwen's *The Wounded Healer*. In this view, priests become good pastors to the degree that they expose their own wounds to therapy, inviting others to similar disclosure. The teaching of the Church and centuries of spiritual and moral wisdom are judged by whether they inhibit or enhance the therapeutic norm. And so

the therapeutic marches on from triumph to triumph. Treatment centers for priests take names such as “New Life Center” or “House of Affirmation.” Resisting seminarians are packed off to clinical psychologists for “growth therapy” or what is called “Sexual Attitude Reassessment.” The patient is liberated from “traditional” sexual roles and stereotypes to be his true self while, at the same time, taught to observe the “boundaries” of professional conduct. The Palm Beach bishop who was forced to resign used the claim that he was practicing therapy as an excuse for sex with young men. Three of the seminarians who accused him are now very openly gay. The bishop confessed to “having crossed the boundaries.” In such a view, the boundaries are not grounded in moral truth or fidelity to ecclesial vocation but would appear to be merely external limits on the expression of an otherwise amoral therapeutic.

Given all that has now come to light, bishops should resist the proposal that the solution is in adding another layer of the therapeutic. Some bishops continue to look to the therapists; it would seem to be the only answer they know, except for the force of law. But therapists can provide only a more intrusive and degrading approach to priestly formation. If now the order of the day is to tailor the therapeutic to the fear of legal liabilities, the result will be seminaries ever more disordered and ever more repressive. The result will be more testing, more scrutiny, more coerced self-disclosure and self-discovery—and more files to turn over, in due course, to the public prosecutor. The alternative is love for Christ and his Church, including the tough love of disciplining the wild card in the poker of life that is sexuality. The great task and the great grace, as St. Augustine reminds us, is the right ordering of our loves and loyalties. In a word, fidelity. Or we might go so far as to rehabilitate another word banished by the therapeutic: holiness.

To Be a Priest

As mentioned earlier, there are dioceses and seminaries today that are attracting large numbers of manly, faithful, and holy candidates for the priesthood. The seminarians at, for instance, the North American College in Rome are an inspiration. The same is true of communities such as the Legionaries of Christ. Moreover, and without in any way excusing what has gone wrong, we should not blind ourselves to the fact that there are some in the media who are bent upon exploiting the present scandals in the hope of discrediting the Church and her teaching, especially her teaching with respect to sexual morality. In these months it has been a disappointment that so few non-Catholic Christians

seem to recognize that the attack is not just against the Catholic Church but against Christian faith and morals as such. Nor should we fail to acknowledge the tragedy and injustice when priests who have been faithful for many years are subjected to public disgrace by the exposure of, or even no more than the unverified accusation of, a wayward act twenty or thirty years ago. It is no news that the Church has enemies and that some of them are vicious. Neither is it an excuse for what has gone wrong.

The public scandal of priestly sex abuse first broke in the mid-eighties, and was then muted when the media was rightly embarrassed by its reckless and false charges against the late Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago. The bishops did take action and by 1993 most dioceses had in place much more effective systems, often involving lay review boards, for dealing with charges of abuse. As has been noted, none of the currently publicized incidents are from the last ten years. In this connection, it is also important to ask what bishops have done right in the last decade and more. Part of the answer, it would seem, is the reduced defensiveness of a clericalist culture and a greater involvement of lay people not only in advisory roles but in actual decision-making. It does not diminish but enhances the apostolic authority and dignity of the episcopal office when it is exercised in a relationship of trust and cooperation with the faithful—and the overwhelming majority of Catholics do want to understand themselves as the faithful.

Any discussion such as this must end with the acknowledgment that, despite all, most priests and bishops are faithful, often to the point of heroic self-sacrifice. It has become almost a cliché to say that, but it is a cliché because so many people say it, and so many people say it because they know it to be true. Even in the general media, scandal stories are typically accompanied by an acknowledgment of the fine work done by most priests in helping the poor, providing shelters and soup kitchens for the homeless, and so forth. Their value as social workers outweighs the dubiousness of their being priests. That, of course, is to miss the point quite entirely.

The point is that at ordination a young man hears his name called and responds, “I come to serve.” He lies prostrate at the altar and over him is declared, “You are a priest forever in the order of Melchizedek”; he is indelibly marked and for him is prayed the Litany of the Saints, invoking all the heroes and heroines of the past to assist him in being who he truly is—sacramentally, ontologically, and forever—a priest. He is what he does, his person is conformed to his vocation; he preaches, he baptizes, he forgives, he blesses, he anoints, he intercedes, and, above all, he offers *in persona Christi*, and in the presence of the

angels and archangels and all the company of heaven, the eternal sacrifice by which the world is redeemed. He is a priest, possessed of a dignity, all undeserving, that he earnestly and daily prays he will never besmirch nor betray.

One day the present scandals will be yesterday's news. The lawyers, prosecutors, therapists, and spin masters will leave the stage. The reporters will go chasing after other disasters. The Church will remain. About that there is no doubt. Please God, the Church will remain renewed. I do believe that will happen. Whether and how it happens depends upon the bishops who are primarily responsible for the shame and humiliation of the Long Lent of 2002. Theirs is a historic opportunity for self-examination, confession, repentance, and publicly credible resolve to exemplify, by the grace of God, amendment of life in rediscovering, and calling others to rediscover, the vocation to fidelity.

FT

MORALITY IN THE ABSENCE OF A STORY

Some while back, Robert Jenson wrote "How the World Lost its Story" (FT, October 1993), and it has provided rich grist for many intellectual mills, including Steven D. Smith of Notre Dame Law School in an article in the *Wake Forest Law Review*. The commonly assumed distinctions between the "religious" and the "secular" and between "religion" and "morality" are really very odd, says Smith, and make little sense to people who believe that the world has a story, as in upper case Story. The moral question, How should I live?, has an obvious answer: I should live in harmony with the Story of which my life is part. People who have lost the Story come up with sundry moral theories of a utilitarian or pragmatic sort, but they are finally of a merely prudential sort. And, as Smith notes, a problem with mere prudentialism is that its adoption is imprudent "because if people realize that the point of 'morality' is really to get what we want, then people will lose their incentive to respect the moral-prudential imperatives that prudence itself imposes whenever those imperatives seem to impede us from getting what we want."

And so Smith poses his question this way:

Can we reconstruct a "morality" that is more than merely prudential without a Story? Most

people (or at least most specialists) seem to believe—though perhaps out of desperation—that we can. So they set about devising what we might think of as "Story-substitutes." There are various candidates for this role, but the leading candidates to succeed the Story seem to be, first, moral discourse itself and, second, the characters who remain—who have been left stranded, so to speak, without their Story.

The first Story-substitute proposal observes that although we may not be situated in a Story, as we had supposed, still we do find ourselves situated in a moral discourse. We still use words like "should" and "ought," "right" and "wrong," "naughty" and "nice"; and we still talk about things like "virtues" and "duties" and "rights." This usage seems inescapable, as the nihilist "wannabe" quickly learns when he embarrasses himself by declaring that "we ought to stop saying 'ought.'" Moreover, we still recognize that some ways of using this moral vocabulary seem appropriate and broadly "grammatical"; other usages do not. Indeed, analytical philosophers can devote entire careers to studying and explaining how this moral discourse works. So perhaps this discourse can take the place of the Story; indeed, maybe we will do better—become better moral reasoners—without the Story.

The second Story-substitute proposal suggests that moral rights and duties can be squeezed out of the characters themselves, without the aid of any Story—like the odd movie that succeeds with good characters even without the benefit of a discernible plot. Probably the most influential version of this proposal observes that these characters—ourselves, in other words—aspire (at least intermittently) to behave "rationally." Some people might be inclined to deny that this aspiration is their most important feature, and a few might try to disclaim it altogether; but it proves to be harder than you might think to deny the commitment. Try it: a philosopher will ask you to defend your denial—to explain why you are not obligated to be rational—and as soon as you try to satisfy this request the philosopher will say, "See, you can't deny your rational nature without contradicting yourself, because you resort to reasoning even in resisting rationality." So perhaps this innate rationality can be the source of categorical duties that would provide the substance of "morality." Perhaps it could be shown that some responses to the question "How should I live?" are self-contradictory and hence irrational, and that other responses are not.

Obviously, this is not the occasion to enter into the labyrinthine philosophical debates surrounding these “Story-substitute” candidates. But even for present purposes I think I can notice one objection that is in a sense “pre-philosophical,” and hence that even a non-philosopher might be permitted to raise. I can explain the objection in this way: those of us who remember our upbringing in Idaho may think that these Story-substitute accounts, intriguing and important though they may be, are guilty of “changing the subject.” For all of their ingenuity and their (perhaps considerable) merits, in other words, these accounts seem not to be talking about the same sort of thing that we have all along understood “morality” to be (or that we encounter when we feel ourselves subject to “moral” constraints). “Your analysis is very impressive,” we might say to the Story-substitute proponents, “just as the consequentialists’ analysis was impressive. But you said they weren’t really talking about ‘morality’; and it seems that you aren’t either. Even you ‘moral discourse’ types are talking about how we talk about morality—not about morality itself.”

We might make basically the same point, I think, by asking a “So what?” question. Why does “morality,” thus reconceived, exert any significant moral “pull” on us in the way the Story did (or, for the devout, still does)? When we raise this concern with the proponents of the Story-substitute “moralities” (“Why should I make an effort to comply with my moral ‘duties’ as you understand them?”), the answer typically ends up being either that “That’s just what it means to be ‘moral’ (or ‘virtuous,’ or ‘good’)” or else that if we do not comply with the demands of morality we will have committed a special kind of rational blunder—a “performative contradiction.” And our attitude toward each of these responses is likely to be “So what?” The “So what?”, in this context, is a way of expressing that the Story-substitutes are not, in reality, doing what the Story did: they are, rather, ways of changing the subject.

All of which brings us back to those taken-for-granted distinctions between the “religious” and “secular,” and between “religion and morality.”

Even if it is misconceived, though, the question is still pressed upon us: Is it permissible in our political community for public decisions to be based on moral values informed by religion? So I suppose that the devout citizen will just answer

“yes,” adding under her breath, “Because, in the final analysis, that’s the only kind of moral values there are.” Asking whether citizens should be permitted to rely on religious convictions in addressing moral issues will seem to the devout a bit like asking whether horses should be allowed to run in the Kentucky Derby, or whether participation in symphony orchestras should be open to musicians. The questions seem a bit peculiar, but I suppose the appropriate response is still to smile and say “yes.”

So in the end, the tough-minded, post-Story people and the more traditionally devout people may give the same short answer to our question. But their tone—and their longer answers—will be quite different. The devout citizen answers “yes” while thinking that she is putting up with a good deal of conceptual and perhaps spiritual confusion. The tough-minded post-Story survivor may (if he is an indulgent sort of person) also answer “yes”; but if he does he will believe that he is generously tolerating a good deal of backwardness and obscurantism. And as particular controversies arise (about abortion, or the “right to die,” or same-sex marriage), these deeper differences are likely to make even a surface convergence on a “yes” answer seem quite thin.

Still, there is at least a possibility of convergence, at a fairly abstract level, on the answer. It is harder to understand who ought to be really happy with the question—or with the way the culture that produces the question forces us to talk.

I’m not sure the culture “forces” us to talk that way. The pressure to do so can be defied, as Steven Smith defies it. He is among those whom he calls the devout, and he does not simply smile and say “yes” to the way the question is posed. He challenges the question, and explains why. And so should we all.

FT

IT IS NOT A “CATHOLIC THING”

During what may come to be called the Great Lenten Humiliation of 2002, it seemed that every day the news included another report on a priest accused of sexually molesting a minor—in Atlanta, Amarillo, Texas, or the

suburbs of Seattle. A reader acknowledges that a tu quoque ("You're one, too") defense always sounds petty, but he was curious about the often repeated claim that such abuse is as prevalent among other religious leaders. So he went to his Internet search engines looking for news stories about ministers and rabbis accused or convicted of such offenses. It makes a very thick dossier. He stopped after two hours when he had accumulated over three hundred such stories—from Bakersfield, California, to Chicago, Illinois, to a place aptly named Embarrass, Minnesota. They were all cases dating from 1997 to the present, whereas the publicized Catholic scandals are typically from twenty to thirty years ago.

What does this prove? Perhaps nothing, except that sexual abuse by clergy is more widespread than one might expect. And one might want to see a comparable search on abuse by other professions, such as teachers and social workers. Some might complain that the Catholic Church has been "unfairly" singled out for negative publicity, but that comes with being the Catholic Church. Certainly this reader's findings excuse nothing. But they do provide a measure of perspective.

Just as I was thinking why there was little or no reporting on this in the media, the *Christian Science Monitor* of April 5 ran a long story on a study just done by Christian Ministry Resources (CMR). CMR is an organization that offers legal and tax advice to more than seventy-five thousand Protestant congregations and one thousand denominational agencies nationwide. The study indicates that over the past decade the number of allegations of sex abuse against churches and church agencies has averaged about seventy per week. The numbers peaked in the mid-nineties and have since been declining, largely because of pressure from insurance companies that insist that churches more carefully screen people working with children or else lose their insurance.

Why are there so many more reported instances of sex abuse in Protestant churches? Anson Shupe, an Indiana University professor who has studied the matter, says, "To me it says Protestants are less reluctant to come forward because they don't put their clergy on as high a pedestal as Catholics do with their priests." Abuse is more frequent among church volunteers than among clergy. Some larger congregations are now fingerprinting and doing a criminal background check on anyone over eighteen who works with children. Says one pastor, "If the check comes back with a blemish, they're not working with kids. That's all there is to it." The story quotes others who have dealt with the problem and say that "churches are the perfect environment for sexual

predators, because they have large numbers of children's programs, a shortage of workers to lead them, and a culture of trust that is the essence of the organization." In short, some of the very strengths of the churches are also their weaknesses.

Again, what happens in other religious communities in no way excuses what has happened in the Catholic Church. And yes, it may be unfair that the media tend to depict the sexual abuse of children and young people as a "Catholic problem." Unfair but, for reasons frequently alluded to in these pages, hardly surprising. Leaving aside all the other factors—old-fashioned anti-Catholicism, eagerness to discredit a traditional morality most publicly represented by the Catholic Church, and so forth—look at it from a purely journalistic viewpoint: nobody is going to win a Pulitzer Prize for exposing rude things done to a fourteen-year-old boy in the basement bathroom of, say, Second Baptist Church in Indianapolis. Not even if the elders were informed and tried to hush it up.

The same story about a priest is obviously very different. With the priest the bishop is somehow implicated, and with the bishop the archbishop is somehow implicated, and with the archbishop the cardinal is somehow implicated—and, as everybody knows, all roads lead to Rome and so the story leads to You Know Who, the representative of the oldest and largest institution in the world. And the institution that bears the moral and spiritual authority that the modernity project has been trying to overthrow for three centuries. Catholics should not complain about the unfairness. It comes with the territory.

FT

THE HERMENEUTICS OF LOVE

The suspicion did cross my mind that Alan Jacobs is not playing fair. If, as he has done, you write a book titled *A Theology of Reading: The Hermeneutics of Love*, you might seem to be saying that any reader who does not love the book has not understood it. But I know, as do the readers of his marvelous essays in these pages, that Alan Jacobs is an eminently fair-minded person. So I think he would allow that it is possible to understand his book and yet not like it very much, never mind love it. Fortunately, I do not have to worry about that possibility since I like the book very much, and urge others to read it, lovingly. It is just out from Westview (186 pp., \$18 paper).

Reading with love entails risks, according to Jacobs, including the risk of not being in command of the text. At several points, he quotes Iris Murdoch: "Coherence is not necessarily good, and one must question its cost. Better sometimes to remain confused." And Murdoch again: "Art and morals are one. . . . Love is the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real." Although Jacobs enters into lively exchange with the usual mandarins of contemporary criticism—Wayne Booth, Martha Nussbaum, Jacques Derrida, John Milbank, et al.—every page is under the long shadow of Augustine, who explained in *De Doctrina Christiana* that love of God and neighbor is required to understand Scripture. Augustine makes the remarkable claim that "Whoever finds a lesson in the text that is useful to the building of charity, even though he has not said what the author may be shown to have intended in that place, has not been deceived, nor is he lying in any way." What we would ordinarily call a misinterpretation may be a "right" interpretation if it serves love, which is, according to Scripture, both God's purpose and being.

In sharpest contrast is a Cartesian hermeneutics that requires a distancing or alienation from the text. Here the posture is one of neutrality and devotion to objectivity. Jacobs finds merit in Hegel's observation that the demand for neutrality generally means that the interpreter of a text should expound its meaning as if he, the interpreter, were dead. Hans-Georg Gadamer (who recently died at age 102) argued that the notion of objectivity had its roots in the Protestant Reformers of the sixteenth century. The Reformers had to defend their own interpretation of the Bible, Gadamer noted, and were up against Catholic theologians who appealed to the indispensability of tradition. Jacobs, a Protestant, writes: "The Reformers found themselves obliged by their polemical situation to show that they could specify a set of reliable safeguards against error—safeguards which would serve a similar liminal function to the concept of 'tradition' in the Roman Catholic Church—and this need to provide safeguards and eliminate error came to dominate the hermeneutical tradition for the next several centuries. The chief goal of theological hermeneutics naturally, then, comes to be associated more closely with 'getting it right' than with a deepening of understanding or a growing in love." That may be a bit harsh, but I expect there is a good deal to it. It must be added that there were also Catholic interpreters who used Scripture *and* tradition in order to win an argument. The difference is between using, even exploiting, the text and serving the text in love. Between the reader and the text, it is a matter of who submits to whom.

A Hard Saying

My problem with parts of Jacobs' argument may have something to do with the fact that this office receives hundreds and hundreds of books for review. New stacks grow faster than old ones can be—always judiciously!—whittled down. I expect we give more attention to books than any comparable journal in the world. (Yes, you're right: there is no publication that is *really* comparable, but modesty excuses the figure of speech.) Yet we can review or even briefly note but a small fraction of all the books received. Little wonder that Jacobs induces a sense of guilt: "Charity demands that we extend the gift of love to all books, and receive the gift of love when it is offered to us. . . . There is no single form that either the giving or the receiving takes, and moreover there is no inconsistency in having certain favorite books while seeking to love all other books in the way appropriate to them. . . . We may indeed use books—it is right and proper that we do so—but we must use them in the way that Augustine counsels, which is to say, a way that recognizes their value as parts of God's world and that therefore loves them in an ordinate manner."

That is a hard saying for book review editors, and maybe Jacobs did not have editors in mind. Even for the editor, however, Jacobs leaves some out. We do try to love them all "in the way appropriate to them" and in a manner that is "ordinate." Appropriately and ordinately, most get tossed after a brief examination. Not without a touch of sadness, however. Some are simply not pertinent to our interests (making a billion in the market or getting right with God through aerobics), while many are simply bad books, meaning they are impossibly wrongheaded or impossibly dull, or both. Yet one is aware that even a bad book is somebody's pride, joy, and proffered contribution to making the world a much better place. Always in my mind is the image of the author incensed by our god-like arrogance in consigning his book to the bin destined for the Strand, a store around the corner that advertises its offering of eight miles of lost books. It is a sadness, but it cannot be helped. True, we frequently publish comment on really bad books, but that is usually in cases where misguided editors elsewhere give them favorable notice, thus potentially misleading the unwary reader. Does that sound arrogant? It probably is. Arrogance is endemic to this business, and it is a wonder that Damon Linker, who has primary responsibility for books in this shop, has not succumbed, to date.

A Final Homecoming

But I wander from Alan Jacobs' argument. The

person he draws on, perhaps more than any other, is the Russian thinker Mikhail Bakhtin, whose books, mainly published by the University of Texas Press, are not as well known here as they deserve to be. Bakhtin can at times sound like the trendiest of postmodernists, the kind I examined a while back in an essay on George Steiner and Paul Fiddes ("The End of Endings," *FT*, August/September 2001). But, as we shall see, there is a critical difference with Bakhtin. Here, for example, is a suggestive passage:

There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends into the boundless past and the boundless future). Even past meanings, that is, those born in the dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all)—they will always change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent, future development of the dialogue. At any moment in the development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of forgotten contextual meanings, but at certain moments of the dialogue's subsequent development along the way they are recalled and invigorated in renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will have its homecoming festival.

That may sound a lot like the never ending, never resolved, and never resolvable "conversation" that is the model of interpretation espoused by such as Richard Rorty or Stanley Fish. There is a crucial difference, however. Bakhtin is a Christian. Eschatology provides the comic, viz., happy, ending. Jacobs writes, "For Bakhtin, God is the Father who waits patiently but hopefully for the world's prodigal meanings to return to Him and receive His blessing. Bakhtin implicitly invites us as readers to wait in patient hope for that consummation, and to participate, at first proleptically and then fully, in the 'homecoming festival.'" The thought of all prodigal meanings returning for the Father's blessing is fetching, although it would seem that some prodigals never return, persisting to the end in being, quite simply and damningly, wrong. One may, by stretching hope, envision the universal salvation of personal signifiers, but only after they have repented of what they wrongly signified.

Bakhtin's thought is formed by Orthodox faith and piety, which is centered in *theosis*, or deification, the redeeming work by which we are restored not only in the image of God but into the very Trinitarian life of God. This is our deepest need and our destiny. The open-ended dialogue of meanings is held together by a "constant unity of answerability," and is in this way a

dialogue of faithfulness. Against Descartes and even against Plato, the dialogue of faithfulness denies our self-sufficiency, says Jacobs. I'm not sure that is fair to Descartes, who underscores an infinite openness to infinity, or to Plato's understanding of self-transcendence in devotion to the ideas, but Jacobs is on firm ground when he elects the pitifully misguided Ralph Waldo Emerson as his foil. "It is not the office of a man to receive gifts," declared Emerson. "How dare you give them? We wish to be self-sustained. We do not quite forgive a giver. The hand that feeds us is in some danger of being bitten." How dare the giver of gifts assume that we are somehow deficient?

Jacobs introduces the phrase "Quixotic reading," by which he means the practice of looking into a book or poem and seeing only the reflection of oneself. Once again, I wonder if this is not unfair to Don Quixote, who was undoubtedly deluded but whose delusions opened him to worlds within worlds not contained by unbridled egotism. Here too, Emerson is the man whom Jacobs more fairly skewers. "Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense," Emerson pontificated, "for the utmost in due time becomes the outmost—and our first thought is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. . . . In every work of genius we recognize our own rejected thoughts: they come back to us with a certain alienated majesty." For Emerson, Jacobs observes, "Even works of genius cannot truly be gifts to us: they are merely our own possessions returned to their rightful owner." History and anything else outside the self, declared Emerson, "is an impertinence and an injury, if it be anything more than a cheerful apologue and parable of my being and becoming." Now that is egotism, and egoism, of a very low order, and the negation of the hermeneutics of love and faithfulness.

The Fear of Being Deceived

The opposite of the hermeneutics of love is, of course, the hermeneutics of suspicion, and here Nietzsche is the mad master. According to Nietzsche, the happy person is absolutely self-sufficient, and self-sufficiency is the goal of lifelong struggle. Hell is indeed, as Sartre declared, other people. Every other person is an adversary and Nietzsche's stated goal is "not to cleave to another person, though he be the one you love most—every person is a prison, also a nook and corner." More than that, contact with others is defilement. "Solitude is with us a virtue: it is a sublime urge and inclination for cleanliness which sees that all contact between man and man—in society—must inevitably be unclean. All community

makes somehow, somewhere, sometime—‘common.’” It follows that “every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood.” The sentiment is echoed by the eternally adolescent Emerson: “To be great is to be misunderstood.” (As your fifteen-year-old may have said just yesterday.) The drivenly despairing Nietzsche is often contrasted with the buoyantly exuberant Emerson, but what Jacobs says of the former applies as well to the latter: he is torn “between contempt for all those beneath him and desire for their understanding and approval.” Except Emerson was a showman, while Nietzsche let the tearing go all the way, severing the self into madness.

Nietzsche’s later thought was driven by fear, writes Jacobs. “Above all else he fears being deceived in faith, hope, and love—after all, all three states of mind open one to deception—and would rather suffer anything than the humiliation of being fooled. This may be said to be the very origin of the hermeneutics of suspicion, the adolescent fear of being caught believing in that which others have ceased to believe in.” Nietzsche is often praised for the daring of his thought, says Jacobs, but the daring of his thought may be the product of the excruciating timidity of his way of living. Jacobs’ reading of Nietzsche, Emerson, and other masters of self-sufficiency is incisive and devastating, but is it loving? Will their meanings, too, have a place in the “homecoming festival”? Will they, like the prodigal son, return to receive the Father’s blessing?

People Must Be Amused

The hermeneutics of love, it seems, extends to every text and author. It is, says Jacobs, both “flexible and responsible.” “It will have *universal obligations but highly particular forms of attention*. This is the road to justice, or, as the Bible would have it, to *shalom*.” I am not so sure. The hermeneutics of love, says Jacobs, has a game-like quality, and here he makes charming use of Gradgrind and Sleary in Charles Dickens’ *Hard Times*:

I would like to think that writing a book like this one—that is, making an academic case for governing interpretation by the law of love—bears some analogy to running a circus. To those who would label the project naive, childish, frivolous, foolish, the ringmaster can do little more than simply shrug and continue the game. Indeed, this is the best form of argument available to the circus-owner or the advocate of charitable interpretation. To Gradgrind’s Benthamite arguments, Sleary has no response

except to continue the circus’ performances, and merely to say, as he does more than once, “People mutht be amuthed”—which is not an argument but a kind of imperative declaration: Sleary politely refuses to enter the dialectical arena where Gradgrind brandishes his Benthamite weaponry, but instead contents himself with a) doing something else and b) proclaiming that he is doing something else. “People mutht be amuthed” bears the whole content of Sleary’s kerygma.

Yes, but Alan Jacobs’ kerygma is proclaimed in “making an academic case” that, of necessity, enters “the dialectical arena.” As Sleary’s circus includes the animals and the acts of his choosing, so also Jacobs’ hermeneutical game includes and excludes, and the burden of his book is to explain who is in and who is out, and why. And that, too, is of necessity. Iris Murdoch is right: “Coherence is not necessarily good, and one must question its cost. Better sometimes to remain confused.” With Mikhail Bakhtin one may, in light of the Eschaton, suspend final judgment, even at the cost of incoherence, in the hope that all prodigal meanings will return to receive the Father’s blessing. But that is a hope directed toward the future. Along the way, here and now, decisions must be made about meanings that are, in fact, prodigal. Recognizing that does not mean that one has succumbed to the Reformer’s obsession with “getting it right” or to a Cartesian obsession with self-sufficiency. Discernment and decision are tasks of love, knowing that love can never be separated from justice. The hermeneutics of love indeed leads to a deepening of understanding, including a deepened understanding of why some meanings are wrong. Remembering always that our discernments and judgments are conditioned by the knowledge that “now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known.” We can and should be open to a final surprise when prodigal meanings return, without fudging for a moment the fact that they were prodigal. That they were prodigal makes it possible for them to re-turn—to turn back to the truth that they turned from.

The book is *A Theology of Reading: The Hermeneutics of Love*, and I recommend reading it, lovingly. Even as I have read it, trusting in the assurance of St. Augustine: “Whoever finds a lesson in the text that is useful to the building of charity, even though he has not said what the author may be shown to have intended in that place, has not been deceived, nor is he lying in any way.”

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WHILE WE'RE AT IT

■ More on “The Best Bioethicists that Money Can Buy” (Public Square, March). Professor Carl Elliott of the Center for Bioethics at the University of Minnesota is probably not ingratiating himself with some of his colleagues by publishing in the *American Prospect* a bracing critique titled “Pharma Buys a Conscience.” It is not only the pharmaceutical industry, of course, but it is mainly that industry that bids fair to take over bioethics as a wholly owned subsidiary. Prof. Elliott cites numerous instances in which both medical research and ethical counsel about medical research are provided by people in the employ—frequently the very lucrative employ—of companies that have a steep interest in outcomes. Elliott writes, “Industry-sponsored bioethics programs face problems that parallel those encountered by industry-sponsored medical researchers. What do you do when your scholarly work conflicts with the goals of your industry sponsor? No one is forcing industry money on bioethics programs, but many of them are located in academic health centers, where faculty members are expected to generate money to fund their research either by seeing patients or by obtaining grants. If bioethics is seen as an activity that can attract industry sponsorship, university administrators strapped for cash will inevitably look to industry as a financial solution. All that remains is for bioethicists themselves to dispense with the ethical roadblocks.” Our ethicists have a conflict-of-interest problem? Oh dear, we’d better check with our ethicists on that. Good news: they’ve ruled that there’s no problem. Next question? Of course there are different ways of rationalizing the unseemly circumstance of being a paid piper. Elliott writes: “Defenders of corporate consultation often bristle at the suggestion that accepting money from industry compromises their impartiality or makes them any less objective a moral critic. ‘Objectivity is a myth,’ [one bioethicist] told me. . . . ‘I don’t think there is a person alive who is engaged in an activity who has absolutely no interest in how it will turn out.’ Thomas Donaldson, director of the ethics program at the Wharton School, has compared ethics consultants to the external accounting firms often employed by corporations to audit their financial records. Like accountants, ethicists may be paid by the very industries they are assessing, but they are kept honest by their need to maintain a reputation for integrity. But the comparison of ethicists to accountants is deeply misleading. Ethical analysis does not look anything like a financial audit. If a company is cooking its books and the accountant closes his eyes

to this fact in his audit, the accountant’s transgression can be reliably detected and verified by outside monitors. But how do you detect the transgressions of an ethics consultant? Ethicists have widely divergent views: they come from different religious standpoints, use different theoretical frameworks, profess different political philosophies. They are also free to change their minds at any point. How do you tell the difference between an ethics consultant who has changed her mind for legitimate reasons and one who has changed her mind for money? How do you distinguish between a consultant who has been hired for his integrity and one who has been hired because he supports what the company plans to do? A savvy CEO will have no problem finding an ethicist to say virtually anything. Yet influence is not exactly what’s at issue. If a policeman takes money to overlook a speeding violation and then writes the ticket anyway, he has still accepted a bribe, even if he has not been influenced by it. The point is that certain people in whom public trust is placed must not have a financial interest in violating the duties carried by their institutional role. In this respect, at least, they must be financially disinterested. What is more, they must be seen as disinterested; otherwise, the institution they represent risks falling apart. Judges and jurors, for instance, depend on the appearance of disinterestedness for their fragile hold on public trust. Judges get paid, of course, as do bioethicists and other academics. But the source of that payment is crucial. If we allowed judges to be paid by corporate litigators, they would soon lose their credibility—and rightly so. If bioethicists have gained any credibility in the public eye, it rests on the perception that they have no financial interest in the objects of their scrutiny.” At present, that public credibility, such as it is, is being fast eroded. The pharmaceutical industry is not about to go away, nor should it. And ethical oversight is undoubtedly necessary. But if it is to be done by watchdogs rather than lapdogs, some independent arrangement for their care and feeding will have to be found.

■ Hymns are out, choirs are out, “praise teams” are in. So says Anderson Rearick of Nazarene College in Ohio. It’s part of the “entertainment worship” thing, with members of the praise team scattered around the audience, mikes in hand, making sure that everybody takes hearty part in eighteen reprises of “I love you, Lord, love you, love you, love you.” Rearick, writing in the *Christian Century*, observes: “It’s all to our benefit. After all, if a member of the congregation is filled with jealousy, and thus a carnal heart, the discipline of standing through fifteen choruses of ‘Thank you, Jesus’ will chastise the flesh. And although the words

may sometimes be a mystery, no one should worry. The lyrics are so simple and short that memorization is automatic. And so I say, 'Praise the Lord!', 'Thank you, Jesus!', and 'Awesome is as awesome does.'" Catholics should not sneer, for there is evidence that this slappy-happy kitsch is invading Catholic parishes as well. When it comes to congregational singing, it sometimes seems that American Catholics went directly from silence to decadence without passing through the period of great hymnody.

■ Avery Cardinal Dulles did his usual incisive job in reviewing *Passionate Uncertainty*, the McDonough-Bianchi book on the state of Jesuits today, his incisiveness always being tempered by generosity of spirit (FT, April). Discussing the book in the *New York Review of Books*, Garry Wills notes that the Society of Jesus in the U.S. has declined from 8,393 in 1965 to 3,635 today, with a marked increase in the number of homosexuals. There are more ex-Jesuits in the U.S. today than Jesuits. He writes, "It is not surprising that the numbers of heterosexuals have declined, as many left to marry and others were deterred by the celibacy requirement from entering. The remaining or arriving gays have formed protective networks—the authors call it a 'lavender Mafia'—to provide the sense of community otherwise so hard to come by in the order. Of course, this works against a larger sense of community, since some of the Jesuits interviewed express resentment at being excluded by the gays." Father Raymond Schroth, a Jesuit, comes to a more sanguine conclusion in a review in the *Newark Star-Ledger* (March 3, 2002): "Yet the overall portrait is one of men content in their vocations, who have drawn closer to the person of Jesus while leaving an earlier Almighty God figure behind." In view of recent and much-publicized developments regarding sexual abuse by priests, including Jesuits, one hopes that men who are on such friendly terms with Jesus will be able to get a reintroduction to his Father. One waited to see how *America*, the main Jesuit publication in this country, would deal with the book. The editors assigned it to a social scientist who took issue with the authors' interviewing methodology; observed that, if one read only the statements of those who had good things to say about the Society, one would come away with a better impression of the Society; and suggested that the "inspiring" official Jesuit documents provide "a more reliable picture." There are undoubtedly problems with the McDonough-Bianchi book, as Cardinal Dulles noted, but surely one might have hoped for at least a hint of openness on the part of *America* to the possibility that there is a problem or two in the Society as well. In other contexts, such denial is sometimes called stonewalling.

■ India is the most pervasively religious society in the world and Sweden the most secular, giving rise to Peter Berger's jibe that, in order to understand America's culture wars, one must know that it is a nation of Indians ruled by an elite of Swedes. But things are not going well with religion and society in India, as witness the resent slaughter of five hundred Muslims by Hindu mobs in the western part of the country. Tunku Varadarajan of the *Wall Street Journal's* editorial page notes that Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, had no use for religion of any sort and tried to impose a secular regime from on high. But he knew he couldn't do what Ataturk did in Turkey or the Jacobins during the French Revolution. Varadarajan writes: "India's secularism has, from its inception, offered a contrast to the Jacobin-Turkish model. Religion is not excluded from the political sphere; in fact, there are numerous political parties which have patently religious manifestos. The Bharatiya Janata Party of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee is often described as a 'Hindu nationalist' party, and counts among its extra-parliamentary allies a few groups that are avowedly Hindu-chauvinist. Secularism, in its Indian ideal, emulates some of the ways of the liberal West, which is one reason why Indian democracy—in spite of its flaws—has so many admirers in America and Europe. Religious parties are not proscribed; religiosity is not a bar to political advancement; and religious discrimination is unlawful. The framers of the Indian constitution envisaged a multireligious state whose citizens coexist, with no group enjoying advantage, nor disadvantage, by virtue of religion." Varadarajan is surely right in calling for tolerance in a religiously pluralistic society, and tolerance is most securely grounded in religious belief and practice. One has to wonder why, in advancing his proposal, he uses the Western term "secularism," with all the Jacobin connotations it carries. There would seem to be no better way to guarantee the opposition of those devoted to the flourishing of both religion and democracy.

■ Father Benedict Groeschel is one of the wisest spiritual directors around, and his little essay "Waiting for Grace" is one of the wisest reflections on the pastoral care of homosexuals. It is included in a book, *With Mind and Heart Renewed* (University Press of America), celebrating the ministry of Fr. John Harvey, the founder of Courage, an association of recovering homosexuals. The subtitle of Fr. Groeschel's essay is "The Pastoral Care of Those Who Are Not Yet Disposed to Follow the Commandments." He writes: "The thorny problem of the pastoral care of those who desire to participate in the life of the Church, and who are yet either unwilling or unable to observe its moral

teachings, is one that many pastors and pastoral workers encounter every day. In every good-sized parish there are people beginning to experience a real call to conversion, but who are involved in moral difficulties ranging from invalid marriages and homosexual relationships to addiction to alcohol and drugs. There are others who are unaware of the call to real conversion but who at least want to be a part of the life of the Church, and this desire may indeed be a call of divine grace. The question of the pastoral care of this very needy group presents itself over and over again. What can be done for them without becoming an enabler, someone who out of compassion or need to be agreeable or even guilt, cooperates in another person's immorality or psychological confusion by pretending that a real and ongoing conversion has taken place?" The great difficulty, Fr. Groeschel knows, is in being compassionate without becoming an "enabler" of sinful actions. The essay offers sage counsel on many questions, including how to respond to the claim of homosexuals that "God has made me this way." In ministering to homosexual persons over many years, he has also learned. For instance: "It may come as a surprise to many to know that those who were sexual partners may live in chastity together. I myself know a number of people who once lived together in homosexual relationships who now share the same domicile but lead scrupulously chaste lives as friends. It is conceivable that the only way that they were going to lead a chaste life was with the emotional support of another person struggling with the same difficult adjustment. They now have the love of a chaste friendship. Now it is my pastoral impression that such people, having gained chastity, merely need to communicate to their close circle of relatives and friends that they are living a chaste Christian life, in order to avoid misunderstanding and confusing others. I would not have thought this possible, but we live and learn." Too often, Fr. Groeschel believes, ministries ostensibly aimed at leading those with same-sex desires to the fullness of conversion—as we all need to be led to the fullness of conversion—become part of the problem rather than the solution. "This brings up the oxymoron of 'gay-lesbian ministry.' Truth be told, there is simply no such Christian ministry, any more than there is a ministry to 'drunks.' There is a very needed ministry to homosexual persons and recovering alcoholics. The terms 'gay and lesbian' mean the acceptance of a lifestyle with a commitment to immoral behavior. Homosexual is a condition; gay and lesbian is a decision, a commitment which is powerfully denounced by St. Paul. It is my personal conviction that the accepted use of these terms for a ministry is a profound cause of confusion for the faithful and a dangerous spiritual disservice to

those who have a right to be shepherded by the Church." But the essay, as well as other essays in this fine book, deserves to be read in full.

■ Christianity is ever so much more interesting as a venture of obedience to truth revealed. Yet so many Christians persist in making it up as they go along, living a truth contrived in their own image. "Childless by Choice" is an article in *Prism*, "America's Alternate Evangelical Voice," published by Evangelicals for Social Action. The author explains that when she got married she and her husband assumed they would have children. "But before giving us a child, God called us to steward our other talents." God got her husband into graduate school "and put in my heart a conviction that my gift for writing came with a command to publish." Ergo, no time for children. The author includes a bibliography promoting childlessness, admitting that the books mentioned might not be endorsed by evangelicals. In fact, some of the books mentioned are aggressively anti-Christian and pro-abortion. But, she says, "they're all we have until Christians write their own." She adds, "I do plan to write that book." Being a good evangelical, she of course quotes Scripture in support of her position. "Shout for joy, O barren one, you who have borne no child; break forth into joyful shouting and cry aloud, you who have not travailed; for the sons of the desolate one will be more numerous than the sons of the married woman." That's Isaiah 54, the context being the suffering of the Messiah, which is quite an analogical reach for the author's belief in her mission to publish. She writes, "Paul's comments on not marrying, if single, might have been meant to include not reproducing, if married. It is an alternative call, a radical one even, but it is a call." Why get bogged down in what Paul actually said when he might have said what we think he should have said? The magazine is *Prism*, which is, at times, an alternative to the evangelical voice.

■ It's been ever so long since I've commented on *Christian News*, a collage of news clippings harvested from many sources and published by a Lutheran pastor, Herman Otten, who takes being called a right-winger as a compliment. This item has an old picture of me (you can actually see the few hairs on the top of my head) and reproduces, for the umpteenth time, some left-leaning statements of mine from twenty-five and thirty years ago when I was, with increasing difficulty, trying to maintain my liberal credentials. The point of this story, as of many others in *Christian News*, is that I continue to be invited to speak at Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod institutions, whereas Pr. Otten is not. But what I liked about the item is the

charge, in boldface, that accompanies the picture: "Father Richard Neuhaus Says Non-Christians Can Be Saved With Faith in Christ." I suspect there may be a typo there, but it states my position fairly enough. Of course, I would want to add that it must be a living faith attended by good works.

■ Religion is what a person does with his solitude, William James believed, and Richard Rorty, who claims the legacy of James, agrees. Rorty also claims to be the heir of John Dewey, however, who had a different understanding of the public nature of religion, even proposing his own version of a public religion, which he called "A Common Faith." (See "The American Mind," Public Square, December 2001.) Rorty recently expanded on his understanding of religion in a speech he gave in Germany upon being awarded the Meister Eckhart Prize. He noted the oddity that Eckhart was God-obsessed while he has frequently described himself as an atheist. But the word atheist, Rorty says, is dated and misleading. Both theists and atheists think they have an epistemological or metaphysical disagreement, when in fact religion has been decisively defeated by science and common sense in its claim to describe reality or how we can know what is real. Now Rorty says he is more accurately described as an anticlericalist, which he defines this way: "It is the view that ecclesiastical institutions, despite all the good they do—despite all the comfort they provide to those in need or in despair—are dangerous to the health of democratic societies, so dangerous that it would be best for them eventually to wither away. The dangers that we anticlericalists fear are particularly evident in my own country. The Christian fundamentalists whose support has become indispensable to right-wing American politicians are undermining the secularist, Jeffersonian tradition in American culture. They are making it respectable once again to say that the U.S. is 'a Christian nation'—an assertion that would have been considered, a few decades ago, as in bad taste." Rorty devotes most of his speech to the thought of Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo, who has returned to the Catholicism of his childhood, but with the difference that he now understands that the Incarnation means that God has emptied Himself (the *kenosis* of Philippians 2) of any claim that impinges upon public truth. (I have not read Vattimo, but Rorty's description of his argument in favor of radical secularization seems reminiscent of "secular society" and "death of God" discussions in this country in the 1960s.) Rorty once again sets forth his religious-like commitment to our making a human future that he allows may be utopian, and concludes with this contrast between his view and Vattimo's: "I have no idea how such a society could come about. It is, one

might say, a mystery. That mystery, like that of the Incarnation, concerns the coming into existence of a love that is kind, patient, and endures all things. First Corinthians 13 is an equally useful text for both religious people like Vattimo, whose sense of what transcends our present condition is bound up with a feeling of dependence, and for nonreligious people like myself, for whom this sense consists simply in hope for a better human future. The difference between these two sorts of people is that between unjustifiable gratitude and unjustifiable hope. This is not a matter of conflicting beliefs about what exists and what does not exist. So I should like to think of both Vattimo and myself as having gotten at least a little way past the issue of theism versus atheism." His drawing of the difference between living by gratitude and living by hope is suggestive. Rorty admits he may be deluded in his hope, but only the future can tell. On the other hand, one who is deluded in his gratitude, which necessarily assumes a gift or grace already given, is simply deluded. Is Vattimo right or wrong in being grateful? The response to that question necessarily entails considerations metaphysical and epistemological; in short, considerations of truth. Once again, it would seem, Richard Rorty has failed to escape from the bothersome question of what counts as truth. Moreover, Meister Eckhart, with his wild and wily theological mind, would say that Rorty, who says the one absolute is love, is in fact, whether he knows it or not, speaking of God.

■ Something odd is happening in Protestant groups that used to be strongly opposed to bishops, according to a story in the *Atlanta Constitution*. Once it was "Mister," then "Reverend," then "Doctor," and now it is "Bishop." Or more. The Rev. Miles Fowler of Big Miller Grove Baptist Church is now Bishop Miles Fowler. The popular television preacher is Bishop T. D. Jakes. Earl Paulk of the International Communion of Charismatic Churches is nothing less than Archbishop Paulk. Not to be outdone, Jamie Pleasant of Kingdom Builders Christian Center in Norcross, Georgia, is Apostle Pleasant. The way this is going, we may yet see a return to the time of anti-popes.

■ In his Gifford Lectures, Stanley Hauerwas is sharply critical of William James and Reinhold Niebuhr as representatives of the liberalism he thinks we should reject (see Stephen H. Webb's "The Very American Stanley Hauerwas" elsewhere in this issue). I am inclined to think Niebuhr was more of a believing Christian than Hauerwas allows, but that's for another time. At hand is a review of Hauerwas' book by Richard Wightman Fox, a biographer of Niebuhr. He writes: "*With the Grain of the Universe* shows Christian

and secular liberals why James and Niebuhr are so important to their faith. James, like his hero Whitman, underwrites the quest for novel experience, for becoming more fully human. This was Emerson's way: living one's life in a quest for wider and wider circles of experience. Liberalism is about individuals getting to be who they decide they most truly are, according to their own lights, whether they are women or men, gay or straight, no matter what their color, cultural background, or economic status. Liberal modernity is about choice, and helping others acquire the power to choose. It is about choosing again and again, remaining open throughout one's life to refashioning oneself. This can look like anarchy to many defenders of tradition. But now it is a tradition in its own right, a tradition (in the nineteenth-century U.S. alone) developed by Jefferson, Emerson, Fuller, Douglass, Whitman, Lincoln, Stanton, Anthony, Gilman, Rauschenbusch, Gladden, Debs, Dewey, and James, among many others. It is a tradition that needs defending today more than ever. It is the tradition at the fountainhead of liberal and democratic freedom." That is in some ways an attractive vision of liberalism, but note how incessantly and stiflingly self-referential it is. The alternative view is that the high adventure of life, intellectually and spiritually, is in losing oneself in obedience to upper case Truth, in which, by surprising grace, one finds oneself. I suppose Fox would call that conservative. Another word for it is Christian.

■ One-quarter of the pre-war Jewish community in the Netherlands survived the Holocaust, but it seems doubtful they will survive the way they live now. According to a study reported by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, among the forty-four thousand Dutch Jews, only 28 percent of couples have children, 44 percent under age thirty-five live alone (almost double the rate for the general population), and one-third of the women are still childless at the age of forty. On drugs, homosexuality, euthanasia, and a host of other matters—not least in adapting religion to, as they say, speak to the modern world—the Netherlands is ever so advanced.

■ I was down speaking at Duke University the other week and was reminded that the question of blessing same-sex unions in the Duke chapel, on which I had commented some while back ("When Tolerance Is Trump," Public Square, February 2001), is still a hot issue there, as it should be. Since my comment, my friend William H. Willimon, dean of the chapel, who makes it clear that he does not approve of such blessings and will personally have nothing to do with them, responds in the *Christian Century* to the criticism that he should not have gone along with the

chapel's permitting them. Of a divinity school colleague who says such blessings desecrate a Christian chapel, Willimon asks, "Where was this theologian's protest when the university had the gall to parade in an American flag at opening convocation?" Surely he is not suggesting that displaying the flag is incompatible with Christian morality. Or maybe he is. He writes that the claim that allowing same-sex blessings is "an attack on biblical principles and the United Methodist Church is just plain silly." He explains: "I don't get it. Divorce? Remarriage after divorce? Greed? Those are biblical subjects on which we ought to have no disagreement. Our Lord has expressly forbidden such sin, even though my church has found a way to overlook it, even among our bishops." We overlook divorce, remarriage, and greed, so what's the big deal with homosexual coupling? In view of so much heterosexual misbehavior, Willimon writes, "I think it is in bad taste for me, or any other pastor, to focus on homosexual sin as the worst of sin." It would not only be in bad taste, it would be heretical. Did any of the critics of whom he complains say that homosexual sin is "the worst of sins"? I rather doubt it. He writes, "Richard Hays has written convincingly that, while there is New Testament evidence that the practice of homosexuality is contrary to Pauline views of the self under Christ, there is absolutely no biblical justification for making this the predominant issue for the Church, the supreme test of fidelity." He is at least partly right about that. Certainly it is not the supreme test of fidelity, and it should not be the predominant issue for the Church. But who has made it such a dominant issue for some churches if not homosexual activists who demand that Christians abandon two millennia of biblical and traditional teaching on human sexuality? One semi-plausible argument for Duke's decision is that Duke University and its chapel have long since ceased to be Christian in any meaningful sense of the term. But then, as I said in my earlier comment, the question is: Who decided that, and when, and by what authority? Hasn't Willimon simply caved in the face of a false, even if institutionally entrenched, assumption? And if, in fact, the assumption is correct, why is he dean of a non-Christian chapel? Willimon should work on a better response to his critics. Better yet, he should retract his acquiescence in the decision made by the university administration. "I'm not resigning," he defiantly declares. Good. The only thing missing is an assurance that the Rev. William H. Willimon, minister of the gospel and dean of a chapel dedicated to the lordship of Jesus Christ, is staying to contend for the truth he professes and against the flaccid liberalism that he says he rejects.

■ The nice thing about assigning inexperienced journalists to a story is that the press can invent a whole new world, or, in this case, resurrect realities long dead and buried. John J. Fialka, staff reporter of the *Wall Street Journal*, has just discovered the National Religious Partnership for the Environment, a scattering of mainly mainline Protestants who have joined hands with the Sierra Club and other environmental alarmists. The story goes on and on about what a coup this is, since the churches “set the moral tone for the whole country,” and so forth. “Bob Edgar, general secretary of the National Council of Churches, which represents some fifty million members of U.S. Protestant churches, says . . .” That description of the NCC, common fifty years ago, was perhaps last used some twenty years ago. Today the NCC is largely a letterhead organization with a slew of “member churches,” most of which make no financial contribution, which is why the organization, headed by the former liberal Democratic Congressman Bob Edgar, has a skeleton staff focused on priorities such as paying overdue telephone bills. The more troubling thought is that Mr. Fialka is not inexperienced, that he knows the NCC has simply hitched a free ride with environmental organizations that do have resources, and that he is just shilling for the cause. I prefer to think the article is best explained by ignorance.

■ Mention Gore Vidal and the phrase “acerbic wit” is sure to follow. His métier is more accurately described as full-bore nastiness in the service of a perpetual snit. *Publishers Weekly* comments on a new collection of Vidal rants, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got to Be So Hated*. The reviewer is a bit put off by Vidal’s suggestion that we should try to see the world from the viewpoint of Osama bin Laden, and that Timothy McVeigh of Oklahoma City infamy was a martyr in the libertarian cause. “But in this book, the tone is as important as the text,” says *Publishers Weekly*. “Vidal gleefully skewers American capitalism and the role of the religious right in American politics at every opportunity.” So the book is not all bad.

■ This is a little late, but it should not go unremarked. A few days before Easter, President Bush issued from the White House a message to “Christians around the world [who] celebrate the central event of their faith—the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, whom Christians believe is the Messiah, the Son of God.” The message could not have been more theologically specific. “Jesus’ death stands out in history as the perfect example of unconditional love. The four Gospels of the Christian Bible recount his amazing life, his miraculous death, resurrection, and ascension, and his unending offer of salvation to all.” Referring

to the current war against terrorism, Bush says, “As we fight to promote freedom around the world and to protect innocent lives in America, we remember the call of the Battle Hymn of the Republic: ‘As he died to make men holy, let us live to make men free.’” I don’t know when was the last time that such an explicitly Christian message was issued from the White House, but I suspect it has been a very long time. It received almost no mention in the media and, as far as I know, there was not a word about the “violation of the separation of church and state” from the usual suspects. Was it a good thing to do? Jaded political analysts might say the President was shoring up support among his “Christian constituency”—about 90 percent of the country being Christian of one sort or another—and it cost him nothing. Some thoughtful Christians may admit to a measure of ambivalence about the mixing of Christian faith and piety with the Administration’s foreign and domestic policies. The mixing was minimal, however, noting September 11 and observing that “Americans responded with strength, compassion, and generosity”—which virtues likely have something to do with Christian faith. One friend thought such an explicitly Christian message divisive, since the President is “supposed to represent all the people.” But there is no way Mr. Bush can be a Buddhist to Buddhists or a Muslim to Muslims. He is—not at all incidentally—a Christian. Of course, one might argue that, precisely for that reason, a religious message is “inappropriate,” which is the argument for what someone has called the naked public square. My hunch is that Mr. Bush just thought it would be the right thing to send Easter greetings to his fellow believers, and so he did it. The only wrong note is the misquotation of Julia Ward Howe’s hymn. She wrote, “As he died to make men holy, let us die to make men free.” The more comfortable “live to make men free” appears in many contemporary hymnals (along with “inclusive” substitutes for “men”). The message of Jesus, to follow him in being prepared to die for the right, is the deeper truth. But I don’t want to cavil. The Easter statement was welcome and, as I say, should not go unremarked.

■ The *Washington Times* quotes this from the Easter homily of a Catholic bishop: “Christ is our light in this time. He leads us to apologize humbly and profoundly for past sinfulness, to follow our strict diocesan policy on sexual abuse and misconduct in the future, and to develop additional protocols in order to prevent harm to any member of the Church.” It does not say what biblical text the bishop was expounding, but apparently there was no mention of millstones.

■ “The mores of New Jersey.” The phrase may puzzle

people whose view of New Jersey is formed by watching *The Sopranos*. I can, however, give personal testimony to the fact that there are many people and communities of virtue and sense in that great state. But then there is the matter of the courts in New Jersey and, more specifically, their cutting-edge role in devaluing human life, as in what are called “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” lawsuits (see Jay Webber, “Better Off Dead?” FT, May). The *New Jersey Law Journal*—a journal of, by, and for lawyers—is editorially critical of the French National Assembly for legislating against awarding damages to the parents of a disabled boy “because medical errors allowed him to be born.” He would have been better off dead, and his parents would have been spared great trouble and expense. The *Journal* opines: “Wrongful life and wrongful birth cases implicate deep feelings not just about law, but religion, ethics, and other fundamental values. In a pluralistic society, different people, understandably, may hold different views that are contentious.” Ah yes, that pesky pluralism again. What to do when there are different and contentious “feelings” about fundamental values? Obviously, let it be settled by lawyers who have a bundle to make in the common law of torts as interpreted by very progressive courts. The editorial concludes: “Given the difference between the legal systems and the mores of France and New Jersey, we hesitate to say that the National Assembly reached the wrong decision for France. Suffice it to say, we are satisfied with the state of the law in New Jersey.” “Why the hell not?” as Tony Soprano might say.

■ Bishop Fulton J. Sheen was beyond doubt the most celebrated Catholic cleric of his time, and remains a hero to many today. The end of his life trailed off toward the inglorious, however. After clashing with Cardinal Spellman of New York, he was appointed Archbishop of Rochester, New York, which some (perhaps Sheen as well) viewed as a form of exile. The Second Vatican Council had recently concluded, and Sheen declared his ambition to make Rochester a model of Vatican II reforms. James Hitchcock, St. Louis University historian, reviews Thomas C. Reeve’s *America’s Bishop: The Life and Times of Fulton J. Sheen*, and offers this reflection: “During the council he had supported most changes, at one point even exulting that the gathering ‘undid’ four hundred years of history, although prior to that time he had given no public, and few private, intimations that he thought the Church needed change. Now he seemed often to lose his critical faculties in a rush of euphoria (including President John F. Kennedy in an account of ‘modern saints,’ for example). His brief career in Rochester was a sad story, full of obscure conflicts the

full nature of which are not known, partly because the Sheen archives there are in disarray. What seems to have happened is that he attempted to establish himself as a leader of change, at one point even getting maneuvered by a television interviewer into saying that contraception might be a permissible practice, then found that he had unleashed forces that he could not control. Attacked from both left and right, he was practically forced to retire, and his personally chosen successor went on to make Rochester perhaps the most liberal diocese in the United States, an ironic legacy from a man who for decades epitomized Catholic orthodoxy for millions of people. Sheen’s career illustrates both why the Church was so strong in the United States for so long and also why it began to unravel after 1965. If biography, as used to be thought, is for the purpose of teaching moral lessons—the secrets of both greatness and decline—Archbishop Sheen should perhaps above all be seen as a victim of his own success. At every stage of his career he faced an ambiguous situation in which he could use his great talents to further the kingdom of heaven, yet those very efforts required pursuing the path of ever greater fame and adulation, measuring success by public recognition. Often he seems to have been unable to distinguish between acting for God and acting for himself. But he titled his autobiography *Treasure in Clay*, and of few such flawed vessels has God made more prodigious use.”

■ After his best-selling tribute to his own people, *How the Irish Saved Civilization*, and a second in obeisance to another people who really matter, *The Gifts of the Jews: How a Tribe of Desert Nomads Changed the Way Everyone Thinks and Feels*—which, one notes, is an awful lot like saving civilization—Thomas Cahill does his duty by Catholic liberalism with *Pope John XXIII*, which is part of the Penguin Lives series. It is too much even for liberal *Commonweal*, where Christopher Ruddy writes that the book will be enjoyed by “those who like their biography Manichean-style.” In this case, it’s Good Pope John XXIII against Evil Pope John Paul II. The latter is, according to Cahill, a tyrannical reactionary under whom “we have come full circle and are back in the pontificate of Pius XII.” Ruddy writes: “Only the most hardened of John Paul’s opponents could make such a claim. Diplomatic inertia and regal aloofness are not John Paul’s faults. And the claim that this pontificate is ‘restorationist’ could only be made by someone who has paid only slight attention to the best theology of the last twenty years.” Here is his summing up: “One need not subscribe to papal biographer George Weigel’s flights of hagiography—wherein John Paul’s only faults are that he is sometimes *too* patient, *too* visionary—to realize that Cahill has misjudged the

current pope. Perhaps the time has come to call a cease-fire on polemical contrasts between John and John Paul. Aspects of the present pontificate (including some of those mentioned by Cahill) should be criticized. Ironically, however, Cahill's portrait of John Paul violates the gentleness so characteristic of his hero Good Pope John, and fails to exhibit the 'primacy of charity' that Yves Congar held to be the first condition for all true reform in the Church." It is possible that some may detect in that just a hint of animosity toward Weigel's splendid biography, *Witness to Hope*. With the gentleness so characteristic of this space, I take Ruddy to mean that Weigel's acutely insightful and exquisitely nuanced book is hagiography, which means writing about a saint, which, in my judgment, is what Weigel was doing. In any event, Ruddy is right about the "polemical contrasts" that have become such a liberal convention and only demean John XXIII by making the case for his greatness dependent upon denigrating the greatness of John Paul II.

■ Andy Lamey, writing in the *National Post*, complains about Canadians who complain that "our political culture is biased against religion" and is guilty of "unfairly excluding faith-based perspectives from the so-called naked public square." Nonsense, says Mr. Lamey. He points to provinces that fund religious schools, which is true, although some of them increasingly limit just how religious those schools can be. He notes the existence of Sunday closing laws in some provinces, and that Elizabeth is acknowledged as Queen "by the grace of God," and even that the Mounties can wear wedding rings "as a symbol of their commitment to holy matrimony." In sum, Lamey writes, "church leaders [should admit that] they occupy a position not of victimhood but conspicuous and long-standing privilege." This might not be worth mentioning, except that also in this country one encounters a similar misunderstanding of what is meant by the naked public square. Like Mr. Lamey, people point to various public symbols, often of a vestigial nature, reflecting the cultural influence of Christianity, and suggest that religious leaders or institutions are falsely claiming to be victims. That entirely misses the point. The point is the exclusion of religion and religiously grounded moral arguments from political discourse. That such exclusion is the established practice, more overtly in Canada than here, seems to me to be manifest. See Raymond J. de Souza's analysis of the last Canadian election ("The Politics of Incivility," FT, March 2001), in which any reference to moral argument associated with religion was subjected to vulgar condemnation as a violation of the totally secularist (read naked) public square. Yes, Mr. Lamey is

right, the Mounties are allowed to wear wedding rings, and Elizabeth is queen by the grace of God, and some provinces close stores on Sundays, but at question is the way in which a society deliberates how to rightly order its life together. In that deliberation, only arguments that are not guilty by association with religion are allowed a voice. And, as I say, that is much more the case in Canada than in the U.S.

■ When it came the time to die, his wife Joanie and their three children, ages two to five, gathered by his bed and sang *Dona Nobis Pacem* (Give us your peace). David Orgon Coolidge died in peace as they were singing. David was a friend. A man without guile and with bottomless good humor. He put his enormous energy into launching the Marriage Law Project, working closely with the Ethics and Public Policy Center and the law school of Catholic University, both in Washington. His project became the clearing and coordinating center for the legal defense of marriage against revisionist campaigns for, inter alia, same-sex marriage. He fought well, and he fought clean, and he never let the fight consume him. Then came the brain cancer and months of vigil that led a large network of family and friends into new intensities of prayer and caring. David Orgon Coolidge. May choirs of angels greet him on the far side of Jordan.

■ "Companions on the Sacred Journey: An Interfaith Conference Celebrating Love, Compassion, and Spiritual Wisdom." Well, I'm certainly for all those good things. Scheduled for next month at Princeton University, it is presented by the chapel ministry of the university and funded by something called The Infinity Foundation (which one may assume is not only far out but farthest out). The conference is exquisitely inclusive, with Rabbi Marcia Prager offering "Jewish spiritual wisdom that draws from the wisdom of other paths as well," and therapist Joan Borysenko offering an exciting alternative to "patriarchal" oppression, it being the sad case that "in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the map for the spiritual journey was written by men for other men." The Venerable Gelongma Trime Lhamo, a Buddhist nun, will demonstrate "practices that develop the healing properties of your own mind," while "behavioral neurologist" Susan Mickel will show how Buddhist *vipassana* meditation "helps us see clearly into the true nature of our embodied hearts and minds, and into the nature of reality." Paul Rasor, a Unitarian Universalist minister, will explain why materialism leads to violence, and Father Robert E. Kennedy, a Jesuit and Zen Master, will enhance "appreciation of the practice of what is good in the world's religions." Among many other attractions, Robin Becker, teacher and dancer, will

explain how “the longing to remember, unite with, and live our divine inheritance is the heart of Sufi practice.” Dr. Robert K. C. Forman, executive editor of the *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, will explore what may be the constitutive question posed by the conference: “Might it be possible to forge communities of the spirit yet not sacrifice our own beliefs, insights, and experiences on the altar of traditional religious creeds and institutions?” I have this hunch that his answer is that it is possible. For three days in June, Princeton offers a wondrous array of alternative altars, turning itself into a veritable Wal-Mart of unabashed spiritual consumerism, requiring no sacrifice other than the \$200 registration fee. Only in America. Love it or leave it.

■ I have often quoted Herbert Butterfield to the effect that realism is a boast, not a school of thought. That is often the case, especially in discussions of public policies, foreign and domestic, as they touch on the dynamics of interest and power. Philosophically, however, realism is also a school of thought. In his recently published intellectual biography, *A Mind's Matter* (Eerdmans), Stanley L. Jaki—priest, scientist, philosopher, and theologian—looks back on a long and productive life, and is inclined to settle scores with anyone and everyone who ever disagreed with him. Along the way, he offers this suggestive description of what it means to be a philosophical realist. “Heavy reliance on the phrase, ‘objects do object,’ or some equivalent of it, such as ‘objects are here to object,’ could at least convey the measure to which commitment to realism has become with me nothing short of a methodical obsession. For in order to be a realist it is just not enough to stand by the primacy of objective reality. As a historian and philosopher of physics I saw some egregious examples of how inadequate such a stance can be. Einstein’s is a classic case. So are Pauli’s words to Born that Einstein’s refusal to accept the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics was rooted not so much in a connection between causality and exact measurements as in an obsession with the primacy of the physically real. Pauli had only ridicule for that obsession. But in the absence of such an obsession the most inadequate, indeed half-baked, philosophies can be grafted onto excellent physics. These philosophies may amount to no more than the individual physicist’s rumination about his own universe. Obsession with the real ought to be articulated systematically, if it is to turn into a well-reasoned message. Yet this means much more than just to be systematic in one’s realism. Preoccupation with a system may, in fact, distract one’s attention from what gives life to the system, namely, the very starting point of one’s

philosophizing. Realism has to be methodical, that is, a continual return to what one has most consciously taken for one’s primary step. This is something more than what I said about the importance of the first step taken in any activity. Continual return to that first step, to an ever fresh reconsideration of what it means, of what it implies, is what gives life to one’s realism in philosophy. What I would say now is that a true realist, a true objectivist, should never tire of taking an ever fresh look at that primary step of his. He should be ready to test it again and again against ever new problems, tasks, and possibilities, in fact against all of one’s major concerns.” Father Jaki is today honored as a leading Catholic conservative, but he persists in thinking of himself as a liberal. The problem is with what has happened to liberalism, especially in the Church. “Liberal theologians and their journalist allies writing on religion hand down in any given month more infallible statements than all the popes in two thousand years. At the same time they keep denouncing dogmatism.” So in what sense is he a liberal? He answers: “The liberalism I believed in from early on simply meant an openness to the immense variety in which the real encounters us and, hopefully, we encounter the real. In other words, my liberalism seems to have been an integral aspect of a realism that held me in its grip from early on.” One wishes such liberalism, and Fr. Jaki, *ad multos annos*.

■ That wickedly keen social observer David Brooks has this in the *Atlantic Monthly*: “The New Age quest is for those who have a bias toward self-discovery techniques that are performed while barefoot. It suits men who believe that everyday life is full of trivial distractions and who want to discover inner joys and deep harmonies, which can then be used as fodder for self-adoring monologues before captive dinner-party audiences. The quest usually starts with a few afternoons in the spirituality section of the local bookstore. Several months of journal keeping, bread making, yoga classes, and suburban Buddhist epiphanies follow. Pretty soon Hermann Hesse novels begin to seem intelligent; the garage has been transformed into a pottery studio; the days start with chants to Eos, Goddess of the Dawn; and it seems like a good idea to grow a ponytail on the back of your head even though there’s no hair left on top. This spiritual mid-life crisis is the near exclusive province of a certain kind of soft-spoken, upscale Democrat.” That’s very nice, although I know some Republicans and a great many Independents (as in the herd of independent minds) who fit the picture. Which reminds me of a comment read somewhere recently that in the center of the monstrosity held up for adoration by our culture is a mirror.

■ The Woodstock Theological Center, a Jesuit enterprise, takes on the tough questions. This is from the announcement for a forum on religion in the public square: "This discussion will examine two forms of radical religion in public life: the uncompromisingly nonviolent as modeled by Mahatma Gandhi and Dorothy Day, and the unflinchingly violent as represented by Osama bin Laden and Timothy McVeigh. By way of contrast, we shall also discuss how God may be found along more moderate paths amid the ambiguity and compromise of public life." Somehow I don't think they mean "more moderate" than Mahatma Gandhi and Dorothy Day. Then there is this: "Some claim that each of the following lived fully integrated, publicly uncompromising religious lives: Dorothy Day, Mother Teresa, Osama bin Laden, and Timothy McVeigh. Can we grant their search for religious integrity yet distinguish between them? On what grounds?" How to distinguish? Oh, that's a tough one. Dorothy Day and Mother Teresa were women? They were Catholics? No? I give up.

■ A reader reports that Melrose United Church in Hamilton, Ontario, posted this mantra on its bulletin board last Palm Sunday: "Jesus Christ and Judas are both movements of a single dance." Our puzzled reader thought we might want to join in pondering that. I think I hear the sound of thousands of one hand clappings.

■ "Can There Be a Decent Left?" When that question, with its implication that there is not now a decent left, is asked by the editor of *Dissent*, the chief intellectual journal of the left, attention should be paid. And when that editor is Michael Walzer, the much respected political philosopher of Princeton, very careful attention should be paid. In the fall of last year, he writes, the left did its best to organize opposition to the war on terrorism, arguing that it was unjust in its cause and/or consequences, or unwinnable as in "another Vietnam." Walzer writes: "But among last fall's antiwar demonstrators, 'Stop the bombing' wasn't a slogan that summarized a coherent view of the bombing—or of the alternatives to it. The truth is that most leftists were not committed to having a coherent view about things like that; they were committed to opposing the war, and they were prepared to oppose it without regard to its causes or character and without any visible concern about preventing future terrorist attacks." And that raises some larger considerations: "The radical failure of the left's response to the events of last fall raises a disturbing question: Can there be a decent left in a superpower? Or more accurately, in the only superpower? Maybe the guilt produced by living in such a country and enjoying its privileges

makes it impossible to sustain a decent (intelligent, responsible, morally nuanced) politics. Maybe festering resentment, ingrown anger, and self-hate are the inevitable result of the long years spent in fruitless opposition to the global reach of American power. Certainly, all those emotions were plain to see in the left's reaction to September 11, in the failure to register the horror of the attack or to acknowledge the human pain it caused, in the schadenfreude of so many of the first responses, the barely concealed glee that the imperial state had finally gotten what it deserved. Many people on the left recovered their moral balance in the weeks that followed; there is at least the beginning of what should be a long process of self-examination. But many more have still not brought themselves to think about what really happened." The left has no future, he says, if it persists in pitting itself against sympathetic identification with America. "I grew up with the Americanism of the Popular Front in the 1930s and 1940s; I look back on it now and think that the Communist Party's effort to create a leftist pop culture in an instant, as the party line turned, was kitschy and manipulative—and also politically very smart. Paul Robeson's 'Ballad for Americans,' whatever the quality of the music, provides at least a sense of what an unalienated American radicalism might be like. The days after September 11 would not have been a bad time for a popular front. What had happened that made anything like that unthinkable?" Walzer specifies four factors leading to the bankruptcy of the left. The first is an "ideology" that reflects the lingering effects of the Marxist theory of imperialism and the third-worldist doctrines of the 1960s and 1970s. "We may think that we live in a post-ideological age, and maybe most of us do, but the traces of old ideologies can be found everywhere in the discourse of the left. Perhaps the most striking consequence is the inability of leftists to recognize or acknowledge the power of religion in the modern world. Whenever writers on the left say that the root cause of terror is global inequality or human poverty, the assertion is in fact a denial that religious motives really count. Theology, on this view, is just the temporary, colloquial idiom in which the legitimate rage of oppressed men and women is expressed." The second factor, following from the first, is that the left has turned itself into a permanent elite of "internal aliens." The left despairs of ever exercising power, and therefore cannot speak responsibly to those who do. In its self-indulgence, it does not even desire to exercise power. "But what really marks the left, or a large part of it, is the bitterness that comes with abandoning any such desire. The alienation is radical. How else can one understand the unwillingness of people who, after all,

live here, and whose children and grandchildren live here, to join in a serious debate about how to protect the country against future terrorist attacks? There is a pathology in this unwillingness, and it has already done us great damage." The third and fourth factors have to do with delusions of moral purity that preclude the recognition that there are evils in the world that we have the right, and obligation, not only to criticize but to oppose. "The world (and this includes the third world) is too full of hatred, cruelty, and corruption for any left, even the American left, to suspend its judgment about what's going on. It's not the case that because we are privileged, we should turn inward and focus our criticism only on ourselves. In fact, inwardness is one of our privileges; it is often a form of political self-indulgence. Yes, we are entitled to blame the others whenever they are blameworthy; in fact, it is only when we do that, when we denounce, say, the authoritarianism of third-world governments, that we will find our true comrades—the local opponents of the maximal leaders and military juntas, who are often waiting for our recognition and support. If we value democracy, we have to be prepared to defend it, at home, of course, but not only there." Walzer concludes with the declaration, "The left needs to begin again." Agreeing with the gist of his argument about what has gone wrong with the left, and what it got wrong from the start, and in no way meaning to be flippant, the obvious response to that concluding declaration is, Why? The clear, if implicit, answer to his title question is that there cannot be a decent left, or at least not a decent left in recognizable continuity with the left that was and is. A better conclusion is that the left needs to be given a decent burial. Which, in fact, Michael Walzer's remarkable article may be doing.

■ Some readers have asked, with a note of puzzlement, what I mean when I write in my recent book *As I Lay Dying* that I came better to appreciate why I had always found so unconvincing the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*. Much better, I wrote, is *Cogitor ergo sum*—I am thought, therefore I am. There are many literary references in the book, but I had not come across this before. It is a 1929 poem by C. S. Lewis:

*Master, they say that when I seem
To be in speech with you,
Since you make no replies, it's all a dream
— One talker aping two.*

*They are half right, but not as they
Imagine; rather, I
Seek in myself the things I meant to say,
And lo! the words are dry.*

*Then, seeing me empty, you forsake
The Listener's role, and through
My dead lips breathe and into utterance wake
The thoughts I never knew.*

What they say is half right, Lewis says, and when he knows that he knows his own emptiness into which God speaks "the thoughts I never knew."

*And thus you neither need reply
Nor can; thus, while we seem
Two talking, thou art One forever, and I
No dreamer, but thy dream.*

Exactly. *Cogitor ergo sum*. The poem is in Stephen Medcalf's review of Denis Donoghue's *Adam's Curse: Reflections on Religion and Literature* (University of Notre Dame Press) and, while I'm at it, there is also Medcalf's insightful comment on the claim that Milton in *Paradise Lost* portrays an Arian, not-quite-God, Christ and, in addition, has no place for the Holy Spirit. Not so, writes Medcalf. "But the opening of *Paradise Lost*, when Milton invokes the Holy Spirit instead of the Muse, makes it clear that in Milton's hope the Spirit will, like the Muse in the *Iliad*, be not only present but omnipresent in the poem. As in Lewis' understanding of prayer, everything in *Paradise Lost* is sung or said by the Spirit. No more than in prayer will this always work out in fact. The Spirit can only work through Milton and through human language. But that is the paradigm, and in such magnificent lines as 'As thus the Filial Godhead answering spake,' we feel not only the explicit presence of the Son in His relation with the Father, but the implicit presence of the Spirit. The poem is not Arian, but fully Trinitarian." I am thought, therefore I am; I am spoken, therefore I am.

■ The airing of an hour-long interview on *Booknotes* with Brian Lamb is scheduled for a Sunday evening in May at eight o'clock EDT and rerun at eleven. The occasion is my recent book, *As I Lay Dying: Meditations Upon Returning*, and the discussion covers my life and work, the continuing influence of the sixties and seventies, the clerical and sexual disarray in the Catholic Church, and much else, including *As I Lay Dying*. I think you might enjoy the program. *Booknotes* is broadcast on C-Span, and you can check TV listings for the day of showing. And, since you may have been about to ask, *As I Lay Dying* is selling very nicely and getting good reviews. Thank you for having been about to ask.


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
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
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
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
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